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ABSTRACT 
This Article reevaluates the original meaning of “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause. The 
dominant view of that word holds that it refers only to breaks between official Senate sessions. By 
identifying new evidence and correcting mistaken interpretations, this Article finds support only 
for the conclusion that the original public meaning of “recess” was ordinary and broad, referring 
to any time when a legislative body is not conducting business. The evidence does not support any 
particular limitation on recesses, although it does not rule out the possibility that one existed. For 
those seeking to limit “recess,” the Article poses four reasonable nonoriginalist limiting 
constructions. It also considers whether the divergence in views on “recess” can be attributed to 
methodological differences among originalists and finds that explanation improbable. Finally, the 
Article makes two general points that arise from its analysis: it may be more difficult than is widely 
appreciated to establish a specialized original meaning, and scholars making originalist claims 
should provide clear accounts of the scope and limitations of their research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
After more than a decade of skirmishes between the President and 
the Senate over the Recess Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court 
largely settled the matter in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Can-
ning.1  Constitutional scholars anticipated that the case might be his-
torically significant in two ways.  First, the Court might dramatically 
alter the balance of power between the President and the Senate by 
giving one of them a firm upper hand in appointments.2  Second, the 
case might produce a constitutional rarity:  a Supreme Court decision 
squarely grounded in the original meaning of the Constitution.3  In 
fact, Noel Canning largely preserves recent practice regarding recess 
appointments.  Indeed, in permitting appointments during intra-
session recesses longer than nine days,4 as well as recesses from three 
to nine days long if justified by genuine need in unusual circum-
stances,5 the majority made a point of “put[ting] significant weight 
upon historical practice.”6 
The role of originalism in the opinions, however, is more compli-
cated.  The dissent-like concurrence, written by Justice Antonin Scal-
 
 1 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 573 U.S. __ (2014). 
 2 The President urged the Court to permit recess appointments liberally so that he could 
circumvent the Senate’s advice and consent authority.  The challenger asked the Court to 
authorize the Senate to block virtually all presidential appointments, recess or otherwise, 
and leave the President unable to govern effectively.  See David J. Arkush, The Senate and 
the Recess Appointments, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 1 (2013). 
 3 Cf. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (noting the rarity of cases like 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in which “original understandings [take] 
center stage”); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
411, 420–32 (2013) (arguing that the “new originalist” emphasis on original public mean-
ing has exerted a “gravitational force” on the Supreme Court even though its decisions 
rarely rely explicitly on original public meaning). 
 4 NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 20–21 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (“[W]e have 
not found a single example of a recess appointment made during an intrasession recess 
that was shorter than 10 days.”). 
 5 Id. at 21 (“We . . . leave open the possibility that some very unusual circumstance—a na-
tional catastrophe, for instance, that renders the Senate unavailable but calls for an ur-
gent response—could demand the exercise of the recess-appointment power during a 
shorter break.”). 
 6 Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
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ia, purports to be grounded in the original meaning of the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  It adopts a view promoted by originalist schol-
ars in recent years, which rapidly has become the predominant view 
of the Clause’s original meaning.  This Article presents new evidence 
and argument that this view of the original meaning of the Clause is 
almost certainly mistaken, at least regarding the word recess, and like-
ly regarding the word happen as well.  Curiously, the majority, while 
not expressly originalist, comes closer to reflecting the Clause’s origi-
nal meaning. 
Until recently, all three branches of government believed that “re-
cess” for constitutional purposes has an ordinary, general meaning 
that refers to any time the Senate is not sitting for business, with the 
possible limit of a minimum duration.  That longstanding consensus 
began to erode rapidly after the publication of a 2005 law review arti-
cle by Michael Rappaport arguing that “recess” originally had a nar-
row, specialized meaning.7  In Rappaport’s view, the Clause contem-
plated only the long breaks between annual, formal sessions of the 
Senate, which in the present day are sometimes called “inter-session” 
recesses.8  Rappaport also argues that the President may only fill a va-
cancy if it arises during the relevant recess.9  The combination of the-
se positions would all but read the Recess Appointments Clause out 
of the Constitution.  In the present day, inter-session recesses are of-
ten very short, and sometimes the Senate does not take one at all.10 
This new position on the meaning of “recess,” which we may call 
the “technical” or “narrow” view,11 gained influence rapidly, with the 
 
 7 Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1487, 1491 (2005). 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id. 
 10 JT. COMM. ON PRINTING, 112TH U.S. CONG., CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 535–38 (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CDIR 
[hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY] (providing the commencement adjournment 
dates for the first eighty Congresses as well as recess dates).  The Senate does not appear 
to have taken a recess between the first and second sessions of the 111th Congress. On 
December 30, 2011, the Senate adjourned until January 3, 2012, without ending its first 
session.  See 157 Cong. Rec. S8793.  The second session began when the Senate met on 
January 3, 2012.  See 158 Cong. Rec. S1. 
 11 Naming positions is a difficult task.  Rappaport labels his view the “inter-session” position. 
Id. at 1547.  This Article eschews that name because views may differ on the meaning of 
“session,” rendering the label “inter-session” more confusing than illuminating.  As an 
example, one might adopt the view that the Clause permits appointments only during 
“inter-session” breaks and that “session” is not limited to official Senate sessions.  Perhaps 
a session for purposes of the Clause is any work period between breaks of one week or 
more.  See infra text accompanying notes 361–69.  This position is no less “inter-session,” 
but it contemplates a much broader set of appointments than Rappaport’s.  When possi-
ble, it is useful to name viewpoints based on unique characteristics.  Rapport’s view is 
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D.C. Circuit and Third Circuit adopting it in 2013 to strike down re-
cess appointments by President Barack Obama,12 and the four con-
curring Supreme Court Justices adopting it in Noel Canning.13  Be-
cause the narrow views of both “recess” and “happen” had become 
almost universally viewed as correct but stood in stark contrast to 
longstanding practice, Noel Canning was framed as a clash between 
text and tradition, original meaning and historical practice.14 
This Article argues that the narrow, technical position on “recess” 
is mistaken as a matter of original meaning.  Many contemporary 
originalists distinguish between “interpretation,” the work of ascer-
taining original public meaning, and “construction,” the act of sup-
plementing original meaning where it is ambiguous or vague.15  This 
Article’s claim is that, as matter of interpretation, the evidence on 
“recess” supports only the conclusion that the word’s original public 
meaning was ordinary and general, just as it is today.  By “ordinary” 
and “general,” this Article means that “recess” was not limited to a 
particular, technical type of break, such as the break between formal 
Senate sessions. 
Within the broad original meaning of recess, there exist some rea-
sonable narrowing constructions of the word, but the technical posi-
tion is not one of them.  The Senate likely has some authority under 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause to define its recesses and sessions for 
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, and the President may 
have some interpretive role as well.  One might reasonably believe 
 
alone in turning on formal or official Senate sessions.  Naming it the “formal” position 
seems improper, as that label carries overtones of formalistic legal analysis and discus-
sions of formalism and pragmatism in separation of powers cases.  “Technical” and “nar-
row” are better descriptors, as Rappaport’s position relies on technical definitions rather 
than ordinary meanings and it adopts the narrowest possible meaning of the relevant 
terms. 
 12 See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We hold 
that ‘the Recess of the Senate’ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only inter-
session breaks.”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the presidential appointments in question were invalid under the “Recess Appoint-
ments Clause of the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3”).  
 13 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (asserting that “the President lacked the authority” to make the appointments at 
issue). 
 14 Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Noel Canning, No. 12-1281 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) 
(questioning by Justice Antonin Scalia asking, “What do you do when there is a practice 
that—that flatly contradicts a clear text of the Constitution? Which—which of the two 
prevails?”); Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession:  Recess Appointments and the 
Role of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 965, 966–67 
(2013) (laying out his “minority” position favoring “original interpretation” of the Clause 
versus the meaning that has evolved through history). 
 15 See infra text accompanying notes 282–90. 
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that there should be pragmatic limits on appointment-enabling re-
cesses, such as a minimum duration.  Or perhaps “recess” refers to 
any break of some significance, such as the breaks between periods of 
ordinary legislative business—what contemporary senators refer to as 
“recesses” between “work periods.”16  Finally, it is possible that the on-
ly limit on “recess” is whatever the political process bars as a practical 
matter. 
Evidence for each of these positions is too weak to support the 
conclusion that it was the exclusive original public meaning of “re-
cess” in the late eighteenth century, but each is a reasonable elabora-
tion or construction of the term.  Among the constructions, this Article 
favors a “work period” view under which the President may make uni-
lateral appointments during breaks, usually one week or longer, be-
tween ordinary periods of Senate business.17  The Senate appears to 
have adopted this position implicitly.  It is also the most likely candi-
date for what the Framers meant by “recess” if they envisioned any-
thing short of the broadest definition.  This Article would further 
supplement that construction with a rule that is consistent with the 
purpose of the Clause and that the Senate would likely accept if rele-
vant circumstances were to arise:  the President can also make ap-
pointments when the need is urgent and the Senate is actually una-
vailable. 
Part I of this Article presents the evidence for the ordinary, broad 
reading of “recess.”  Historical dictionaries strongly support it.  Nine 
ratification-era state constitutions appear to use “recess” in its ordi-
nary, general sense, and none clearly uses it narrowly.  Every unam-
biguous use of “recess” in the records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion is general.  Examples of general usage can also be found in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law, Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 Manu-
al of Parliamentary Practice, the records of the House of Commons, and 
records of state legislative proceedings in the years before the Consti-
tution’s drafting.  In one of the most compelling pieces of evidence, 
state legislative practices varied regarding the styling of sessions and 
recesses in the ratification era.  An identical recess would have been 
“intra-session” in New Jersey and “inter-session” in Massachusetts.  
This variation makes it almost inconceivable that provisions of the 
United States Constitution would turn on the strict, formal applica-
tion of any particular understanding of words like “recess” and “ses-
sion.”  Multiple structural inferences from the Constitution also sup-
 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 362–63. 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 361–69. 
Oct. 2014] THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS  167 
 
port a general reading of “recess.”  The Rules of Proceedings Clause 
of Article I grants the Senate the authority to define its own sessions 
and recesses.  This Clause is inconsistent with the notion that the Re-
cess Appointments Clause draws strict, technical distinctions based on 
the words “session” and “recess,” as those distinctions would effective-
ly limit the Senate’s ability to control its own practices.  Moreover, the 
Senate Vacancy Clause triggers state selection of senators during the 
“recess” of a state legislature.  It is even more implausible that the 
Constitution implicitly prescribes, or turns on, a strict plan for state 
legislative practice regarding sessions and recesses.  The Constitution 
also distinguishes between sessions of Congress and sessions of each 
house of Congress, further undermining the notion that the docu-
ment embeds any particular prescription regarding sessions or re-
cesses. 
Part II reviews the evidence for the technical position and finds it 
wanting.  Proponents of that position rely mostly on a few usage ex-
amples that, on close inspection, do not support a narrow reading of 
“recess.”  The two texts on which they rely most heavily—the ratifica-
tion-era Constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire—use 
“recess” to refer to intra-session, not inter-session, breaks.  Supporters 
of the technical position also attempt to draw on a constitutional dis-
tinction between “adjournments” and “recesses,” but they misread the 
text. 
The strongest support for the technical position derives not from 
textual sources, as most theories of originalism prescribe, but from 
twenty-first-century reasoning about the Framers’ goals and expecta-
tions.  As for goals, it is said that the Framers should have wanted the 
shortest possible terms for recess appointees, should have crafted a 
bright-line rule to prevent the President from circumventing the Sen-
ate, and should have limited the President’s unilateral appointment 
power to very long recesses.  Each of these assertions contradicts the 
plain text of the Recess Appointments Clause.  Some also contradict 
its universally accepted purposes, and none is supported by evidence 
of the Framers’ actual intent.  Moreover, to the extent that the pro-
posed policies have merit, a general reading of “recess” serves them 
as well as the technical position, if not better. 
The technical position also draws support from a narrative about 
the Framers expectations for congressional practice:  “recess” in the 
Clause must mean “inter-session recess” because that is the only type 
of recess the Framers expected the Senate to take.  Most scholars, 
originalists and nonoriginalists alike, reject using arguments about 
the Framers’ expectations as a trump card in constitutional analysis 
because such claims involve counterfactual guesswork and carry a 
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high risk of motivated reasoning.  Indeed, the “inter-session-
expectations” narrative, as we can call it, ignores important historical 
evidence:  the records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that 
some delegates believed the Senate would stay in session continually.  
Perhaps those delegates therefore would have expected most Senate 
recesses to occur during its formal session.  At a minimum, the Fram-
ers would have had difficulty predicting how the Senate would style 
and enumerate its formal sessions and recesses. 
It is also not difficult to generate other persuasive stories about 
the Framers’ expectations.  One is what we might call a “military-
responsiveness” narrative:  the recess appointment power and related 
federal and state powers were established in the shadow of existential 
threats of violence, both foreign and domestic, which make nonsen-
sical the notion that the powers would turn on the vagaries of legisla-
tive procedure.  The point was to give the President, particularly but 
not exclusively when acting as Commander in Chief, the power to act 
quickly to respond to crises when the Senate is unavailable.  On this 
view, to restrict the Recess Appointments Clause to formal inter-
session recesses would undermine some of the Constitution’s most 
important, expressly granted federal powers. 
Part III comments briefly on the original meanings of “session” 
and “happen,” making initial observations based on the most im-
portant evidence.  That evidence suggests that “session” did not have 
a narrow technical, meaning, which casts further doubt on the possi-
bility that “recess” had a narrow meaning.  The technical position de-
fines recesses as breaks between official Senate sessions.  If “session” 
was not used in this technical sense, then it is highly unlikely that “re-
cess” was.  Regarding “happen,” this Article observes that the domi-
nant, narrow view has less evidentiary support than is commonly be-
lieved, and the broader view more support.  The “happen” question 
would benefit from more thorough research akin to this Article’s in-
quiry into “recess.” 
Despite the evidence against the technical position on “recess,” 
several prominent originalists have endorsed it.  Part IV asks whether 
the divergence between this Article’s and their conclusions can be at-
tributed to differences in methodology.  It examines four contempo-
rary theories of originalism and concludes in most cases that meth-
odological differences are an improbable explanation.  Part IV also 
considers whether and how one might restrict the definition of an 
appointment-enabling “recess” despite the lack of evidence that the 
term’s original meaning was restricted in any particular way.  In the 
parlance of originalist theory, this is an exercise in “construction” ra-
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ther than “interpretation,” of supplementing what we know about 
original meaning rather than discerning that meaning conclusively. 
Part IV then makes two points for contemporary originalist in-
quiry and debate that arise from this Article’s analysis and the sharp 
disagreement over the original meaning of “recess.”  First, some 
originalists may underappreciate the difficulty of establishing narrow 
or specialized original meanings of particular terms.  Second, be-
cause of originalism’s goal of objectivity, its special claim to authority, 
and the difficulties inherent in conducting originalist inquiries, 
originalist scholars should work to establish a set of standards or 
methods that promote quality, rigor, and thoroughness in originalist 
research.  As a starting point, this Article proposes that originalists 
provide thorough and frank accountings of the scope and limitations 
of the research on which they rely. 
I.  THE ORDINARY READING OF RECESS 
In recent years, two interpretive questions have arisen under the 
Recess Appointments Clause.  One is whether the President can make 
recess appointments only during breaks between formal Senate ses-
sions (“inter-session” recesses) or also during other Senate breaks 
(“intra-session” recesses).  A second question is whether the President 
may fill vacancies only if they arise during a given recess, or also those 
that existed before the recess began.  This Article touches only briefly 
on the latter question. 
 
A.  Ordinary Reading:  Text and Structure 
1.  Text:  Dictionary Evidence and Interpretive Default Rules 
The Recess Appointments Clause states: 
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall 
expire at the End of their next Session.18 
When analyzing the word recess, we start with its ordinary, common-
sense meaning, as evidenced by contemporaneous dictionaries.  It 
appears to be universally accepted that the ordinary meaning of “re-
cess” refers to any legislative break, both now and in early America.  
The 1755 and 1785 editions of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language define “recess” in relevant part as “[r]emission or sus-
 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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pension of any procedure” and provide the following usage example:  
“I conceived this parliament would find work, with convenient recess-
es, for the first three years.”19  Noah Webster’s 1828 American Diction-
ary of the English Language defines the term similarly, as “Remission or 
suspension of business or procedure; as, the house of representatives 
had a recess of half an hour.”20  The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
defines recess, in relevant part, as “a period of cessation from usual 
work or employment” and identifies its early use as having been 
“chiefly of Parliament” before expanding to schools.21  The OED’s us-
age examples, which are from the 1600s and 1700s, do not limit the 
word to a specific recess.22 
In standard textual analysis, two related presumptions establish 
that one’s default position in interpreting the term recess should be 
its broad, ordinary meaning.  The first holds that terms are to be giv-
en their ordinary meaning unless there is good evidence for some 
other meaning, which usually comes from contextual cues.23  This 
principle applies to the interpretation of the Constitution as well as 
statutes.24  Second, a general term like “recess” is read as applying 
 
 19 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1650 (1755), available at 
http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=1650 [hereinafter JOHNSON 
1755] (attributing the statement to King Charles I); 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 469 (6th ed. 1785), available at http://publicdomainreview.org/
collections/samuel-johnsons-dictionary-of-the-english-language-1785/ [hereinafter 
JOHNSON 1785]. 
 20 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 428 (1828). 
 21 THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1525 (1991). 
 22 See e.g., id. (quoting, the 1620 Journal of the House of Lords, “They [sc. the Commons] 
humbly desire to know the Time of the Recess of this Parliament, and of the Access again 
as They may accordingly depart and meet again at the same Time their Lord-ships shall”); 
id. (quoting a 1706 Royal speech printed in the London Gazette as stating, “[i]t would be 
convenient to make a recess in some short time”). 
 23 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012) (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic 
rule of interpretation . . . .  Interpreters should not be required to divine arcane nuances 
or to discover hidden meanings.”); see also Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1494 (“If two inter-
pretations are possible, but one uses the language in a more natural or common way, 
then the more natural interpretation governs unless purpose, structure, and history pro-
vides evidence strong enough to outweigh the impact of the greater naturalness of the 
usage.”).  Where a text concerns law, legal terms are typically given their ordinary legal 
meanings.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 73 (“And when the law is the subject, 
ordinary legal meaning is to be expected, which often differs from the common mean-
ing.”).  This point makes no difference regarding the words “recess.”  The broad and nar-
row readings of the word are both contextually appropriate, legal meanings; each applies 
to legislative breaks.  The relevant distinction is that the general meaning is ordinary and 
the narrow reading is specialized, or a term of art, even in discussions limited to legisla-
tures. 
 24 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 69 (“‘[E]very word in the constitution is to be 
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some 
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generally, absent good reason to read it narrowly.25  This latter prin-
ciple typically holds in the face of arguments that the drafters actually 
had a narrower objective in mind26 or could not have imagined the 
present application.27  To be clear, these interpretive principles are 
only rebuttable presumptions, not rules of law, and it is impossible to 
state in the abstract what showing will suffice to unseat them in any 
given case.  But they establish a default position and make clear 
where the burden lies—with the proponent of reading a broad, ordi-
nary term to mean something narrower or more technical.  This Arti-
cle concludes that the evidence on the original meaning of “recess” 
falls far short of meeting that burden. 
2.  Structure:  The Rules of Proceedings Clause, the Senate Vacancy 
Clause, and the Textual Distinction Between Sessions of Congress and 
Sessions of the Senate 
Two constitutional provisions bear on the proper reading of “re-
cess” in the Recess Appointments Clause, as does a conceptual dis-
tinction that the Constitution draws.  First, Article I states that “Each 
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”28  Read naturally, 
this Clause applies to the Senate’s comings and goings, and therefore 
authorizes the Senate to define its recesses (and sessions) absent a 
clear, specific constitutional provision to the contrary.29  It is hard to 
 
ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.’” (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 436–37 (1833))); see also Jack M. Balkin, Must 
we be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM REV. OF LEGAL STUD. 57, 72 (2013) 
(“[M]ost of the Constitution does not consist of generally recognized terms of art or of 
words with narrow meanings that would seem unusual to us today.  With very few excep-
tions the words that constitute its abstract principles and vague standards mean today 
what they meant at the time of their adoption.”). 
 25 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 101–06 (discussing the “General-Terms Can-
on” of construction). 
 26 See id. at 103–04 (discussing instances in which narrow meanings were rejected in favor of 
more general readings regardless of the primary intent of various drafters). 
 27 See id. at 104–05 (discussing cases in which terms were given general interpretations even 
if Congress did not forsee the applications at issue). 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 29 This is not to suggest that the Senate has limitless authority to define its recesses.  At a 
minimum, the courts can likely police the boundaries of the word “recess” and reject ab-
surd or outlandish Senate positions.  This view is somewhat analogous to Justice Souter’s 
concurrence in Nixon v. United States, although this Article does not take a position on 
whether Justice Souter’s view or this Article’s position on Senate authority under the 
Rules of Proceedings Clause should be characterized as falling within the “political ques-
tion” doctrine.  See Arkush, supra note 2, at 2 n.4 (citing the argument in Nixon v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) that when 
the Senate exercises its duty to “try” impeachments under the Impeachment Trial Clause, 
the courts should yield under the political question doctrine to the Senate’s choice of 
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read the Recess Appointments Clause as such a provision.  The 
Clause neither explicitly exempts recesses from the Senate’s authority 
over its proceedings nor gives any other hint that it is meant to dis-
place the Rules of Proceedings Clause regarding the word recess.  In-
deed, if the Recess Appointments Clause were meant to prescribe a 
fixed, constitutional definition of recess from which the Senate can-
not deviate, one would expect it to provide that definition rather 
than leaving it open to debate.  Instead, the Clause uses the most 
general terms available to describe the concepts it invokes.  That 
word choice is consistent with an understanding that the terms are 
general and will be explicated, if at all, by the appropriate house of 
Congress in accordance with the Rules of Proceedings Clause.  It is 
much less consistent with the view that the Framers were attempting 
to constitutionalize specific forms of sessions and recesses. 
In fact, there appears to be universal agreement that the Senate 
can redefine its sessions and recesses, at least within reasonable limits.  
Michael Rappaport, the principal proponent of the technical position 
on “recess,” doubts that the Constitution would prevent the Senate 
from redefining its own sessions, and he even suggests that Congress 
(or the Senate)30 could have chosen to hold semiannual sessions with 
two of what he calls “inter-session” recesses.31  But the Senate’s au-
thority to redefine its sessions is deeply problematic for the technical 
position on recess.  If “session” is not a fixed constitutional concept—
if the Senate can redefine its sessions at will—then an “inter-session” 
requirement establishes nothing of significance.  There is no obvious 
 
procedure “within broad boundaries,” but the courts might properly intervene if the Sen-
ate were to range too far outside those boundaries, for example by using a coin toss). 
 30 One might argue that Congress and the President can alter the congressional sessions by 
passing a law, but a single house cannot.  Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Ar-
ticle III Judges:  Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV 377, 422–23 (2005) (not-
ing that “[t]he two houses of Congress can control when they are in recess by concurrent 
resolution” and can end sessions if they act concurrently).  This is not the place to en-
dorse or dispute that argument, as it makes no difference to the point here:  if the defini-
tions of recesses and sessions are mutable, then it makes little sense to say that the Recess 
Appointments Clause invokes either concept in a narrow, technical sense. 
 31 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1570 (“[T]he alternative interpretation [permitting in-
trasession recess appointments that expire upon the next intrasession recess] has the cu-
rious effect of depriving Congress of control over the length and number of its ses-
sions.”); id. at 1565 n.235 (citing Michael Carrier for the proposition that inter-session 
recesses are at least one month long, whereas intra-sessions are generally shorter than 
twenty days); see also Hartnett, supra note 30 at 413 (“Nothing in the Constitution pre-
cludes Congress from having multiple sessions each year.  The First Congress had three 
sessions, as did the Fifth Congress.  Considering only the antebellum years, four addition-
al Congresses—the Eleventh, Thirteenth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Seventh—held three 
sessions each.”). 
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reason why the Senate could not opt for monthly or even weekly ses-
sions, with the latter establishing what Rappaport calls an “inter-
session” recess every weekend.32  (Rappaport does not put any mini-
mum time duration on an appointment-enabling inter-session re-
cess.)  In other words, the Senate’s authority to redefine its sessions 
renders the technical position nonsensically ephemeral, making it a 
deeply unlikely candidate for adoption in the Constitution.  Addi-
tionally, there is a simpler and more direct way to produce the same 
result—by permitting appointments during any “recess,” which is also 
a term that the Senate can define. 
We also have historical evidence about the Framers’ concerns re-
garding congressional rules, and none of it suggests a desire to limit 
congressional control over the styling or enumeration of sessions or 
recesses.  The Framers carefully considered questions regarding how 
Congress should convene and adjourn, viewing them as important to 
congressional independence.33  They settled on three simple rules.  
Congress must meet at least once each year.  Each house of Congress 
must consent before the other may adjourn for more than three days 
during a legislative session.  And the President can adjourn the Con-
gress if the two houses disagree on when to adjourn.34  In contrast to 
their careful consideration of these rules, the Framers did not discuss 
the meaning of the terms “recess” or “session,” as used in the Recess 
Appointments Clause;35 nor for that matter did they discuss “ad-
journment,” which appears in the next section of the Constitution.36  
No one has discovered any suggestion by the Framers that these 
terms were intended to have anything but their ordinary, com-
monsense meanings.  Moreover, a broad, ordinary, and practical 
meaning fits what we know about the pragmatic, dual purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause.  It was intended to relieve the Senate of 
the burden of remaining in perpetual session to provide advice and 
 
 32 See Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?:  A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 459 (2005) (“I would think that pursuant to the authority of each 
House to make rules for its own proceedings Congress could decide to hold twelve ‘ses-
sions’ each calendar year, with a few days off—perhaps just a weekend—between them.”). 
 33 See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361, 386–88 (2004) (explaining how certain constitutional provisions relating to the con-
vening and adjourning of Congress reflect the value of congressional independence and 
discussing debates about this value). 
 34 See id. at 386–87 (“Article II gives certain scheduling powers to the president, who may 
‘. . . in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjourn-
ment . . . adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 3)). 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 36 Id. at § 3. 
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consent on presidential appointments and to enable the President to 
fill important offices temporarily when the Senate is unavailable.37  
Notably, the view that the Senate can define its own recesses also ad-
vances the primary policy underlying narrower interpretations of the 
Clause—limiting the President’s recess appointment power to pre-
vent circumvention of the Senate—and does so without unduly tying 
the Senate’s hands. 
The Senate Vacancy Clause is also relevant to the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause.  Before the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which established the direct popular election of United 
States senators,38 Article I of the Constitution provided that state legis-
latures selected senators, and it gave state executives the power to ap-
point senators “during the Recess of the Legislature of [the execu-
tive’s] state.”39  To hold that “the Recess” has a narrow, technical 
meaning in the Senate Vacancy Clause would imply that the Constitu-
tion prescribes a uniform session and recess practice not only for the 
United States Congress, but also for state legislatures.  This would be 
peculiar.  The Constitution has virtually nothing to say about the 
structure or internal workings of state governments except that the 
federal government should guarantee each state a “Republican Form 
of Government.”40  If, on the other hand, the Clause does not restrict 
state practice, then it is hard to say that it limits the Senate’s. 
A final structural inference stems from the Constitution’s distinc-
tion between sessions of Congress and the sessions of the individual 
houses of Congress.  The Recess Appointments Clause states that re-
cess appointments expire at the end of “their next Session,” by which 
it means the Senate’s next session.41  The Adjournments Clause, by con-
trast, states that each house needs the other’s permission to adjourn 
for more than three days during “the Session of Congress.”42  Section 6 
 
 37 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the last clause of Article II 
and noting that “it would have been improper to oblige this body [the Senate] to be con-
tinually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen”). 
 38 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 39 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
 40 Id. at art. IV, § 4. 
 41 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 42 Id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (emphasis added).  Note that the Adjournments Clause’s use of “the 
session of Congress” also lends further support to the argument that the House may not 
constitutionally interfere with the President and the Senate’s appointment authority by 
refusing to grant the Senate permission to adjourn for more than three days in order to 
block recess appointments.  See Arkush, supra note 2, at 6–7 (discussing the House’s lack 
of authority “to block recess appointments”).  Under this view, the Senate’s consideration 
of executive business qualifies exclusively as the Senate’s own session, not “the session of 
Congress.”  The session of Congress includes only the joint business of the House and 
 
Oct. 2014] THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS  175 
 
of Article I immunizes senators and representatives from arrest while 
they attend “the Session of their respective Houses.”43  Thus, the text 
seems to contemplate a difference between the sessions of Congress 
and the sessions of each house.  This makes sense because the Consti-
tution supplies the houses with different powers.  Senate considera-
tion of treaties and nominations does not concern the House or re-
quire its presence, and, from the founding until the 1930s, the Senate 
frequently held special sessions without the House to consider these 
matters.44  In the present day, when the Senate considers these execu-
tive-branch matters, its rules refer to the situation as “executive ses-
sion.”45  Additionally, the President may convene either or both hous-
es on “extraordinary occasions,”46 giving rise to any number of 
situations in which the two houses can have separate sessions.  This 
constitutional distinction between sessions of Congress and sessions 
of each house suggests that the document contemplates a variety of 
possible sessions (and therefore a variety of “inter-session” recesses), 
further suggesting that the Constitution uses the broad, ordinary 
meaning of the words recess and session and does not limit the Sen-
ate’s ability to define them in the context of its own proceedings. 
B.  Contemporaneous Usage 
Another common source of evidence regarding original meaning 
is contemporaneous usage.47  This evidence overwhelmingly supports 
 
Senate—legislating.  Indeed, an early draft of the Adjournments Clause expressly ex-
empted the Senate when conducting certain business.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 180 Sect. 8 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“Neither House, 
without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other 
place than that at which the two Houses are sitting.  But this regulation shall not extend 
to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the article.”).  An interme-
diate proposal, not adopted, would have changed the language to “during the session of 
the House of Reps.”  Id. at 262.  Then, the delegates amended the provision to add “dur-
ing the session of the legislature” and the sentence exempting the Senate.  Id.  The rec-
ords do not explain the change, and there was no debate about the Senate exemption.  
The amendment was arguably more cosmetic, merely reaching the same result by more 
elegant means.  Compare id. at 456, with id. at 474.) (“[S]ession of the Legislature” was 
“changed to session of Congress” by the Committee of Style and Arrangement.) 
 43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 44 See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 10, at 522–28. 
 45 MATTHEW MCGOWAN, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, 
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 
112-1, at 55–59 (2011) (providing rules XXIX–XXXI which pertain to executive sessions). 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. II., § 3. 
 47 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 93 (2004) (noting that the “shift to original public meaning” brings references to 
“common contemporary meanings”). 
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an ordinary reading of “recess” or, perhaps more precisely, is incon-
sistent with the view that the word was limited to “inter-session” re-
cesses.  For this Article, I began by surveying the Federalist Papers 
and records from the Constitutional Convention and the ratification 
debates.48  In these sources, every unambiguous use of the word “re-
cess” is inconsistent with the technical “inter-session” position.49  For 
example, George Washington referred to a ten-day break from the 
Constitutional Convention during which the Committee of Detail 
drafted the Constitution as “the recess.”50 
The nine ratification-era state constitutions that use the word re-
cess also invoke its broad meaning.51  Typically one can discern this 
 
 48 When referring to the convention, this Article cites the 1911 edition of Max Farrand’s 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, supra note 42.  Later editions have corrected errors and added to the original.  
However, none of the modifications are directly relevant to the original meaning of re-
cess, and the 1911 edition has the advantage of being available online.  I also surveyed 
Jonathan Elliot’s five-volume collection of ratification-era materials, but found no non-
duplicative, unambiguous uses of “recess” there.  See JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d 
ed. 1827).  The Federalist Papers use “recess” only in three places.  One refers to “the re-
cess of the Senate” of the Achaean League, an ancient Hellenistic confederation, in a pas-
sage from which the modern reader can glean nothing useful about the meaning of re-
cess in the Constitution.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton) (“The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right 
of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and al-
liances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded 
their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only admin-
istered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its delibera-
tions, when assembled.”).  The other two instances, including a multi-paragraph discus-
sion by Alexander Hamilton, also provide no guidance because their usage of recess 
simply mirrors that of the Recess Appointments Clause and the Senate Vacancy Clause.  
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the Recess Appoitnements 
Clause); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the Senate Vacancy 
Clause). 
 49 For unambiguous uses in correspondence, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 217; 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 138, 269, 323, 601, 605.  All uses at the Conven-
tion were ambiguous, tracking the usage in the Recess Appointments Clause itself.  See 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 190, 372, 431; 3 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 202, 545, 756, 765.  
Two uses were ambiguous on their faces but might be resolved with further research.  See 
id. at 712, 722. 
 50 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 76. 
 51 DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7; MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XIII, XLI; MASS. CONST. of 1780 
pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. V; N.C. CONST. of 1776  §§ XVIII–XIX; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2, § 
L; PA. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20; S.C. CONST. of 1778 arts. IX, XVIII, XXXV; VT. CONST. 
of 1777 ch. II, §§ XVII–XVIII; VT. CONST. of 1786 ch. II, § XI.  Connecticut and Rhode Is-
land did not adopt new constitutions after independence, instead maintaining their co-
lonial charters from 1639 and 1663, respectively.  The South Carolina Constitution of 
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meaning in a given state constitution because the document grants 
powers that it makes little or no sense to limit to inter-session recess-
es.  For example, seven ratification-era constitutions authorize the 
executive to impose embargos for up to thirty days “in the recess” of 
the legislature.52  The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 empowers 
the governor “in the recess of the General Assembly . . . to embody 
the militia for the Public safety.”53  These constitutions were adopted 
in wartime, during a revolution against the British Empire.  It is im-
plausible that the availability of these powers would turn on accidents 
of parliamentary procedure or nomenclature.54 
Robert Natelson has identified numerous ratification-era legisla-
tive enactments that granted similar emergency powers during re-
 
1776, as well as those of Georgia, New Jersey, and New York did not use the word “recess.”  
See GA. CONST. of 1777; N.J. CONST. of 1776; N.Y. CONST. of 1777; S.C. CONST. of 1776. 
 52 DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7 (“A president or chief magistrate . . . may, by and with the ad-
vice of the privy council, lay embargoes or prohibit the exportation of any commodity for 
any time not exceeding thirty days in the recess of the general assembly . . . .”); MD. 
CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XXIII (“[The Governor] may, during the recess of the General 
Assembly, lay embargoes, to prevent the departure of any shipping, or the exportation of 
any commodities, for any time not exceeding thirty days in any one year-summoning the 
General Assembly to meet within the time of the continuance of such embargo . . . .”); 
N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XIX (“He [the Governor] also may by and with the advice of the 
Council of State, lay Embargoes or prohibit the Exportation of any Commodity for any 
Term not exceeding thirty days, at any one time, in the recess of the General Assem-
bly . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20 (“They may also lay embargoes, or prohibit the 
exportation of any commodity, for any time, not exceeding thirty days, in the recess of 
the house only. . . . ”); S.C. CONST. of 1778 arts. XXXV (“That the governor and com-
mander-in-chief for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the privy coun-
cil, may lay embargoes or prohibit the exportation of any commodity, for any time not 
exceeding thirty days, in the recess of the general assembly.”); VT. CONST. of 1777 ch. II, 
§ XVIII (“[T]hey may also lay Embargoes, or prohibit the Exportation of any Commodity, 
for any time not exceeding thirty days, in the recess of the House only . . . .”); VT. CONST. 
of 1786 ch. II, § XI (“[T]hey may also lay Embargoes, or prohibit the Exportation of any 
Commodity, for any time not exceeding thirty days, in the recess of the House on-
ly . . . .”).  Many of the ratification-era documents discussed in this section provide recess 
powers to the executive and a small committee, acting jointly, not solely to the executive.  
For simplicity, this discussion refers to each as if the grant is just to the executive. 
 53 N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XVIII.  The OED defines “embody” in relevant part as “[t]o form 
into a body or company for military or other purposes; to organize” and includes a usage 
example from Thomas Jefferson in 1779.  See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter “OED”]. 
 54 Notably, when James Madison proposed language at the federal convention that would 
have barred states from laying embargoes, George Mason argued that the amendment 
would be not only improper but dangerous, as the Genl. Legislature would not sit 
constantly and therefore could not interpose at the necessary moments—He en-
forced his objection by appealing to the necessity of sudden embargoes during the 
war, to prevent exports, particularly in the case of a blockade—.   
  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 440–41. 
178 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
cesses,55 including authority to “call out the militia” and “issue other 
military orders.”56  Natelson asserts that the legislatures that granted 
these powers “obviously” meant them to be available only during 
long, inter-session recesses.57  He appears to think it unlikely that a 
legislature would grant significant powers during short breaks.  But 
the critical factor is whether the state might face an emergency that 
requires an immediate response, not how long the legislature plans 
to be away when a crisis happens to arise.  Natelson appears to be as-
serting that the assemblies meant to leave their states without anyone 
who had authority to call out the militia or issue military orders mere-
ly because the legislature happened to be on a break that was called 
one thing rather than another (or was relatively short rather than 
long).  In colonies that were actively contemplating or waging war 
against the world’s preeminent imperial power, at the same time as 
they faced threats of domestic rebellion, the notion is implausible.58 
Moreover, even if legislators had long, inter-session recesses in 
mind when granting these emergency powers, it seems unlikely that 
they would object to the governor using them to respond to crises 
 
 55 See Robert G. Natelson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies That May Happen During the 
Recess” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 218–
24 (2014) (explaining the various states’ emergency recess powers). 
 56 Id. at 220. 
 57 Id. at 224. 
 58 Natelson agrees that “[i]n legislative practice, ‘recess’ (without ‘the’) could refer to any 
time when the legislature is not physically sitting, including intrasession breaks and ap-
parently even a noon recess.”  Id. at 213.  But he asserts that the phrase “the recess” 
meant something different “in government practice”:  “[i]t seems . . . that in government 
practice the phrase ‘the Recess’ always referred to the gap between sessions.” Id. (empha-
sis in original).  There are several problems with this claim.  First, it is mistaken as an em-
pirical matter.  This Article cites examples in which “the Recess” refers to intra-session re-
cesses.  Second, Natelson does not explain the difference between “legislative practice” 
and “government practice,” nor why a constitutional provision involving Senate recesses 
would use the “government” rather than “legislative” definition of a term.  Third, Natel-
son does not explain why a reasonable drafter would distinguish among types of recesses 
by the oblique means of including or omitting the word “the.”  That mode of drawing (or 
inferring) distinctions is implausible on its face.  One expects to see the word “the” pre-
cede “recess” in many cases simply because the speaker is referring to a particular recess, 
not because the speaker is trying to limit the scope of the word “recess.”  One who wishes 
to limit the term “recess” would be wise to use more obvious textual cues. 
   Natelson supports his claim regarding the phrase “the Recess” by citing two types of 
pre-ratification usage:  instances in which (a) a text refers to a specific inter-session recess 
as “the Recess,” or (b) a state legislature granted recess powers that Natelson believes 
should have been limited to inter-session recesses (the examples mentioned in the text 
corresponding to this footnote).  Id. at 214–27.  The former fail to support Natelson’s po-
sition because they are silent on whether other recesses were also called “the Recess.”  The 
latter do not support it because Natelson’s opinion that certain powers were intended on-
ly for “inter-session” recesses is no more obvious than the contrary view. 
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during other types of recesses.  Imagine the governor receives word 
of a violent riot in the middle of the night between daily legislative 
sessions, and he responds by summoning a local militia to quell the 
unrest.  Are we to assume that, on meeting the following morning, 
the assembly would chastise the governor for abusing his “recess” 
powers to defend the populace instead of convening the assembly 
first?  If so, then let us modify the facts:  imagine the mob was burn-
ing down the assembly building.  This hypothetical is not a stretch.  
We know that the Framers contemplated situations in which domestic 
violence might prevent legislatures from meeting.59 
Similar evidence comes from ratification-era constitutional provi-
sions that do not involve military matters or foreign relations.  The 
North Carolina Constitution of 1776 generally gives the governor the 
power to “grant[] Pardons and Reprieves,” but specifies that in cases 
prosecuted by the General Assembly he “may in the recess grant a re-
prieve until the next sit[t]ing of the General Assembly.”60  When the 
North Carolina legislature is away, surely the governor can grant a 
temporary reprieve to an individual with good cause who faces immi-
nent and potentially irreversible punishment regardless of the tech-
nical styling of the legislature’s break. 
The South Carolina Constitution of 1778 states: 
[D]uring a recess the president of the senate and speaker of the house of 
representatives shall issue writs for filling up vacancies occasioned by 
death in their respective houses, giving at least three weeks and not more 
than thirty-five days’ previous notice of the time appointed for the elec-
tion.61 
It would make little sense to grant the officer of a legislative body the 
power to schedule a popular election to fill a vacancy within thirty-
five days during one type of recess but not another.  Why should pub-
lic representation in the legislature turn on technicalities and acci-
dents of timing regarding the definitions of legislative breaks? 
The Maryland Constitution of 1776 authorizes the governor “in 
the recess of the General Assembly” to appoint a register of wills for a 
county in which the position becomes vacant.62  There are two ways to 
 
 59 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 467 (“Mr. 
Dickinson moved to insert the words, ‘or Executive’ after the words ‘application of its 
Legislature’—The occasion itself [the occasion requiring a state to ask for federal assis-
tance responding to domestic violence] he remarked might hinder the Legislature from 
meeting.”). 
 60 N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XIX. 
 61 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XVIII. 
 62 MD. CONST. of 1776, pt. 2, art. XLI (“That there be a Register of Wills appointed for each 
county who shall be commissioned by the Governor, on the joint recommendation of the 
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discern that this use of “recess” is probably broad.  First, as in the pre-
vious examples, it is unlikely that one would permit appointments of 
county registers of wills during only some narrow type of recess and 
not others.  Second, the provision specifies that an appointee will 
hold the position “until the meeting of the General Assembly.”63  It is 
doubtful that “meeting” refers only to formal sessions; the word likely 
means any convening for legislative business.64  If the “meeting” that 
follows a recess has no specified type, then the recess also has none. 
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire 
Constitution of 1792 use “recess” to refer to intra-session recesses.  
One can discern their usage from the text, without reasoning about 
the purpose of the provisions.  Because the Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire Constitutions are often cited to support the technical po-
sition on “recess,” this Article discusses them in greater detail below, 
in its review of the evidence for that position.65  Briefly, however, the-
se constitutions give the governor power to “prorogue” the legisla-
ture, which means to end its session, during a recess.  If the legisla-
ture is on “recess” and its session has not already ended—which 
 
Senate and House of Delegates; and that, upon the death, resignation, disqualification, or 
removal out of the county of any Register of Wills, in the recess of the General Assembly 
the Governor, with the advice of the Council, may appoint and commission a fit and 
proper person to such vacant office, to hold the same until the meeting of the General 
Assembly.”).  The Maryland Constitution also provides that the Governor may appoint 
“Treasurers . . . and the Commissioners of the Loan Office . . . in the recess of the Gen-
eral Assembly,” id. at pt. 2, art. XIII, as well as Clerks of court “in the vacation” of courts, 
id. at pt. 2, art. XLVII.  By the document’s usage, “vacation” and “recess” appear to be vir-
tual synonyms, with the former used to refer to judicial breaks and the latter legislative 
breaks. 
 63 Id. at pt. 2, art. XLI. 
 64 Both Johnson’s 1755 and 1785 dictionaries define “meeting,” in relevant part, merely as 
“[a]n assembly; a convention.”  2 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 1281; 2 JOHNSON 1785, 
supra note 19, at 112.  The OED provides two relevant definitions, each dating from the 
Middle Ages or earlier and continuing in use to the present:  “[t]he act or an instance of 
assembling or coming together for social, business, or other purposes; the action of en-
countering a person or persons” and “[a] gathering or assembly of a number of people 
for entertainment, discussion, legislation, etc.; the people so assembled.”  OED, supra 
note 53.  In addition, other usage in the Maryland Constitution confirms that “meeting” 
does not signify a formal session.  For example, Article XIX supplies the Senate with pow-
er to fill a vacancy in its own ranks “immediately . . . or at their next meeting.”  MD. 
CONST. of 1776, pt. 2, art. XIX.  This provision would be nonsensical if “meeting” meant 
“formal session.”  That reading would permit the Senate to fill a vacancy immediately if it 
happens to be in session when the vacancy arises, but if the Senate is on an intra-session 
recess would force it to leave the position open through the end of the current session 
and the subsequent inter-session recess, only to be filled at the onset of the next session. 
 65 See infra text accompanying notes 124–32. 
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should often (if not always) be the case if the governor can “pro-
rogue” it—then it must be on an “intra-session” recess.66 
Examples of ordinary usage abound elsewhere, including in other 
texts on which proponents of the technical position rely.  Black-
stone’s Commentaries uses “these recesses” to refer to three kinds of 
breaks—those following a parliamentary “adjournment,” “proroga-
tion,” or “dissolution” (a “dissolution” dissolved the parliament): 
As to all other privileges which obstruct the ordinary course of justice, 
they cease by the statutes 12 W. III. c. 3. and 11 Geo. II. c. 24. immediate-
ly after the dissolution or prorogation of the parliament, or adjournment 
of the houses for above a fortnight; and during these recesses a peer, or 
member of the house of commons, may be sued like an ordinary sub-
ject . . . .67 
Likewise, Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 Manual of Parliamentary Practice, 
written to guide the Senate, uses the term “recess” to refer to breaks 
following both prorogations and adjournments:  “[c]ommittees may 
be appointed to sit during a recess by adjournment, but not by pro-
rogation.”68  The Manual further makes clear that recesses can occur 
during sessions because it states that an “[a]djournment . . . is no 
more than a continuance of the session from one day to another.”69  
If an adjournment “continu[es] . . . the session,” and there is such 
thing as a “recess by adjournment,” then the word recess must con-
template what modern observers call “intra-session” recesses—
recesses without a break in the session.70 
The Blackstone and Jefferson passages quoted above each refer to 
English parliamentary practice.  One might think it proper to look 
directly at parliamentary records as well.  There, too, one finds ex-
amples of “recess” referring to intra-session recesses—or, leaving “ses-
sion” out of the discussion—passages that refer to relatively brief re-
cesses that follow adjournments rather than prorogations.  For 
example, the record of the House of Commons from 1660 to 1680, 
published in 1742, includes the following passage: 
The next Day, which was the 20th of December, the Money Bill, and the 
three other Bills being ready for the Royal Assent, the King came to the 
House of Peers . . . .  Upon the passing of which, the Parliament was ad-
 
 66 See id. 
 67 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161 (emphasis added). 
 68 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 174 (1801) (citations omitted).  Rappaport cites this text when 
explaining English parliamentary practice regarding “adjournment” and “prorogation.” 
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550–51 nn.192–94.  But he appears to have missed its sig-
nificance for his argument regarding the word “recess.” 
 69 Id. at 173. 
 70 Id. at 173–74. 
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journ’d to the 10th Day of January; and so breaking up, had a Recess for near 
three Weeks . . . .  The Parliament being again met, January 10, according to 
Adjournment, the joint Committee of Lords and Commons appointed to make en-
quiry during the Recess, into certain Plots about that time said to be on foot, 
gave in their Report . . . .71 
Numerous examples can be found in the American colonial legisla-
tures as well.  In 1754, Governor Jonathan Belcher of New Jersey sent 
a message to the General Assembly in which he referred to “the Re-
cess” that he was granting them by adjourning from April 29 to June 
172—and this appears to be the only use of the word “recess” in the 
four-year volume of New Jersey assembly records in which it appears.  
When Massachusetts legislators asked their governor on June 29, 
1768 to grant them a “recess,” he responded as if either a “proroga-
tion” or an “adjournment” would initiate a “recess,” saying, “I cannot 
consistently with my Sense of Duty Prorogue or Adjourn the General 
Court until I have receiv’d your Answer to his Majesty’s Requisition.”73  
In 1771 the Pennsylvania Gazette specified that a break which it called 
“the Recess” of New York’s legislature was an intra-session recess: 
Captain McDougall . . . remains still in the New Gaol, for the Assembly 
was not prorogued, but adjourned; so that the Sessions is not at an End, 
and the Recess is only till the 25th Instant, when the Members are to 
meet again . . . .74 
On July 18, 1775, one month after the Battle of Bunker Hill and two 
weeks after George Washington was named Commander in Chief of 
the Continental Army, the Continental Congress adopted a resolu-
tion that foreshadowed the use of “recess” in several ratification-era 
constitutions: 
RESOLVED, THAT it be recommended to the inhabitants of all the 
United English Colonies in North-America, that all able bodied effective 
 
 71 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 46–60 (1742), available at 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=37617 (emphasis added).  Not only 
does the House of Commons use “the Recess” to refer to the break following an ad-
journment; it is discussing a break similar in timing to the one at issue in Noel Canning. 
 72 THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, May 16, 1754, at 1 (digital copy on file with author); THE 
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 10 
(1785), available at https://archive.org/details/votesproceedings1754newj (Apr. 29, 
1754).  Ordinarily the Governor “prorogued” the New Jersey Assembly to end its sittings, 
meaning that what we would call a new session began at its next meeting.  See id. at 12 
(Dec. 14, 1752) (stating that the governor “directed a prorogation”); id. at 52 (May 16, 
1753) (“[T]he Governor was pleased to prorogue the House to the 10th of July next.”).  
But on April 29, 1754, Governor Belcher issued a “Writ of Adjournment.” Id. at 10 (April 
17, 1754 to April 25, 1754).  The assembly met “pursuant to an Adjournment” on June 1. 
Id. at 11 (June 3, 1754). 
 73 45 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1768–69, at 86, 88 
(1976) (emphasis added). 
 74 THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 1771, at 2–3 (digital copy on file with author). 
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men, between 16 and 50 years of age, in each Colony, immediately form 
themselves into regular companies of militia . . . * * * That all officers 
above the rank of a Captain be appointed by their respective Provincial 
Assemblies or Conventions, or in their recess by the Committees of safety 
appointed by said Assemblies or Conventions.  That all officers be com-
missioned by the Provincial Assemblies or Conventions, or in their recess by 
the Committees of Safety appointed by said Assemblies or Conventions. * 
* * That it be recommended to each colony to appoint a Committee of 
Safety, to superintend and direct all matters necessary for the security 
and defence of their respective Colonies, in the recess of their Assemblies 
and Conventions.75 
It is doubtful that the Continental Congress meant these provisions to 
turn on a particular definition of “recess.”  In that case, it would have 
needed to canvass the session and recess practices of each colonial 
legislative assembly before crafting its one-size-fits-all recommenda-
tion—or, worse, made one in ignorance.  It also would have to have 
concluded, inexplicably, that the assemblies should leave critical mili-
tary posts vacant and their territories without emergency legislative 
powers when they happen to be on breaks that fall during rather than 
between formal legislative sessions. 
In fact, ratification-era state legislatures varied substantially in 
their nomenclature for legislative sessions.  This evidence casts strong 
doubt on the possibility that federal drafters would craft rules that 
turn on strict semantic distinctions between “inter-session” and “intra-
session” recesses.  The contrast between New Jersey and Massachu-
setts practices illustrate the point.  The New Jersey legislature enu-
merated its “sessions” by year and called each work period within a 
given (annual) session a “sitting.”76  By contrast, when the Massachu-
setts legislature met multiple times a year, it called each sitting a new 
“session.”77  Imagine, then, that the U.S. Constitution limits recess ap-
pointments to “inter-session” recesses in accordance with the tech-
nical position (it does not use the word, but let us assume it is fairly 
implied).  In that case, one cannot tell whether the document incor-
porates the New Jersey or the Massachusetts sense of “inter-session.”  
The difference between the two is stark.  The New Jersey definition 
 
 75 THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, July 26, 1775, at 2 (digital copy on file with author) (empha-
sis added). 
 76 See, e.g., THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF 
NEW JERSEY, supra note 72, at 5 (“At a SESSION begun at Trenton on the 25th Day of Oc-
tober, 1785, and continued by Adjournments. Being the first Sitting.”); id. at 177 (“Being 
the second Sitting”); id. at 265 (“Being the third Sitting”). 
 77 See, e.g., 47 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1770–1771,at 
vii (1978) (listing in the table of contents four sessions of the “General Court, 1770–
1771”: “First Session:  30 May–25 June 1770;” “Second Session:  25 July–3 August 1770;” 
“Third Session:  26 September–20 November 1770;” “Fourth Session:  3–26 April 1771”). 
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would permit recess appointments only once per year, while the Mas-
sachusetts definition would permit them multiple times—for an iden-
tical pattern of legislative meetings and breaks.  It is difficult to imag-
ine, then, that the Constitution turns on the strict application of one 
of these definitions, particularly when there is no record of its draft-
ers discussing which definition to choose. 
To be sure, there are numerous examples from the 1770s and 
1780s in which “recess” is used to refer to an inter-session recess.78  But 
that is to be expected of a general term.  General words are used to 
refer to various specific things, so long as each falls within the word’s 
general definition. 
C.  Purpose 
The purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is to enable the 
President to fill posts when necessary or convenient without requiring 
the Senate to remain in session continually or return to Washington 
when inconvenient.79  This policy appears to be based on two beliefs:  
the Senate was not likely to—or perhaps should not—spend too much 
time in Washington, and generally it should not be forced to return 
to Washington merely to consider appointments.  These views, in 
turn, appear to have been driven by the Framers’ relatively narrow 
expectations for federal legislative business and their brand of repub-
lican political theory, which held that elected representatives should 
spend a good deal of time in their local communities.80 
Three aspects of the Clause’s purpose are worth noting.  The first, 
which has gone largely unnoticed, is that the Clause advances the in-
terests of not just the President, but also the Senate.  The Senate 
might prefer the President to have recess appointment power so that 
senators can spend more uninterrupted time in their home states.  As 
a general matter, the Senate should hold this preference whenever it 
does not anticipate opposing the President’s nominations, which 
means most of the time.  There is evidence that the Framers expected 
this to be the norm, as they believed the Senate would only rarely re-
 
 78 See, e.g., THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 1774, at 2 (reporting that the Governor 
“opened the sixth Session of the General Assembly” and printing his speech to the as-
sembly, which, among other things, recounts that “since your Recess” representatives 
from New York and Massachusetts reached a provisional agreement to settle the border 
between the two jurisdictions); see also THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Feb. 9, 1774, at 1 (re-
ferring to a “Recess of the General Court by Propogation [sic]”). 
 79 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 80 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1564, n.232 (noting Republican political theory and 
expectations regarding Congress’s legislative business). 
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ject presidential nominees.81  But regardless of their views, it should 
be the norm even in modern times.  The Senate majority typically 
supports the President’s nominations when it is aligned with him and 
opposes them only infrequently even when it is not.  To the extent 
that the Clause’s widely acknowledged purpose has any implication 
for how one reads its text, the fact that the Clause serves both the 
President and the Senate in most situations lends some support to 
broader readings.  The technical position has a weaker connection to 
the Clause’s purpose, as it seeks to protect the Senate from subver-
sion by the President without accounting for the Senate’s affirmative 
interest in recess appointments.82 
Second, the Clause is pragmatic and reflects a compromise be-
tween competing values.  Although the Framers settled on presiden-
tial nomination and Senate consent as the primary method of ap-
pointment, the Clause embodies a recognition that practical 
considerations (from the perspective of the President, the Senate, or 
both) can trump the primary method.  If any inference can be drawn 
from this purpose, it suggests the aptness of reading the Clause plain-
ly, which establishes the following pragmatic arrangement:  the terms 
of the Clause have their ordinary, general meanings, perhaps subject 
to the Senate’s refinement under the Rules of Proceedings Clause.  If 
disputes arise under the Clause, the President and the Senate are 
bound not by judicially imposed, technical interpretations of the 
Clause but by notions of reasonableness enforced largely, if not en-
tirely, through the political process.83  In this view, the Clause does 
 
 81 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process:  A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 653–54 (1993) (“Giv-
en that the Senate was not to exercise choice itself, it appeared to Alexander Hamilton 
that a nominee should be rejected only for ‘special and strong reasons.’ . . . [T]he origi-
nal understanding of the Appointments Clause does not contemplate rejections for rea-
sons of partisanship or disagreement over the nominee’s likely vote in a single case, be-
cause these reasons would be neither special nor strong.”); see also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 
48, at 134 (quoting Iredell as saying, “Suppose a man nominated by the President; with 
what face would any senator object to him without a good reason? There must be some 
decorum in every public body”). 
 82 See infra text accompanying notes 183–87. 
 83 Cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:  THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 577 (2012) (“Here, actual usage has not always precipitated fixed 
rules, but instead has structured a conversation between presidents and senators resulting 
in evolving understandings, conventions, and truces.”); Patrick Hein, In Defense of Broad 
Recess Appointment Power:  The Effectiveness of Political Counterweights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 235, 
252–54 (2008) (discussing political confrontations between the President and the legisla-
tive branch); Herz, supra note 32, at 460 (“Thus, proposals for a fast-track confirmatory 
procedure, or for disaggregating spending into hundreds of separate ‘bills,’ never went 
anywhere.  Neither would the twelve-sessions-a-year idea.  There are surely many reasons 
why they do not.  But the beginning of an answer would seem to lie in the facts that:  (1) 
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not limit recesses to any particular type.  One might reasonably wish 
to read minimum length limitations into the Clause, but that matter 
is largely left to the President and the Senate to negotiate. 
Finally, the Framers scarcely discussed the Clause at all, and there 
is no record of any debate over it at the Constitutional Convention or 
the ratification conventions.  This, too, lends slight support to a 
pragmatic, plain reading.  If the Framers were concerned about the 
technicalities of the Clause or wished it to draw bright lines, one 
might expect them not only to have used narrower language, but to 
have discussed or debated their policy views, as well as their word 
choice.  They were not averse to quibbling over technicalities.  Re-
garding the ten-day period for the President to sign bills passed by 
Congress, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention considered 
whether the text should read “within ten days (sundays excepted) af-
ter it shall have been presented to him” or “within ten days (sundays 
excepted) after the day on which it shall have been presented to him.”84  
In contrast to this close consideration of the deadline for presidential 
signatures, the drafters did not debate the Recess Appointments 
Clause at all.  Sometimes drafters who adopt general language are in-
tentionally delegating authority to those who implement it.  We have 
too little evidence to suggest intentional delegation in the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause.  It is plausible, but it is no less plausible that the 
Framers simply did not think about the Clause much.  At a minimum, 
however, they appear to have been unconcerned with the details of 
its operation enough that they did not bother to ensure that would 
be read more narrowly than its ordinary terms suggest. 
D. History 
The historical record also supports an ordinary reading of the 
Clause.  This view predominated from the nation’s founding until 
2013.  The executive branch adopted a contrary view for no more 
than twenty-five years, from 1901 to 1921 and possibly from 1974 to 
1979. 
In the earliest years after independence, governors in Pennsylva-
nia and Vermont exercised their embargo powers during intra-
 
Congress and the president both realize that two can play this game; (2) political will al-
ways matters as much as legal authority; and (3) the participants are all repeat players, 
who do not know whether their side is going to control the White House, Congress, both, 
or neither at any given point and so cannot risk shifting too much authority to any par-
ticular locus.”).  
 84 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 608 (citing 
Madison’s desire to add those words). 
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session recesses, suggesting that they interpreted “in the recess” in 
their state constitutions to include those recesses.85  Likewise, in 1798, 
the Governor of New Jersey must have interpreted “Recess” in Article 
I of the United States Constitution to include intra-session recesses,86 
as he appointed a United States senator during an intra-session recess 
of the New Jersey General Assembly.87 
The earliest formal opinion on the Recess Appointments Clause, 
by Attorney General William Wirt in 1823, concerned whether the 
President could fill a pre-existing vacancy during a recess.  Wirt did 
not consider the meaning of “recess” directly, but he described the 
Clause in terms that suggest, if anything, support for an ordinary, 
pragmatic reading of the Clause: 
Now, if we interpret the word ‘happen’ as being merely equivalent to 
‘happen to exist,’ (as I think we may legitimately do,) then all vacancies 
which, from any casualty, happen to exist at a time when the Senate cannot be 
consulted as to filling them, may be temporarily filled by the President . . . .88 
If the Clause were perceived as enabling appointments only between 
formal sessions, this would be an odd way of referring to the period 
during which the President can make unilateral appointments.  Wirt 
does not use the word “recess,” nor does he reference in any way a 
lengthy period between formal sessions of Congress.  Instead, he de-
scribes the relevant period pragmatically, as “a time when the Senate 
cannot be consulted as to filling [vacancies].”89  To be sure, Wirt was 
not squarely considering the “recess” question.  But his description is 
unlikely if people in the early nineteenth century commonly believed 
that the Clause contemplated only recesses between official sessions 
of Congress. 
As soon as the United States Congress began taking significant in-
tra-session recesses, presidents began making intra-session recess ap-
pointments, and the historical record is bereft of any contemporane-
ous objection based on their intra-session nature.  President Andrew 
 
 85 See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 225 (2013) (providing exam-
ples “of  state executives assuming that a constitutional recess includes intrasession 
breaks”). 
 86 Until the Seventeenth Amendment established direct popular elections of senators, see 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, Article I directed that state legislatures selected senators, and 
that “the Executive” of a state could appoint senators “during the Recess of the Legisla-
ture of [that] State.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
 87 See New Vista, 719 F.3d at 225–26 (“[The New Jersey’s Governor’s] appointment of a sena-
tor on December 19, 1798, shows that he construed recess to include intrasession breaks 
because the New Jersey General Assembly was in an intrasession break from November 8, 
1798, until January 16, 1799.”). 
 88 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 633 (1823) (emphasis added). 
 89 Id. 
188 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
Johnson made fifty-seven appointments during four different intra-
session recesses in 1867 and 1868.90  The “intra-session” nature of the-
se appointments appears to have generated no controversy at all.  As 
Edward Hartnett has pointed out, although the Fortieth Congress 
impeached and tried Andrew Johnson on charges related to ap-
pointments and removals, it notably did not dispute the constitution-
ality of intra-session recess appointments.91  During this period, Attor-
ney General William Evarts issued three opinions on recess 
appointments, none of which draws any distinction between intra-
session and inter-session appointments.92  Similarly, a United States 
district court that passed on the validity of a Johnson recess appoint-
ment gave no attention to the question of the type of recess.93  And 
the Court of Claims expressly affirmed the legitimacy of a Johnson in-
tra-session recess appointment, stating that it had “no doubt” that the 
President could legally fill a vacancy during the recess in question.94 
Rapport argues that Johnson’s contemporaries might have viewed 
the relevant recesses as “inter-session.”95  The effort is unconvincing.  
First, Rappaport concedes that two of four relevant periods were in-
tra-session recesses.96  Regarding the remaining two, Rappaport points 
to aspects of the congressional record from which one might argue—
or might have believed at the time—that the Senate had ended its 
session even though no one at the time voiced that perspective.97  He 
then takes silence on the recess question as evidence in his favor.  He 
doubts that the President would have taken the “unprecedented” step 
of making intra-session recess appointments without attempting to 
 
 90 See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 408–09 & n.143 (discussing President Johnson’s recess ap-
pointments); Michael B. Rappaport, Why Nonoriginalism Does Not Justify Departing from the 
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause 26–33 (Jan. 3, 2014) (San Diego Legal 
Studies Paper No. 14-140), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374563 (discussing 
Andrew Johnson’s numerous recess appointments). 
 91 See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 409 & n.143 (“Attorney General William Evarts issued his 
opinion concurring with his predecessors that the President could exercise his recess ap-
pointment power even when the vacancy arose while the Senate was in session, as well as 
two other opinions approving recess appointments.”). 
 92 See id. at 409–10 n.143 (citing 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 449 (1868); 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 455, 457 
(1868); 12 Op. Att’y Gen 469 (1868) in discussing these opinions). 
 93 The court found the appointment invalid because it predated the relevant recess, but it 
viewed the recess itself as adequate.  In re District Attorney of the United States, 7 F. Cas. 
731, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1868). 
 94 Gould v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 593, 595–96 (1884) (“We have no doubt that a vacancy 
occurring while the Senate was thus temporarily adjourned, from July 20 to November 21, 
1867, could be and was legally filled by appointment of the President alone . . . .”). 
 95 Rappaport, supra note 90, at 27–31. 
 96 Id. at 30. 
 97 Id. at 27, 28–29. 
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“justif[y]” them.98  This argument assumes its conclusion.  Perhaps 
the President did not attempt to justify the appointments because 
neither he nor anyone else thought they needed justification, as no 
one thought it relevant whether the Senate ended a formal session 
before the break in question. 
The first known suggestion that the Constitution might not au-
thorize intra-session recess appointments did not appear until 1901, 
in an opinion of Attorney General Philander Knox advising President 
Theodore Roosevelt against such appointments.99  Knox mistakenly 
characterizes the Evarts opinions as “relat[ing] only to appointments 
during the recess of the Senate between two sessions of Congress,”100 
and he dismisses the Court of Claims decision with an unsupported 
suggestion that the circumstances giving rise to the intra-session re-
cess were “unusual and involved results which should not be viewed 
as precedents.”101  There is no doubt that the circumstances were un-
usual; less clear is why the episode has no precedential value on the 
“recess” question. 
Knox’s textual analysis relies principally on the definite article 
“the.”  He states, “[i]t will be observed that the phrase is ‘the re-
cess,’”102 arguing that “there have always been two sittings, sessions or 
assemblings of each Congress” and “the recess” is the break between 
them.103  He also argues that the Constitution distinguishes between 
an “adjournment,” which means any break, and “the recess,” which is 
the single break between official sessions of Congress.104  Knox’s asser-
tion about sessions is simply mistaken.  The Constitution does not es-
tablish the name or numbering of congressional sessions, and Con-
gress can hold—and has held—multiple formal sessions in a single 
year if it chooses.  The First and the Fifth Congresses each held three 
 
 98 Id. at 29. 
 99 See 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599 (1901) (advising the President not “to appoint an appraiser of 
merchandise in the district of New York during the current holiday adjournment of the 
Senate”).  The 1868 opinion of the district court that invalidated a Johnson appointment 
suggests that “[w]hether there was a recess of the senate upon adjournment of congress 
on 27th July last” is a question “upon which opinions have, I believe, differed.”  In re Dis-
trict Attorney of the United States, 7 F. Cas. 731, 734, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1868).  But the court 
did not specify whether the “believe[d]” disagreement concerned the intra-session nature 
of the appointment or something else; nor did it offer any source expressing the sup-
posed belief. 
100 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 602.  Hartnett caught this mistake.  See Hartnett, supra 
note 30, at 410–11 (highlighting the mistake). 
101 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603. 
102 Id. at 600 (emphasis in original). 
103 Id. at 603–04. 
104 Id. at 601. 
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sessions, as did four other antebellum Congresses.105  On close inspec-
tion, the distinction between “adjournment” and “recess” also lacks 
merit.  As this Article discusses in greater detail below, the Constitu-
tion uses “adjournment” as the noun form of “adjourn,” not as a 
means to distinguish between “recesses” and other breaks.106 
Knox was also motivated by policy concerns.  He disliked the pos-
sibility that a recess appointment being made over a weekend, which 
he believed would be permissible if intra-session appointments were 
lawful.107  At the same time, he apparently saw no limit on intra-
session recess appointments other than that they fell between official 
sessions of Congress.  His view led to President Theodore Roosevelt 
making appointments during what he called a “constructive recess” 
that occurred when the Senate ended one session and began another 
with a single gavel stroke.108 
When the Senate Judiciary Committee responded to Roosevelt’s 
appointments with a 1905 report defining recesses, it did not distin-
guish between inter-session and intra-session breaks. It endorsed a 
pragmatic view of the word recess: 
[The Framers] used the word [recess] as the mass of mankind then un-
derstood it and now understand it.  It means, in our judgment, in this 
connection the period of time when the Senate is not sitting in regular or 
extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in extraordinary 
session for the discharge of executive functions; when its members owe 
no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is empty; when, because of its 
absence, it can not receive communications from the President or partic-
ipate as a body in making appointments.109 
In 1921, Attorney General Harry Daugherty concurred with the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, rejecting Knox’s view and restoring the con-
sensus view that the type of recess is not important.110  Daugherty did, 
 
105 See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 413 (“The First Congress had three sessions, as did the Fifth 
Congress.  Considering only the antebellum years, four additional Congresses—the Elev-
enth, Thirteenth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Seventh—held three sessions each.”). 
106 See infra text accompanying notes 143–47. 
107 See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603 (“If a temporary appointment could in this 
case be legally made during the current adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no 
reason why such an appointment should not be made during any adjournment, as from 
Thursday or Friday until the following Monday.”). 
108 See Michael A. Carrier, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments 
Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2211–12 (1994) (“Roosevelt claimed that a split second 
separated the two sessions, thus creating a recess which allowed him to make recess ap-
pointments.”). 
109 S. REP. NO. 58-4389 (1905), reprinted in 39 CONG. REC. 3820, 3823 (emphasis omitted). 
110 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 24 (1921)(“If the President is empowered to make recess appoint-
ments during the present adjournment, does it not necessarily follow that the power ex-
ists if an adjournment for only 2 instead of 28 days is taken? I unhesitatingly answer this 
by saying no.”). 
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however, conclude that an appointment-enabling break might have 
some minimum length, likely more than “5 or even 10 days.”111  But 
he believed that a precise number could not be determined, as the 
word recess “must be given a practical construction.”112  Later presi-
dents and attorneys general have all agreed with Daugherty’s rejec-
tion of a distinction between types of recess.  They have differed only 
on the question of minimum length.113 
In the second half of the twentieth century, intra-session recess 
appointments became much more common.114  President Harry 
Truman made twenty appointments during four intra-session recess-
es.115  President Dwight Eisenhower made nine, and President Rich-
ard Nixon made eight.116  A 1979 Office of Legal Counsel memoran-
dum states that from 1974 to 1979, presidents were “reluctant” to 
make intra-session recess appointments because of the 1974 D.C. Cir-
cuit holding that the President could pocket-veto bills during intra-
session recesses.117  But President James Carter resumed making them 
in 1979, and through 2012, presidents made 340.118  In 1979, a United 
States district court passed on the validity of an intra-session recess 
appointment without questioning the constitutionality of its intra-
session rather than inter-session nature.119  Despite the increased use 
of intra-session recess appointments in recent decades, no court 
 
111 Id. at 24–25. 
112 Id. at 25. 
113 See 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 468 (1960) (agreeing with the court’s opinion in Gould v. Unit-
ed States, 19 Ct. Cl. 593 (1884)); 3 Op. O.L.C. 314, 316 (1979) (finding that “the President 
is authorized to make recess appointments during a summer recess of the Senate of a 
month’s duration”); 6 Op. O.L.C. 585, 585 (1982) (approving of a 2 month intra-session 
recess); 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 161 (1996) (finding “that the President has discretion to 
make a good-faith determination of whether a given recess is adequate to bring the 
Clause into play”); 36 Op. O.L.C. __, at 2, 13 (Jan. 6, 2012) (concluding “that the Presi-
dent may determine that pro forma sessions at which no business is to be conducted do 
not interrupt a Senate recess for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause”). 
114 See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 108, at 2212–16 (discussing the recess appointments made 
since 1947). 
115 See id. at 2212–13. 
116 See id. 
117 See 3 Op. O.L.C., supra note 113, at 313 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 
(D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
118 See infra note 352. 
119 See Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585 (D.D.C. 1979). The court rejected a statutory ar-
gument that the Federal Election Campaign Act required all appointees to be Senate-
confirmed in apparent contravention of the Recess Appointments Clause, as well as an 
argument that the Clause provides recess appointment power only in “instances of abso-
lute need.”  Id. at 597.  The court implicitly took the broad view of the words “recess” and 
“session.”  It stated that “[r]ecess appointments have traditionally not been made only in 
exceptional circumstances, but whenever Congress was not in session.”  Id. 
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squarely addressed the “recess” question until 2004, when the Elev-
enth Circuit approved intra-session appointments.120  A court first 
took the position that the Recess Appointments Clause is limited to 
recesses between sessions of Congress in 2013,121 226 years after the 
ratification of the Constitution, 215 years after the word “recess” in 
the U.S. Constitution was first interpreted by the Governor of New 
Jersey to include intra-session recesses, and 146 years after the first in-
tra-session recess appointments were made without any recorded ob-
jection.  In short, with only two brief exceptions in the twentieth cen-
tury, the word recess appears always to have been viewed as having an 
ordinary meaning, not limited to any formal type of recess. 
II.  A CRITIQUE OF THE TECHNICAL POSITION 
Until very recently, the ordinary reading of “recess” dominated.  
Michael Rappaport overturned that longstanding consensus with a 
2005 law review article arguing that original meaning of the Recess 
Appointments Clause was narrow and technical.122  Because of its in-
fluence, the argument merits a detailed evaluation.  Perhaps most il-
luminating is what it does not argue:  Rappaport did not uncover any 
evidence that the Framers intended “recess” to have a special mean-
ing, nor for that matter any evidence that the Framers thought about 
the word at all.  He and other proponents of the technical position 
also agree that the term, on its face, has a general meaning and cite 
historical dictionary evidence that exclusively supports the general 
meaning.123  One might expect these points to end the inquiry, leav-
ing the term its broad, ordinary meaning, subject only to Senate con-
 
120 See Evans v. Stevens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e accept that ‘the Re-
cess,’ originally and through today, could just as properly refer generically to any one—
intrasession or intersession—of the Senate's acts of recessing, that is, taking a break.”). 
121 See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (We 
hold that ‘the Recess of the Senate’ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only in-
tersession breaks.”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“In 
short, we hold that ‘the Recess’ is limited to intersession recesses.”). 
122 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1490 (arguing that “the original meaning [of the Recess 
Appointments Clause] confers quite narrow authority” on the President to make recess 
appointments); see generally Brief of Originalist Scholars as Amici Curiae at 24, NLRB v. 
Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013) (No. 12-1281), 2013 WL 6213265 at *24 [hereinaf-
ter Originalist Brief] (arguing that the narrow reading of the word “recess” “best com-
ports with the Constitution’s text, structure, and purpose”). 
123 See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 23–34 (admitting that “‘recess’ could be used more 
generically to refer to any break in a legislature's conduct of business, including short 
breaks during a session”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550 (discussing dictionary defini-
tions and an “interpretation [that] reads the term ‘recess’ to mean all periods, no matter 
how short, when the Senate is not conducting business”). 
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struction under the Rules of Proceedings Clause.  Instead, Rappaport 
and others attempt to muster indirect evidence to support a narrow, 
technical reading of recess.  The evidence is hard to find. 
A.  Contemporaneous Usage 
The primary argument for the technical position derives not from 
the text of the Constitution, but the use of “recess” in two roughly 
contemporaneous documents.124  The evidence is thin—a single pas-
sage in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, similar to one in the 
New Hampshire Constitution of 1792125—and adherents to the tech-
nical position misread it.  Rappaport begins by explaining that in 
England, breaks during a session were called adjournments, while in-
ter-session breaks were called prorogations.126  Then he quotes the 
Massachusetts Constitution: 
The Governor, with advice of Council, shall have full power and authori-
ty, during the session of the General Court [that is, the Massachusetts leg-
islature], to adjourn or prorogue the same to any time the two Houses 
shall desire . . . and, in the recess of the said Court, to prorogue the same from 
time to time, not exceeding ninety days in any one recess . . . . 127 
The quoted passage states that the governor may prorogue the legis-
lature “in the recess.”  If, as Rappaport explains, a prorogation is “an 
order that . . . would end the session,”128 then the legislature must be 
in session for the governor to prorogue it.  Therefore, the phrase “in 
the recess” must refer to an intra-session recess.  The passage appears 
to use “recess” to refer exclusively to intra-session recesses.129 
 
124 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1549–53 (discussing the use of “recess” in both the Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire Constitutions); Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 24–25 
(discussing “[e]ighteenth-century state constitutions [that] used ‘recess’ to refer to the 
time that the legislature was not in session”). 
125 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1551–52 (discussing and citing MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, 
ch. 2, § 1, art. V; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2, § L). 
126 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550–51 (explaining that “an adjournment was a break in the 
business of a house that occurred during the legislative session” while “a prorogation was 
an order by the King that Would end the session for both houses”). 
127 Id. at 1552 (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. V) (emphasis in original). 
128 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550–51. 
129 One caveat here is that perhaps the Massachusetts Governor could prorogue the assembly 
even when it was already prorogued.  If that were the case, then the passage would appear 
to refer to both intra-session and inter-session recesses rather than just the former:  the 
governor could “prorogue” the assembly when it was on “recess” regardless of whether 
the recess was inter-session or intra-session.  It is not clear whether such authority existed 
in Massachusetts.  It appears to have existed in New Jersey before independence, but not 
after.  Pre-independence, one finds instances in which the New Jersey Governor pro-
rogued the assembly to a certain date, but the assembly did not meet until later and, up-
on reconvening, noted “his Excellency’s several Prorogations.”  MINUTES OF THE 
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Rappaport reaches the opposite conclusion.  His argument ap-
pears to flow as follows: 
(1) If “in the recess” includes times when the legislature is in ses-
sion, then the quoted passage should grant the governor power to 
adjourn as well as prorogue. 
(2) The passage grants power only to prorogue and not to ad-
journ. 
(3) Therefore “in the recess” must refer only to recesses in be-
tween sessions.130 
This gets it backward.  When the legislature is in recess, it has already 
been adjourned (if not prorogued).  Therefore it does not make 
sense to give the governor power to adjourn the legislature during a 
recess.  The more sensible arrangement is that the governor has pow-
er to adjourn or prorogue the legislature during a session but only to 
prorogue when it is already on recess. 
Rappaport makes one other argument about the passage:  because 
one clause discusses what the governor may do “during the session” 
and the next addresses what he may do “in the recess,” the latter must 
refer to a time when the legislature is not in session.131  This reasoning 
begs the question by assuming that “session” and “recess” are mutual-
ly exclusive.  The point of the inquiry is to determine whether the 
word “recess” can refer to a break during a session. 
Note also that the italicized portion of passage states that the gov-
ernor may prorogue the legislature “from time to time, not exceed-
ing ninety days in any one recess.” 132  The phrase’s use of “from time 
to time” is curious. It appears to mean something like, “the governor 
may occasionally prorogue the legislature during a recess, not to ex-
ceed ninety days in any one recess.”  In any event, it arguably suggests 
an intent for the governor to use the granted power reasonably or in 
 
PROVINCIAL CONGRESS AND THE COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 282 
(1879) (Nov. 15, 1775).  After independence, however, this practice appears to have end-
ed, with the assembly instead meeting on the day appointed by law and continuing to new 
sittings by “adjournment.”  See, e.g., THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 72, at 8 (providing specific times 
for meeting after adjournment); THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 6–7 (1786) (providing specific times for meeting after 
adjournment).  This author has not found evidence (whether pre- or post-independence) 
suggesting that the Massachusetts governor could prorogue its assembly when already pro-
rogued, but it is possible that the power existed. 
130 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1552; see also Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 25 (“The 
lack of authority to adjourn the legislature during its recess makes sense if the legislative 
session has ended; by definition, a legislature cannot be adjourned when it is not in ses-
sion.”). 
131 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1552. 
132 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2 § 1, art. V. 
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moderation—and therefore to imply a belief that for some reason 
governors could be trusted to do so.  In effect, the passage may evince 
an intent to establish a loose, pragmatic standard rather than a hard 
rule, and to trust the constraints of the political process to sort out 
the details.  The Recess Appointments Clause arguably reflects a simi-
lar posture. 
Proponents of the technical position also point to two additional 
sources—two passages in Blackstone’s Commentaries and a single order 
from the Virginia House of Delegates.133  These texts provide little 
support.  As discussed above, Blackstone sometimes uses “recess” in a 
general manner.134  One of the Blackstone passages cited for the 
technical position appears to use words casually, not formally.  It con-
templates that a matter arising during an “intermission or recess of 
parliament” might be “brought . . . unto the next parliament” for res-
olution.135  The word “intermission” likely refers to a relatively short 
break during a continuous session.136  When an important matter 
arises during an intermission, it makes little sense to wait and present 
it to the “next parliament” rather than the current parliament, when 
it returns from the intermission.  The natural inference is that this 
Blackstone passage uses words loosely and therefore provides little if 
any support for strict, technical usage. 
The other Blackstone passage,137 and the passage from the Virginia 
House of Delegates, appear to use “recess” and “session” in their nar-
row, technical senses, although one cannot be certain without exam-
ining other records.  But no matter.  These are instances in which 
 
133 See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 25–26 (citing for support 3 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 67, at *57; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *260; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 123 (1777–81) (Thomas W. White ed., 
1827)); Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 26 (“Ordered, That the delegates for the several 
counties consult with their constituents, during the recess of Assembly, on the justice and 
expediency of passing [a bill] . . . and that they procure from them instructions, whether 
or not the said bill shall be passed, and lay the same before the House of Delegates at 
their next session.” (quoting JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (1777–81), supra note 133, at 123). 
134 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
135 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *57 (emphasis omitted) (“This committee seems to have 
been established, lest there should be a defect of justice, for want of a supreme court of 
appeal, during any long intermission or recess of parliament; for the statute further di-
rects, that if the difficulty be so great, that it may not well be determined without assent of 
parliament, it shall be brought by the said [committee] unto the next parliament, who 
shall finally determine the same.” (emphasis omitted)). 
136 See infra note 231. 
137 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *338 (“During the session of parliament the trial of an 
indicted peer is not properly in the court of the lord high steward, but before the [high 
court of parliament]. . . . But in the court of the lord high steward, which is held in the 
recess of parliament, he is the sole judge in matters of law. . . .”). 
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“recess” happens to have been used to refer to inter-session breaks.  
They demonstrate nothing about whether other types of breaks were 
also called “recesses.”  The source from which the originalist scholars 
find the passage from the Virginia House of Delegates builds its prin-
cipal argument about “recess” on this mistaken inference, commit-
ting it many times over.138  One needs more than a few, or even many, 
examples of a technical meaning to establish that it was exclusive.  
Conversely, just a few examples of general usage go a long way toward 
rebutting claims of a technical meaning—and in fact such examples 
abound. 
B.  Structure:  An Inference from “Adjournment” 
Proponents of the technical position have also attempted to infer 
from the Constitution’s text a distinction between the words “recess” 
and “adjournment,” in which the former stands exclusively for inter-
session recesses and the latter describes all legislative breaks.  The ar-
gument begins with the notion that because the Constitution uses 
both words, they must have different meanings.139  This interpretive 
move is by no means uncontroversial.140  But that is no matter because 
the words do in fact mean different things, just not things that sup-
port the technical position.  Adherents to the technical position ar-
gue that each use of “adjourn” or “adjournment” appears in a context 
that makes clear that the text refers to both intra-session and inter-
session recesses, whereas “recess” appears only twice, in contexts that 
might refer only to inter-session recesses.141  Since “adjournment” 
 
138 See Natelson, supra note 55, at 215–17 (arguing, based on the Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire Constitutions and the Virginia House of Delegates document, “that it is clear 
that ‘the recess’ represented the period between sessions and was clearly distinguished 
from them”). 
139 Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 30 (“The choice to use different language (‘the Re-
cess’ rather than ‘Adjournment’) indicates a different meaning.”). 
140 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 170 (explaining that presumption of con-
sistent usage “more than most other canons . . . assumes a perfection of drafting that, as 
an empirical matter, is not often achieved”); cf. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 
561, 598 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The tendency to assume that a word which 
appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, 
has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discus-
sions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.” 
(quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 
333, 337 (1933)); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Original-
ism:  A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 
756 (2009) (noting, regarding the related rule against surplusage or redundancy, “[t]his 
interpretive rule, of course, is not absolute.  While it provides weight in favor of one in-
terpretation, it can be overridden by other considerations.”). 
141 Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 30.  
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clearly refers to all breaks, they argue, the “most obvious” inference is 
that “recess” means only inter-session recesses.142 
But a more obvious interpretation is apparent on the face of the 
text:  the Constitution does not distinguish between one type of break 
called a “recess” and another called an “adjournment” because the 
document never refers to any break as an “adjournment.”  It uses “ad-
journment” just three times,143 and in each instance the word is a 
mere nominalization of the verb “to adjourn.”  In other words, “ad-
journ” and its noun-form “adjournment” refer to the act of adjourn-
ing, while “recess” refers to a break that follows the act.  To illustrate 
this point, one can substitute a verb form for “adjournment” each 
time it appears and fully preserve the meaning of the text.  Here are 
the three passages, with the original usage bracketed and the illustra-
tions in bracketed italics: 
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sun-
days excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall 
be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress [by 
their Adjournment] [by adjourning] prevent its Return, in which Case it 
shall not be a Law.144 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on [a question of 
Adjournment]) [a question of when to adjourn] shall be presented to the 
President of the United States . . . .145 
. . . in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time [of 
Adjournment] [to adjourn], he may adjourn them to such Time as he 
shall think proper . . . .146 
In short, to argue that the word “adjournment” implies a type of 
break distinct from a “recess” is to mistake style for substance.147 
 
142 Id. (“The most obvious explanation is that ‘the Recess’ had a narrower meaning encom-
passing only the expected longer (and, from an appointments standpoint, more prob-
lematic) break between sessions.”); see also Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1559–60 (“The 
most obvious explanation is that the Framers used the two terms to have different mean-
ings.  They used the term ‘adjournment’ to have the all-recess meaning, whereas they 
used the term ‘recess’ to have a narrower meaning.”).  The D.C. Circuit adopted a form 
of this argument.  See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (arguing 
that there is an “inescapable conclusion that the Framers intended something specific by 
the term ‘the Recess,’ and that it was something different than a generic break in pro-
ceedings”).  The Third Circuit concluded that “recess must mean something narrower 
than any break that follows an adjournment,” but that “what this narrower definition is 
cannot be derived from the dichotomy between adjournment and recess alone.”  NLRB v. 
New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 233 (3d Cir. 2013). 
143 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
145 Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
146 Id. at art. II, § 3. 
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Finally, Rappaport notes that the Framers abandoned English par-
liamentary usage of the terms “adjournment” and “prorogation.”148  
This abandonment gives rise to the question whether, when the 
Framers eschewed distinctions between types of adjournments, they 
also left behind distinctions between types of recesses (if they be-
lieved any existed in the first place).  To the extent that the Framers 
thought about the concept of prorogation, we have evidence that 
they were concerned about whether and when the President could 
adjourn the Congress,149 and they supplied that power only when the 
House and Senate could not agree when to adjourn.150  In contrast, 
we have no evidence that the Framers were concerned with distinc-
tions between types of recesses.  Rappaport states that, having adopt-
ed a broad use of “adjournment” to refer to all breaks, the Framers 
“needed” a new way to refer to inter-session breaks, for which they 
chose the word “recess.”151  But it is Rappaport, not the Framers, who 
needs this distinction, to support a narrow, technical reading of “re-
cess.”  If the Framers wished to draw distinctions between recesses 
similar to those that existed in England, then the most obvious course 
of action would have been to adopt (or at least adapt) English par-
liamentary usage, not abandon it in favor of new, more confusing us-
age. 
 
147 Not only is this nominalization point apparent on the face of the Constitution’s text; the 
Eleventh Circuit made a similar point in 2004.  See Evans v. Stevens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“Instead of describing a block of time, the term ‘Adjournment’ in the 
Constitution can be read to signify a parliamentary action:  Congress’s taking or having 
taken a break.”).  So did Hartnett in 2005.  See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 422 (explaining 
that “‘adjourn’ or ‘adjournment’ is used in the Constitution to refer to the parliamentary 
action of choosing to take a break, with ‘recess’ used to refer to the resulting break”).  
Evans also noted that Supreme Court usage in the 1938 Pocket-Veto case, Wright v. United 
States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938), would require a reading opposite that of the technical posi-
tion on the Recess Appointments Clause—that “adjournment” refer only to inter-session 
breaks and “recess” to intra-session breaks.  See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1225 (“We note, howev-
er, that even if the Wright Court’s usage of ‘Adjournment’ and ‘Recess’ were directly ap-
plicable here, their usage would suggest that the term ‘Adjournment’ is the formal break 
occurring at the end of a Session and that a ‘Recess’ is something that can and does occur 
during a Session.  This usage by the Supreme Court tends to support our accepting the 
President’s interpretation that a ‘Recess’ includes a break during a Session.”) 
148  Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1551. 
149 See supra notes 33–34. 
150 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that “in Case of Disagreement between them [the 
House and the Senate], with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them 
to such Time as he shall think proper”).  
151 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1551 n.198 (“Having abandoned the term ‘prorogation’ and 
using a broader meaning of ‘adjournment,’ the Framers needed a term to refer to breaks 
between the sessions—for which, I argue, they used ‘recess.’”). 
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C.  Purpose 
Given the want of textual evidence for the technical position, its 
proponents rely heavily on arguments about the Framers’ original 
purpose in adopting the Recess Appointments Clause, or their expec-
tations for how it would apply.152  This section reviews the evidence 
and analysis on those questions. 
1.  The Duration of Recess Appointments 
Proponents of the technical position also argue that the relative 
length of different recess appointments supports their view.  The Re-
cess Appointments Clause specifies that appointments “shall expire at 
the End of [the Senate’s] next Session.”153  Supporters of the tech-
nical position point out that an intra-session recess appointment 
would last through the end of the current official Senate session and 
the following Senate session, which they deem an “implausible” ar-
rangement.154  Similarly, Rappaport writes that intra-session recess 
appointments “could be considerably longer” than inter-session re-
cess appointments, and reasons, “[b]ecause there is no reason why 
the Framers would have desired this result, this suggests that they did 
not intend the intrasession interpretation.”155 
This reasoning is flawed.  If we assume that formal sessions are 
roughly one year in length, then the average intra-session recess ap-
pointment is eighteen months (from mid-way through one year to 
the end of the next formal session) and the average inter-session ap-
pointment twelve months (a full formal session).  A six-month differ-
ence between appointment terms is not very significant; either length 
is far shorter than the tenure of a typical confirmed nominee, partic-
ularly in the case of judges, who enjoy life tenure.  There is no reason 
to assume the Framers even noticed, much less sought to prevent, 
such a minor difference in duration of appointments.  And it is 
abundantly possible that they would have preferred the longer of the 
two terms, particularly when one considers the tradeoffs involved.  
Prohibiting intra-session appointments would sharply limit the use-
 
152 See Herz, supra note 32, at 447–48, 456–57 (noting that arguments for and against intra-
session recess appointments rely heavily on considerations of purpose). 
153 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
154 See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 30–31 (“If ‘Recess’ instead meant any break in leg-
islative business, a recess appointment would last from the date of the appointment, 
through the end of the current session, through the intersession recess, and through the 
entire subsequent session.  This arrangement is implausible.”). 
155 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1567. 
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fulness of the Recess Appointments Clause by leaving the President 
unable to make key appointments when it is desirable to do so, 
thereby undercutting the Clause’s purpose, in exchange for the small 
benefit of reducing the term of the average appointee by six months.  
Conversely, permitting intra-session recess appointments would ad-
vance the Clause’s purpose—to allow the President to fill important 
posts so that the government can function properly and to allow sen-
ators to spend more uninterrupted time in the states—at the low 
price of accepting appointments that would last six months longer on 
average.  It is not obvious why someone who would choose to adopt 
the Clause in the first place would limit it so sharply for so little bene-
fit. 
A second problem with the reasoning on duration of appoint-
ments is that it assumes part of the conclusion.  It assumes that “ses-
sion” means an official session of Congress.  If the word is used in a 
general sense—with “next session” meaning something like “next 
Senate work period”—then the technical point on duration evapo-
rates.  All appointments would be bounded in the same manner, last-
ing until the end of the Senate’s next work period, and they would be 
far shorter than the inter-session appointments envisioned by the 
technical position.  This reading is textually plausible, given that it 
employs the ordinary meaning of “session.”  It is also plausible as a 
matter of policy.  It would have been reasonable for the Framers to 
anticipate that the Senate would readily confirm most recess appoin-
tees and that a relatively brief work period would be plenty of time to 
do so.  As Hartnett has noted, the time from nomination to confirma-
tion “frequently used to be measured in days, even for Supreme 
Court justices.”156  Finally, the technical point also disappears if one 
combines the ordinary reading of “recess” with the Rules of Proceed-
ings Clause.  If one accepts that the Senate can define its own recesses 
and sessions, then third parties need not fiddle with the meanings of 
those terms to protect the Senate. 
2.  Line-Drawing and Judicial Administrability 
Another policy consideration driving the “inter-session” position is 
a concern about line-drawing or “judicial administrability.”157  Rap-
paport argues: 
 
156 Hartnett, supra note 30, at 425. 
157 Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 33 (“Under this approach, there is no clear way to 
distinguish between legislative breaks that are long enough to count as recesses and those 
that are not.”); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reject-
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It seems plausible, in ordinary language, to use “recess” to mean a break 
in legislative business of a substantial degree, excluding very short inter-
ruptions as not really amounting to a recess.  One significant problem 
with this understanding . . . is that there is no clear way to distinguish be-
tween legislative breaks that are long enough to count as recesses and 
those that are not.  The extreme vagueness of this interpretation makes it 
unlikely that the Framers would have employed this concept of a “not-
too-short” break in the legislative proceedings.158 
This position appears to have been first suggested by Attorney Gen-
eral Knox in 1901.159  One response, drawing exclusively on the Con-
stitution’s text, is that the purported problem is resolved by taking 
account of the Rules of Proceedings Clause.  Under that Clause, 
there is no line-drawing problem because the Senate can define its 
own recesses, or draw its own lines, so to speak. 
Setting aside the Rules of Proceedings Clause, there are three re-
maining problems.  First is the lack of evidence that line-drawing 
concerns motivated the drafters.  The Clause’s text, read naturally, 
suggests the opposite, as it employs the general terms “recess” and 
“session” without providing any limitation, caveat, or special defini-
tion.  One might propose a general presumption that the Framers 
sought to draw bright lines and in turn apply that presumption to our 
reading of the Recess Appointments Clause in particular.  The 
originalist brief suggests this position, but in support it cites only a 
single 1989 law review.160  The relevant passage from that article sug-
gests that the Framers generally preferred clarity to a lack of clarity 
and explains that anti-Federalists and Federalists debated whether the 
completed document was vague or precise.161  For this reason, the ar-
ticle cuts against the technical position as much as in its favor.  It re-
minds us that James Madison, one of the most influential Framers, 
 
ing the “functional approach” to interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause for being 
too vague and “flimsy”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1555 (rejecting an argument for cre-
ating a strict time length to constitute a recess). 
158 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1553; see also Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 504 (“Some undefined 
but substantial number of days-break is not a plausible interpretation of ‘the Recess.’”). 
159 See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603 (“If a temporary appointment could in this 
case be legally made during the current adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no 
reason why such an appointment should not be made during any adjournment, as from 
Thursday or Friday until the following Monday.”). 
160 See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 33 (“The extreme vagueness of the ‘practical una-
vailability’ interpretation makes it unlikely that the Framers would have employed it.” (cit-
ing Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 239, 306–09 (1989))). 
161 See Hamburger, supra note 160, at 306 (“[T]he framers and ratifiers appear to have as-
sumed that they should try to avoid vagueness or imprecision in the Constitution.”). 
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thought precision was impossible in legal drafting162 and believed that 
“the ‘exposition of the Constitution’ would be a ‘copious source’ of 
difficulties ‘until its meaning on all great points shall have been set-
tled by precedents.’”163  Despite their awareness of the difficulties in-
herent in drafting and interpreting texts, the Framers nonetheless 
used general terms like “recess” and “session” rather than more pre-
cise constructions.  Perhaps they knew exactly what they were doing 
in choosing those words. 
The propriety of a more general “bright-lines” presumption is also 
doubtful.  Line-drawing questions are endemic to legal analysis and 
particularly common in constitutional decisionmaking.  It is widely 
accepted that the Framers sought to draft a constitution to “endure 
for ages to come.”164  That goal is not compatible with a practice of 
drawing bright lines wherever possible.  It is more compatible with a 
practice of drawing standards in plain terms wherever possible, in the 
expectation that they will prove more flexible and workable.165  In-
deed, general, abstract usage is more common than not in the Con-
stitution, which is why the document contains few anachronisms like 
the twenty-dollar trigger for civil jury trials.166  The document reflects 
precisely what one would expect from sensible drafters:  the use of 
specific, bright-line rules only where they seem especially warrant-
ed.167 
A second problem is that the “inter-session” position is a poor fit 
for the purposes it ascribes to the Framers.  If the Framers were so 
troubled by recess appointments, despite feeling the need to establish 
 
162 See id. at 309 (“Madison argued in the middle of his Lockean analysis of imprecision that 
obscure points in  the Constitution would  be resolved and made certain by caselaw:  ‘All 
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and 
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until 
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and ad  
adjudications.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison))). 
163 Hamburger, supra note 160, at 309 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Samuel John-
ston (June 21, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 250 (1979)). 
164 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
165 See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 137 (rec-
ommending that, on general principle, constitutional drafters “insert essential principles 
only, lest the operations of government should be clogged by rendering those provisions 
permanent and unalterable” and “use simple and precise language, and general proposi-
tions”).   
166 Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism:  A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 406 
(2013) (“The United States is relatively fortunate that the drafters of the Constitution 
tended to frame the rules somewhat abstractly, such that the Third Amendment is the ex-
ception rather than the rule.”). 
167 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69–70 
(2011) (“Were a constitution too specific, its original meaning probably would become 
outdated very quickly.”). 
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the authority, then it makes little sense for them to have permitted all 
inter-session recess appointments regardless of when they arise dur-
ing a recess.  Some might arise just before the Senate is scheduled to 
return from an inter-session recess.  The “inter-session” position 
would permit an appointment in this situation despite maintaining 
that the Framers would have opposed it.168  A much more obvious ap-
proach would have been to limit recess appointments to situations in 
which the Senate will be away for a long time. 
Finally, the Framers might have had policy views wholly different 
from those that the technical position ascribes to them.  For example, 
as suggested above, they may have expected (or desired) the Clause 
to operate pragmatically, perhaps even flexibly, as befits the Clause’s 
language.169  Yet despite the absence of evidence that the Framers 
were concerned about line-drawing in the Clause, the “inter-session” 
position assumes that the concern was so weighty that the Framers let 
it override the Clause’s core purpose.  To constitutionalize any bright 
line regarding what constitutes a “recess” would risk tying the Presi-
dent’s (and the Senate’s)170 hands at times, preventing appointments 
when they would be useful to both branches—and in the national in-
terest.  Proponents of the technical view have not addressed the rea-
sonable possibility that the Framers intended what is most consonant 
with a plain reading of the text of the Recess Appointments Clause—
a pragmatic standard under which the President and Senate would be 
bound not by hard rules, but by notions of reasonableness enforced 
largely, if not entirely, through the political process.171 
3.  The Length of Recesses 
Rappaport also argues that it would have been sensible for the 
Framers to limit the unilateral appointment power to very long re-
cesses, using this point to support the notion that “recess” must have 
meant “inter-session recess.”172  Many of this argument’s problems are 
similar to those regarding the line-drawing point.  One is that we 
 
168 Rappaport himself seems to think it would be “absurd” to permit recess appointments 
during a recess as short as two weeks.  See infra text accompanying note 173. 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
170 A rigid construction of the Recess Appointments Clause would not only bar the President 
from making recess appointments at times, but also the Senate from enabling them when 
it wishes to do so.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
172 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1562–67 (discussing the Framers’ ideas about lengths of 
recesses); id. at 1563–64 (“Thus, by limiting the Recess Appointments Clause to inter-
session recesses, the Framers would have restricted recess appointments to long recesses, 
without imposing an arbitrary time limit on the length of recesses.”). 
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have no direct evidence of the Framers’ policy views.  Here, more 
than anywhere else, Rappaport appears to fill the vacuum with his 
own.  He believes it is “extremely unlikely” and “seems absurd to im-
agine” that the Framers would have permitted presidential appoint-
ments during recesses lasting only one or two weeks.173  In his view, 
“[e]ven one-month recesses seem too short.”174  These assertions 
themselves might strike the reader as implausible given the historical 
evidence:  ratification-era state constitutions used “recess” to trigger 
powers that one wants the executive to have in an emergency;175 state 
legislatures in the ratification era sometimes took “inter-session” re-
cesses as short as one month in length, if not shorter;176 and every at-
torney general to have considered the question has concluded that 
the minimum duration of appointment-enabling recesses ranges be-
tween three days and roughly two weeks.177 
Moreover, as Hartnett has pointed out, the entire session of a 
court in the ratification era sometimes lasted only one or two weeks.178  
It is difficult to maintain that the Framers would have been “absurd” 
to give the President power to supply judges for courts before their 
sessions come and go.  Rappaport responds to this evidence in two 
ways.  First, he argues that, even though we can (and presumably the 
Framers could) imagine benefits to enabling appointments during 
 
173 Id. at 1562. 
174 Id. 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 51–64. 
176 See, e.g., 47 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1770–1771, 
supra note 77, at vii (reporting that one session ended on June 25 and the next began on 
July 25).  It is possible that a thorough search would reveal even shorter inter-session re-
cesses.  This author happened upon this example of a one-month recess (and others) 
without even attempting an exhaustive search. 
177 As discussed above, Attorney General Knox wrote the first opinion squarely addressing 
the validity of intra-session recesses in 1901.  23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99.  Because he 
rejected intra-session recesses, he did not squarely engage the question of the minimum 
length of a recess, although his opinion does suggest that he thought the Clause should 
not permit a recess appointment over a weekend.  See id. at 603 (stating disapprovingly 
that “[i]f a temporary appointment could in this case be legally made during the current 
adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no reason why such an appointment should 
not be made during any adjournment, as from Thursday or Friday until the following 
Monday”).  In the earliest opinion to address that question, from 1921, Attorney General 
Harry Daugherty concluded that a break must be somewhere over ten days in length but 
could not be determined with precision, as the word recess “must be given a practical 
construction.”  33 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 110, at 25.  More recent views have been 
eighteen days, twelve days, ten days, just three days, or possibly no minimum length.  See 
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1548–49 (discussing the various Presidents who made recess 
appointments during these lengths of time). 
178 See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 416 n.172 (“At the founding, however, an entire term of a 
court might come and go within a week  or two.”).  
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relatively short recesses, the drawbacks would still be too great.179  He 
does not offer evidence that the Framers analyzed these tradeoffs or 
that they agreed with his assessment of the costs and benefits.  Rap-
paport’s second response is to point out that Senate confirmations 
would sometimes take more than two weeks and to argue, therefore, 
that it would not have made sense to permit the President to act 
more quickly on a unilateral basis.180  But as Rappaport notes else-
where, the Senate could confirm nominees quickly when necessary.181  
In fact, in the early years of the republic, the Senate commonly held 
single-day special sessions to consider nominations.182  It is difficult to 
maintain that the Framers would have been “absurd” to let the Presi-
dent fill vacancies with similar speed in the Senate’s absence. 
What appears to drive the inter-session position, as Rappaport’s 
discussion of “costs” suggests, is a concern that the President might 
subvert the ordinary nomination process.183  We have no evidence 
that the Framers shared this concern, much less shared it to a degree 
that would justify severe restrictions on the Clause,184 and one might 
 
179 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1562 n.226 (“The question, though, is not whether one 
can imagine circumstances when it might be convenient for a recess appointment to be 
made during a short recess. . . .  Rather, the question is whether the Framers would have 
wanted the President to have the power to make recess appointments during all brief re-
cesses, even though filling vacancies during these short recesses would generally not be 
critical.  The answer to that question remains clear no.”).  
180 See id. (“It is hard to believe that the Framers would have wanted to take the extraordinary 
step of bypassing the Senate for a recess of a week or two, when a considerably longer pe-
riod often would be needed to make either a recess appointment or an advice and con-
sent appointment.”) 
181 See id. at 1511–12 (arguing that the President and Senate can quickly nominate and con-
firm appointees to fill late-session vacancies). 
182 For example, the Second, Third, and Fifth Senates held one-day sessions of this type.  See 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 10, at 522 (providing the dates of these sessions). 
183 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1491 (summarizing that contrary views “would allow recess 
appointments during recesses that seem far too brief to justify bypassing the Senate’s con-
stitutionally mandated role”); id. (“If the original meaning were followed . . . the Presi-
dent could only make recess appointments during the single annual intersession recess 
and only for vacancies that arose during that recess.  This would make it extremely diffi-
cult for the President to use his recess appointment power as a means of appointing indi-
viduals who could not secure the consent of the Senate.”); id. at 1494 (stating that “per-
haps the biggest interpretive error concerning the Recess Appointments Clause has been 
the view that its sole purpose is to fill vacant offices, rather than to fill such offices while 
preventing the President from too easily circumventing the Senate’s confirmation role”); 
id. at 1499–1500 & n.34 (deeming the Clause “striking” in how far it departs from the or-
dinary appointment method and asserting that “the significance of the recess appoint-
ment power conferred by the Framers is a strong reason for construing the Clause to ap-
ply only in narrow circumstances”). 
184 The closest Rappaport comes to attempting to substantiate the notion that the Framers’ 
shared his concern is when he advocates reading the purpose of the Appointments 
Clause into the Recess Appointments Clause.  Id. at 1494 (“[T]he Framers’ decision to 
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reasonably conclude that history has shown the concern to be over-
stated. Presidential administrations have held since 1921 that the 
President can make intra-session recess appointments.185  Apparently 
no majority of senators has ever objected to this view, and no Presi-
dent has “easily circumvented” the Senate’s advice and consent, to 
use Rappaport’s phrase.186  This is particularly true if the Senate’s role 
is conceived as requiring majority rather than supermajority con-
sent.187 
A final problem with the absurdity argument regarding the length 
of recesses is it presents a false choice between long and short breaks.  
The Framers could have preferred another design entirely.  They 
might have thought it best to grant the Senate power to define its 
own recesses (and sessions), as the Rules of Proceedings Clause di-
rects.  That approach would quiet concerns about subversion of the 
Senate without constitutionalizing a rigid rule that could yield unde-
sirable or arbitrary results.  Alternatively, the Framers might have 
thought it best to establish a pragmatic regime in which the Constitu-
tion defines the recess appointment power in broad, even vague, 
terms and leaves it to the Senate and the President to negotiate the 
meaning over time, constrained by the political process. 
4.  The Framers’ Expectations 
a.  The Inter-session-Expectations Narrative 
One argument that Rappaport does not state explicitly, but that 
one gathers impressionistically from his analysis, is that “recess” signi-
 
employ the Appointments Clause, I will argue, helps to illuminate their purposes in en-
acting the Recess Appointments Clause.”).  Rappaport argues that we should read the 
unilateral appointment power in the Recess Appointments Clause narrowly because it 
cuts against the Framers’ baseline design of joint power.  In light of the baseline, he rea-
sons, it is “hard to believe” that the Framers would have designed a “broad recess ap-
pointment power” that would allow the President “to easily circumvent” the Senate. Id. at 
1507.  But the purpose of an exception is to cut against the rule from which it departs.  
There is no basis for a general rule that all exceptions should be construed narrowly, and 
Rappaport provides no special reason—certainly not one attributable to the Framers—to 
adopt such a rule when reading the Recess Appointments Clause.  The only Framer he 
cites who holds that view is Edmund Randolph.  Id. at 1518–19 (discussing Randolph’s in-
terpretation).  But Randolph opposed the presidential appointment power and the Re-
cess Appointments Clause and wanted to see them removed from the Constitution.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 266–67.  His views on the Clause can hardly be taken as 
representative of general opinion. 
185  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
186 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1507. 
187 See infra text accompanying notes 350–58. 
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fies “inter-session recess” in part because that is simply what the 
Framers had in mind—or perhaps was the only type of recess they 
could have anticipated.188  We can call this the “inter-session-
expectations” narrative.  It may be the most intuitively appealing 
point in favor of the technical position.  The basic idea is that the 
Framers would have thought “recess” referred to long, inter-session 
recesses because at the time, legislatures typically held a single session 
annually, followed by a long break.189  One reason was the difficulty of 
eighteenth-century travel and communication over long distances, 
which made it unlikely that Congress would choose to hold multiple 
work periods in a given year.190  Another was a prevailing theory of 
republican governance, which held that representatives should spend 
a significant portion of their time at home.191 
One problem with this narrative is that, even if we assume that the 
Framers thought Congress would choose not to take multiple breaks in 
a year—which is only an unsubstantiated guess192—that is a far cry 
from prohibiting it from doing so, or from writing rigid constitutional 
rules that function properly only if Congress conforms to expecta-
tions.  Moreover, reading the text in accordance with the inter-
session-expectations narrative would have the strange result of actual-
ly frustrating the Framers’ presumed goals.  Rappaport argues that 
the Framers expected Congress to hold one session annually and take 
one long recess between sessions.193  He also argues that the Framers 
wanted (or should have wanted) to limit recess appointments to long 
recesses, and that the sensible way to accomplish that goal would be 
to limit the power to inter-session recesses.194  From these points, he 
anomalously concludes that the Clause should be read to permit all 
 
188 Rappaport does not state this claim explicitly, and it is possible that he does not support 
it.  This Article’s discussion is directed at the position that it outlines and no more. 
189 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1498, 1563 (“When the Constitution was written, interses-
sion recesses regularly lasted between six and nine months.”). 
190 See, e.g., id. at 1498, 1564 (noting that early America was “a large nation during an age of 
slow transport” and that transportation costs were high and “distances would increase as 
the country grew,” which “meant that Congress would meet for one relatively short ses-
sion per year followed by one long recess”). 
191 See id. at 1564 (“[T]he republican political theory held during the early years of the Re-
public required that legislatures remain in session only for a fraction of the year, thereby 
allowing the legislators to return to their homes and behave like ordinary citizens.”). 
192 Rappaport’s sole evidence on the point is not from the Framers themselves, but rather a 
1924 text.  See id. at 1563–64 nn.228, 230 (citing and quoting Robert Luce, LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLIES 154 (1924), for the proposition that, “concerning state legislatures, ‘[i]n co-
lonial times and indeed up to the development of our railroad systems, the slowness of 
travel made any but periodical gatherings out of the question’”). 
193 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1563–64. 
194 Id. 
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inter-session recesses and to bar all intra-session recesses, regardless of 
their lengths.  In other words, he retains the inter-session element and 
discards duration as a factor—abandoning not just part of what he 
deems the original expectation behind “recess,” but the more signifi-
cant part.  He might respond that the Framers thought “inter-session” 
was synonymous with “long”195 and therefore the “inter-session” view 
conforms to theirs.  But in modern times, we know that intra-session 
recesses are often longer than inter-session recesses.  In other words, 
if the Framers held the views that the technical position ascribes to 
them, then they are fortunate not to have written the word “inter-
session” into the Recess Appointments Clause.  Why, then, should we 
pencil it in? 
This tangled web of counterfactual reasoning is one reason why 
originalists and nonoriginalists alike criticize the approach of reason-
ing from the Framers expectations.  When one attempts to discern 
them, particularly in the absence of good evidence, one is engaging 
in a fundamentally creative, counter-factual enterprise, and it is diffi-
cult to avoid projecting one’s own knowledge and viewpoints onto 
the past.196  Indeed, one reason the inter-session-expectations point is 
enticing is that it accords with our knowledge of certain historical 
facts.  Early Congresses did, in fact, typically take multi-month inter-
session recesses, although they sometimes took more than one in a 
single year.197  They rarely took intra-session recesses at all and, when 
they did, those recesses were roughly one week in length.198  But the 
fact that we know early Congresses followed a certain pattern does 
not establish that the Framers predicted the same events.  The evi-
dence on that point is much more equivocal.  Alexander Hamilton 
predicted that the House and Senate would each meet once annually 
 
195 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1562–66 (arguing that “the Framers took the length of 
recesses into account indirectly”). 
196 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Original-
ism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 574–75 (2008) (arguing that “the expectations of the fram-
ers” and “the public meaning of the text” in early America cannot be known); Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 729–30 & n.96 (2009) (discuss-
ing criticisms of the original meanings approach to interpreting the Constitution and cit-
ing Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 504 (2008)).  As Rap-
paport notes in the context of an unrelated argument, “our world is completely different 
than the Framers’ world.” Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1512 n.70. 
197 See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 10, at 522–23 (recording one-week recesses in 
1800, 1817, and 1828). 
198 See Id. 
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for three months and four to six months, respectively,199 and some of 
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were concerned that 
the Congress might not even meet once each year unless required to 
do so.200  But other delegates expressed concern that the Senate 
would stay in session most of the time,201 and some favored frequent 
meetings of Congress.202  Among those who expected the Senate to be 
“almost continually sitting,”203 it can hardly be said that “recess” must 
have meant “long, inter-session recess.”  Of course, one also should 
not forget the extensive evidence from dictionaries and ratification-
era usage examples that contradict the “inter-session” view.204  It is dif-
ficult to justify the assumption that “recess” meant something like 
“long, inter-session recess” to the Framers when our records of their 
correspondence suggest otherwise. 
Moreover, we know little to nothing of how the Framers expected 
Congress to define its sessions, further complicating the notion that 
they had a certain type of “inter-session” recess in mind.  Jefferson’s 
Manual reasons its way to a basis for how the Senate should define its 
sessions as if the matter remained unsettled in 1801.205  As discussed 
above, states followed different practices in the ratification era.  For 
example, while New Jersey enumerated its sessions by year and used 
 
199 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Hence it is evident that a portion of the 
year will suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives; we 
may suppose about a fourth for the latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former.”). 
200 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 200 (noting 
that the requirement that Congress meet once a year was added because “that point 
seems not to be freed from doubt”). 
201 Id., at 175; id. at 230; id. at 431; LUTHER MARTIN, GENUINE INFORMATION, in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 255, 271; 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 444.  James Wilson 
seems to have had mixed views.  Compare id. at 523 (reporting Wilson’s view that “[t]he 
Senate, will moreover in all probability be in constant Session”), with 2 ELLIOT, supra note 
48, at 513 (reporting Wilson as saying, “I apprehend that . . . it will not be found neces-
sary for the Senate always to sit.  I know some gentlemen have insinuated and conjectured 
that this will be the case; but I am inclined to a contrary opinion”). 
202 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 199 (“Mr. 
Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent meetings of the Legisla-
tive body.”). 
203 GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT, in 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 638. 
204 See supra Part I.A–B. 
205 See JEFFERSON, supra note 68, at 96 (discussing motions to adjourn).  This is not to say that 
the Senate had not settled into a practice, but rather that the basis or propriety of the 
practice might still have been unclear, which in turn suggests that the eventual practice 
might have been difficult to predict years earlier.  Alternatively, the opposite could be 
true.  Perhaps Congress was just doing what everyone expected.  Under that view, Thom-
as Jefferson’s posture of working toward a legal explanation in the Manual is just that—
posturing. 
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the word “sitting” to refer to individual work periods during a year, 
Massachusetts labeled each sitting a separate “session.”206  Observers 
following the technical definition of “recess,” then, would call the 
same type of break an “intra-session” recess in New Jersey and an “in-
ter-session” recess in Massachusetts.  How could the Framers have 
known which convention the U.S. Senate would adopt?  Imagine 
some of them expected Congress to follow the Massachusetts model.  
In that case, the “inter-session” view actually defeats their intent.  This 
discussion illustrates that if the Framers wished to constitutionalize a 
certain type of recess, one would expect them to have defined it more 
clearly, and possibly sketched a concept of the session as well.  Of 
course, if they thought about the issue long enough to perceive these 
definitional needs, then they also would have been reasonable to es-
chew strict definitions altogether and leave the details to future polit-
ical actors.207 
b.  A Counter-narrative:  Military Responsiveness 
One notable aspect of the inter-session-expectations view is its lack 
of context.  It isolates a single point about what the Framers might 
have thought, from which it builds out a view on the Clause’s whole 
purpose.  What might we see if we were to widen the inquiry at the 
starting point?  Other possible narratives come into view, including 
one that counsels in favor of an ordinary reading of “recess” and a 
liberal reading of the Clause more generally. 
It is common that the Constitution was born out of the failures of 
the Articles of Confederation.  The federation lacked a central power 
adequate to respond to many of the problems that its member states 
faced, including existential threats posed by foreign powers and do-
mestic unrest alike.  Developments like Shays’ Rebellion, which be-
gan on August 29, 1786, are credited with bringing recalcitrant 
members like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and others back 
to the drafting table.208  During that episode, Massachusetts Governor 
 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
207 Cf. Balkin, supra note 24, at 76 (“We should ask whether it makes sense for us to ascribe to 
the adopters the purpose of delegating a particular issue to be worked out in the future, 
even though the adopters might have had application beliefs about the issue in question.  If 
it does not make sense to ascribe a purpose to delegate a question to the future, then we 
should infer that this content is part of the framework.”). 
208 See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION:  THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 
120–31 (1980) (discussing the fact that the Rebellion showed that the states were weak as 
individuals and some early Americans’ arguments for a more unified national govern-
ment). 
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James Bowdoin struggled for months to maintain order.  When he 
called on local militia to halt violent attacks on courthouses, many 
militiamen refused, siding with the rebels.209  Bowdoin appealed to 
the Continental Congress, which responded by establishing a federal 
army, but troop recruitment efforts foundered when every state but 
Virginia refused to fund the force.210  After months of violence, mer-
cantile elites in Massachusetts funded a private army to quell the un-
rest.211  During this period, the former colonies had also just complet-
ed a war of independence and faced threats from England, France, 
and Spain. 
This context helps us understand several interrelated provisions of 
the document that emerged from the 1787 convention in Philadelph-
ia, which began less than three months after Shays’ Rebellion was put 
down.  The Constitution makes the President the Commander in 
Chief of the armed forces,212 provides the President authority to ap-
point “officers of the United States,” a category that includes military 
officers, with the Senate’s advice and consent,213 as well as unilaterally 
on a temporary basis when the Senate is away,214 and charges the fed-
eral government with protecting each state from domestic violence 
upon its request.215 
Given the historical circumstances and the apparent motivations 
of the drafters, it is implausible that these critical powers would turn 
on accidents of Senate procedure.  If an emergency arises that re-
quires a federal response, and effective action requires the President 
to fill vacant offices, then the Constitution provides a means to do so 
regardless of the Senate’s availability.  Under the technical position, it 
is not hard to imagine the United States experiencing a major attack 
to which the President cannot respond quickly and effectively be-
cause the Senate happens to be on an “intra-session” rather than “in-
ter-session” recess.  From the perspective of what we might call the 
“military-responsiveness” narrative, forbidding presidential appoint-
ments during intra-session recesses would undermine some of the 
Constitution’s core purposes and most important grants of federal 
power. 
 
209 See id. at 79–80. 
210 See id. at 84 (discussing the failure of the attempt to create federal troops). 
211 See id. at 82–86 (discussing the Massachusetts recruitment and how it was followed by simi-
lar recruitments in other states). 
212 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
213 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
214 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
215 Id. at art. IV, § 4. 
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III.  INITIAL EVIDENCE ON SESSION AND HAPPEN 
Although this Article does not take strong positions on the mean-
ing of “session” or “happen,” as it does not engage in thorough analy-
sis of those questions.  But it is worth sketching a preliminary view on 
each.  In short, the narrow readings of “session” and “happen” also 
appear to have surprisingly little evidentiary support. 
A.  Session 
The definition of “session” is relevant to the technical position on 
“recess” because that view requires “session” to have two characteris-
tics:  it must be mutually exclusive with “recess,” and it must refer 
solely to the formal (typically annual) sessions of Congress.216  A mere 
finding that recesses and sessions were mutually exclusive would not 
support the technical position because both words might be used in 
their ordinary senses, with session referring to any sitting and recess 
referring to any break in any sitting.  And a mere finding that “ses-
sion” refers only to formal sessions would not suffice because recesses 
might be taken during sessions.  That is, of course, the central ques-
tion regarding the propriety of intra-session recess appointments.  
Indeed, one extraordinary oversight by some who hold the technical 
position, including the D.C. Circuit, is that they assume that “session” 
refers to formal sessions of Congress—thereby assuming away half the 
question.217  This Article does not conduct a comprehensive inquiry 
into “session,” but the initial evidence contradicts both of the tech-
nical position’s requirements.  It is unclear whether “session” in the 
Recess Appointments Clause contemplates only formal sessions or 
means something like what the contemporary senators call a “work 
period,” any period of legislative business between breaks of a week 
or more.218  Either is plausible—if anything the “work period” defini-
tion appears more likely, as it tracks ratification-era state legislative 
 
216 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550 (“The intersession interpretation . . . reads the 
term ’recess’ to mean a period when Congress is not in session.  Under this view, a recess 
is not just any break in the business of the legislature, but only a break that occurs when 
the legislature is out of session.”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1487 (“The Article main-
tains that the Constitution permits recess appointments only during an intersession re-
cess—the recess between two sessions of a Congress—and does not allow such appoint-
ments during an intrasession recess—the typically shorter recess taken during a 
session.”). 
217 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (asserting without citing any 
authority that “[i]t is universally accepted that “Session” here refers to the usually two or 
sometimes three sessions per Congress”). 
218 See infra text accompanying notes 361–63. 
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practices219—and neither would imply that the word “recess” must 
have a narrow, technical meaning.220 
Evidence from dictionaries strongly suggests that the word session, 
like recess, had an ordinary, broad meaning.  Johnson’s dictionaries 
define “session” in relevant part as “the space for which an assembly 
sits, without intermission or recess.”221  (The dictionary defines 
“space” in part as a “[q]uantity of time.”222) Johnson’s makes no men-
tion of a technical notion of “session” that would refer only to an offi-
cial period of a legislative body.  To the contrary, by stating that a ses-
sion is a sitting without a break of any kind, the dictionary implies the 
opposite.  Formal sessions are usually (if not always) too long to op-
erate without breaks of any kind. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) supplies a technical definition 
of “session,” but only as a special usage of its third definition of the 
word.  The OED leads with a rare usage, “[t]he action or act of sit-
ting,”223 then provides the ordinary, general meaning of “session” as 
applied to legislative bodies:  “[t]he sitting together of a number of 
persons (esp. of a court, a legislative, administrative, or deliberative 
body) for conference or the transaction of business.”224  Notably, the 
OED states that, in the past, this sense of “session” commonly referred 
to a single, continuous sitting225—a definition that undermines the 
technical position on “recess.”  If “session” means a single, continu-
ous sitting, and “recess” is defined a time when the body is not in 
“session” (which is the technical position)226 then “recess” must refer 
to any legislative break—any break in a single, continuous sitting, not 
just breaks between official sessions. 
 
219 See infra text accompanying notes 361–66. 
220 One problem for the technical position is the implausibility of the Framers restricting the 
Senate’s ability to define its own sessions, in direct contravention of the Rules of Proceed-
ings Clause, not to mention doing so obliquely, with general terms in Article II rather 
than a clear statement in Article I.  This point is made above in the discussion of the 
Rules of Proceedings Clause.  There is no need to repeat it here. 
221 2 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 1797; 2 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 19, at 608. 
222 2 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 19, at 696. 
223 OED, supra note 53. 
224 Id. (“The sitting together of a number of persons (esp. of a court, a legislative, adminis-
trative, or deliberative body) for conference or the transaction of business.  Also (now 
somewhat rarely), a single continuous sitting of persons assembled for conference or 
business.”). 
225 Id. 
226 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550 (“The intersession interpretation, by contrast, 
reads the term ‘recess’ to mean a period when Congress is not in session.  Under this 
view, a recess is not just any break in the business of the legislature, but only a break that 
occurs when the legislature is out of session.  This position views a recess as mutually ex-
clusive with the legislative session.”).  
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Third, the OED supplies a narrower definition:  “[a] continuous 
series of sittings or meetings . . . held daily or at short intervals; the 
period or term during which the sittings continue to be held; op-
posed to recess or vacation.”227  This definition still falls short of the 
technical position on “session,” as it corresponds not only to official 
sessions, but also to other periods of business that are bounded by 
significant breaks.  In the contemporary Senate, this concept—a pe-
riod of legislative business between Senate breaks of one or more 
weeks—is sometimes also referred to as a “work period.”228  It is here 
that the OED finally supplies a meaning of session like that main-
tained by the technical position, identifying it as a specific, English 
parliamentary usage:  “[i]n English parliamentary use, applied to the 
period between the opening of Parliament and its prorogation.”229  
One might argue that this definition may be precisely what the Fram-
ers intended to invoke, despite that it is a specialized meaning.  But 
that point would be difficult to establish.  As the OED explains, even 
in the specialized context of English parliament, the word is some-
times used—or misused—more broadly to refer to other legislative 
periods: 
The term autumn session (instead of ‘autumn sitting’) is sometimes used 
to designate the exceptional resumption of the sittings of the Houses, af-
ter an adjournment, in what is normally the autumn recess; but this use is 
condemned by parliamentary authorities as incorrect.230 
In sum, the evidence from dictionaries confirms the prevalence of 
the ordinary meaning of session and casts doubt on the technical po-
sition.231 
 
227 OED, supra note 53 (emphasis in original). 
228 See infra text accompanying notes 362–63.  The Senate Rules use “session” not only to re-
fer to formal, usually annual sessions, but also other periods such as “daily sessions.” 
MCGOWAN, supra note 45, at 4 (printing of Rule IV, which governs the “Commencement 
of Daily Sessions”).  The Senate Rules also refer to open session, closed session, and Ex-
ecutive Session. See, e.g., id. at 1 (referring to an “open session”); id. at 20 (discussing what 
happens “when the Senate meets in closed session”); id. at 55 (printing of Rule XXIX 
which pertains to “Executive Sessions”). 
229 OED, supra note53. 
230 Id. 
231 Note that Johnson’s definition of “session” refers to an “intermission or recess,” suggest-
ing that those two terms might refer to distinct concepts.  Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary de-
fines “intermission” in relevant part as “[c]essation for a time; pause; intermediate stop.”  
1 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 1114.  One can infer then, that “intermission” in the 
context of legislative business might have referred to an exceedingly short break, such as 
a lunch break.  This inference does not help establish whether “recess” is used in an or-
dinary or technical sense in the Constitution, but it suggests an answer to the most com-
mon criticism of the ordinary reading of recess, which is that the Framers cannot have in-
tended a broad meaning because it would embrace any break, even a lunch break.  
Perhaps such breaks were more commonly known as “intermissions” than “recesses.” 
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Aside from the dictionary evidence on “session,” this Article has 
already noted that the Constitution appears to distinguish between a 
“session of Congress” and a session of an individual house.232  It has 
also noted the existence of variation in state practice for enumerating 
“sessions:”  some state legislatures used a practice like the modern 
Senate’s, in which sessions are enumerated annually; others named 
each sitting a separate “session” regardless of how many they held in 
any given year.233  This usage strongly suggests that “session” in the 
Constitution does not have a fixed, narrow, and technical meaning 
referring only to the formal, typically annual, sessions of Congress.  
Rather, the word either refers to any legislative break or something 
akin to what the modern Senate calls the “work period.”234  It might 
seem odd that the term of a recess appointee could expire at the end 
of the Senate’s next work period.  But if one recalls that the Senate is 
usually expected to confirm presidential nominees,235 then there is 
nothing obviously wrong with such an arrangement. 
Finally, Edward Hartnett has argued that the Constitution’s struc-
ture suggests that recesses and sessions are not mutually exclusive.  In 
his view, Congress can initiate recesses alone but needs the Presi-
dent’s assistance to initiate a new session.236  Because the Constitution 
puts recess-initiation and session-initiation in separate hands, he rea-
sons, “it must contemplate that [recesses and sessions] are not inher-
ently reciprocal.”237  Moreover, although Jefferson’s Manual uses “ses-
sion” to refer to formal sessions in multiple places,238 Jefferson cites 
British Parliamentary sources for the proposition that the Senate may 
end its current session and start a new one whenever it desires, to 
solve procedural problems.239  His view accords with the point that 
sessions are malleable and not a fixed constitutional concept. 
 
232 See supra text accompanying notes 41–46. 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
234 See id. 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
236 See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 422–24 (“The two houses of Congress can control when 
they are in recess by concurrent resolution, but they must act ‘by law’ to exercise control 
over their sessions . . . that is, by presenting a bill to the President for signature or veto.”). 
237 Id. at 424. 
238 See, e.g., JEFFERSON, supra note 68, at 38 (“Standing committees . . . are usually appointed 
at the first meeting, to continue through the session.”). 
239 See, e.g., id. at 149 (“Or the session may be closed for one, two, three, or more days, and a 
new one commenced.”). 
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B.  Happen 
Having presented an affirmative case on “recess” and a comment 
on “session,” it now makes sense to discuss the “happen” issue briefly 
to generate a more full account of the Recess Appointments Clause.  
The question regarding “happen” is whether a vacancy must arise 
during a recess, or merely exist during it.  Following Rappaport’s 
lead, we can call these positions the “arise” view and the “exist” 
view.240 
As with the word “recess,” our default position on “happen” 
should be the term’s ordinary meaning.  Initially, that meaning ap-
pears to be “occur” or “happen to arise,” as opposed to “happen to 
exist.”  That is the word’s modern meaning, and it was certainly a use 
of the word in the ratification era as well.  Johnson’s 1755 and 1785 
dictionaries define the word primarily as “[t]o fall out;  . . . to come to 
pass.”241 OED’s first definition of “happen” is “[o]f an event, action, 
etc.:  to take place, to come to pass, occur . . . to ensue as an effect or 
result.”242 
Further study would be required to be confident that the present 
ordinary meaning of “happen” was the exclusive public meaning at 
the time of the Constitution’s drafting and ratification. There is 
strong evidence that “happen” might also have meant “exist.”  The 
OED’s third definition is “[t]o chance to be . . . .”243  It provides the fol-
lowing usage examples, some from or near the ratification era, which 
are worth quoting extensively because the usage is so foreign to mod-
ern ears: 
Scho..tald his Eyme that he was hapnyt thar. (1488) 
He felt hym self happynnyt amyd his foyn. (1522)244 
The knots or kernels that happen in any part of the body. (1657) 
It made a Jest for every body that went by; and wou’d have been appre-
hended by the very blind Cuckold himself, had he hapned in the way. 
(1693) 
Two other Officers..coming up to us, asked how we happened abroad so 
late? (1755)245 
 
240 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1502–03 (discussing the “arise” and “exist” interpretations 
of the term “happen” in the Clause). 
241 1 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 965; 1 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 19, at 929. 
242 OED, supra note 53. 
243 OED, supra note 53 (emphasis added). 
244 This example is from the Aeneid and has also been translated as, “found himself amidst 
his foes.” VIRGIL, THE AENEID, book IX (trans. John Dryden, 1697), available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Virgil/aeneid.mb.txt.  When rephrased in something closer to 
modern English, the OED example apparently would read, “he found himself happened 
amidst his foes.” 
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I once happened in Company with a very ingenious Gentleman. (1776) 
Some young Americans happening at Toulon. (1806) 
Although most ratification-era dictionaries provide definitions similar 
to Johnson’s,246 one also provides the definition “to be.”247  In perhaps 
the most persuasive example, Thomas Jefferson actually used the 
word “happen” to mean exist in personal correspondence about va-
cancies.248  His usage is highly persuasive evidence because, unlike a 
direct opinion on the Clause, it is unlikely to have been strategic.  It 
probably reflects ordinary usage by one of the more articulate mem-
bers of the framing generation. 
In addition, Attorney General Wirt’s 1823 opinion approving the 
“exist” interpretation provides stronger support for that view as a 
matter of original meaning than has been recognized previously.  
Most commentators focus on Wirt’s concession that the “most natural 
sense” of “happen” is the arise view.249  But Wirt noted that “[i]t may 
mean, also, without violence to the sense, ‘happen to exist.’”250  In other 
words, although the “arise” reading was more natural, the “exist” 
reading was also plausible as a textual matter.  Wirt’s analysis comes 
thirty-six years after the Constitution was adopted, and therefore it is 
not the strongest evidence of ordinary meaning in 1787.  But it is 
consistent with the possibility that the Constitution used a now-
archaic meaning of “happen” that an 1823 reader could still recog-
nize—and some writers, such as Thomas Jefferson, still used251—even 
though it had already begun to sound less natural than the arise us-
age.  The arise meaning was likely more common even in 1787, but 
 
245 A fuller excerpt reads, “[o]rders were given that no Man should be out of his Quar-
ters . . . .  my Comrade Johnston and I were going home, we met on the Market-place the 
Major, and two other Officers, who coming up to us, asked how we happened abroad so 
late? I answered we were going home . . . .” THE MEMOIRS OF CAPT. PETER DRAKE 37 
(1755), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=kl9DAAAAYAAJ. 
246 See Natelson, supra note 55, at 227–28 (discussing “[a] survey of Founding-Era dictionar-
ies” concerning the meaning of the word “happen” and finding that “‘happen’ more like-
ly was used to mean ‘arise’”). 
247 See id. at 228 (“The only arguably dissenting work was that by Thomas Dyche and Wil- 
liam Pardon, which gave as a secondary definition . . . the phrase ‘to be.’” (quoting 
THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 379 (16th ed. 
1777))). 
248 Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Jan. 26, 1802), available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0280 (“The phrase in the 
constitution is ‘to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate.’ 
this may mean ‘vacancies that may happen to be’ or ‘may happen to fall.’ it is certainly 
susceptible of both constructions . . . .”). 
249 1 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 88, at 631–32. 
250 Id. at 632 (emphasis added). 
251 See supra note 248. 
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that a meaning was more common does not mean that the Constitu-
tion adopted it. 
Alexander Hamilton’s opinion is similar.  He appears to endorse 
the “arise” view, with the important qualification that he was not con-
sidering it directly, but rather addressing the question whether a new-
ly established office constitutes a “vacancy.”252  However, Hamilton 
characterizes his reading of “happen,” which involves casualty or fall-
ing out by chance, not as the exclusive meaning of the word, but only 
its “most familiar and obvious sense.”253  Perhaps this is a rhetorical 
flourish rather than a genuine qualification.  But perhaps it means 
exactly what it implies:  that “happen” also had other meanings. 
Other evidence comes from appointment powers granted in state 
constitutions.  Among the ratification-era state constitutions that pro-
vide some kind of special appointment power, most, if not all, supply 
it without regard to when the vacancy arises.254  For example, the 
South Carolina Constitutions of 1776 and 1778 state: 
 
252 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3, 1799), available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=Date%3A1799-05-03&s=1111311111&r=2 (“In my opin-
ion Vacancy is a relative term, and presupposes that the Office has been once filled.  If so, 
the  power to fill the Vacancy is not the power to make an original appointment.  The 
phrase  ‘Which may have happened’ serves to confirm this construction.  It implies casu-
alty—and  denotes such Offices as having been once filled, have become vacant by acci-
dental circumstances.  This at least is the most familiar and obvious sense, and in a matter 
of this kind it could not be adviseable to exercise a doubtful authority.”). 
253 Id. 
254 See DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 21 (“In case of vacancy of the offices above directed to be 
filled by the president and general assembly, the president and privy council may appoint 
others in their stead until there shall be a new election.”); PA. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20 
(“The president . . . shall supply every vacancy in any office, occasioned by death, resigna-
tion, removal or disqualification, until the office can be filled in the time and manner di-
rected by law or this constitution.”); S.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XXIV (“That in Case of Va-
cancy in any of the Offices above directed to be filled by the General Assembly and 
legislative Council, the President and Commander in Chief with the advice and Consent 
of the Privy Council, may appoint others in their stead, until there shall be an election by 
the General Assembly and legislative Council to fill those vacancies respectively.”); S.C. 
CONST. of 1778 art. XXXI (“That in case of vacancy in any of the offices above directed to 
be filled by the senate and house of representatives, the governor and commander-in-
chief, with the advice and consent of the privy council, may appoint others in their stead, 
until there shall be an election by the senate and house of representatives to fill those va-
cancies respectively.”); GA. CONST. of 1777 art. XXI (“The Governor, with the Advice of 
the executive Council, shall fill up all intermediate Vacancies, that shall happen in Offic-
es, till the next general Election . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777 ch. 2, § XVIII (“The Gover-
nor . . . shall supply every vacancy in any Office, occasioned by Death, Resignation, Re-
moval, or Disqualification until the Office can be filled in the time and manner directed 
by Law or this Constitution.”); VT. CONST. of 1786 ch. 2, § XI (“The Governor . . . shall 
supply every vacancy in any office occasioned by death or otherwise, until the office can 
be filled in the manner directed by law or this Constitution.”).  Some of these documents 
 
Oct. 2014] THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS  219 
 
That in Case of Vacancy in any of the Offices above directed to be filled 
by the General Assembly and legislative Council, the President and 
Commander in Chief, with the advice and Consent of the Privy Council, 
may appoint others in their stead, until there shall be an election by the 
General Assembly and legislative Council to fill those vacancies respec-
tively.255 
Likewise, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 states: 
In case of vacancy of the offices above directed to be filled by the presi-
dent and general assembly, the president and privy council may appoint 
others in their stead until there shall be a new election.256 
The Georgia Constitution of 1777 is the only ratification-era state 
constitution that uses the word “happen” when granting special ap-
pointment powers.  It clearly adopts an “exist” view, and the word 
“happen” would serve the same function in the provision regardless 
of whether it means “arise” or “exist”: 
The [g]overnor, with the [a]dvice of the executive [c]ouncil, shall fill up 
all intermediate [v]acancies, that shall happen in [o]ffices, till the next 
general [e]lection . . . .257 
This power apparently extends to positions for which the Georgia leg-
islature otherwise has exclusive appointment authority, such as county 
justices of the peace and registers of probate.258 
Two possible exceptions to the general “exist” rule are the North 
Carolina and Maryland constitutions of 1776.259  The former is some-
times cited as evidencing the “arise” view of “happen” in the federal 
Constitution.260  Like all but one of the state constitutions, the North 
 
grant unilateral appointment power to the executive in all situations and therefore must 
be discounted. 
255 S.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XXIV; S.C. CONST. of 1778 art. XXXI. 
256 DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 21. 
257 GA. CONST. of 1777 art. XXI. 
258 Id. at art. LIII (“All civil Officers in each County shall be annually elected, on the Day of 
the general Election, except Justices of the Peace, and Registers of Probates, who shall be 
appointed by the House of Assembly.”). 
259 See MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XLI (“That there be a Register of Wills appointed for 
each county who shall be commissioned by the Governor, on the joint recommendation 
of the Senate and House of Delegates; anal that, upon the death, resignation, disqualifi-
cation, or removal out of the county of any Register of Wills, in the recess of the General 
Assembly the Governor, with the advice of the Council, may appoint and commission a fit 
and proper person to such vacant office, to hold the same until the meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XX (“That in every case where any Officer the 
right of whose appointment is by this Constitution vested in the General Assembly, shall 
during their recess die or his Office by other means become vacant, the Governor shall 
have power with the advice of the Council of State to fill up such vacancy by granting a 
Temporary Commission, which shall expire at the end of the next Session of the General 
Assembly.”). 
260 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing the North Carolina 
Constitution for support that it, “like the Recess Appointments Clause, describes a singu-
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Carolina and Maryland documents do not use the word “happen,” 
which limits their value as to the meaning of the precise text in the 
Recess Appointments Clause.261  It is also questionable whether they 
actually incorporate the “arise” view.  The North Carolina Constitu-
tion arguably limits the recess appointment power to vacancies that 
arise during a recess only in cases of vacancy caused by death.  If the 
office “become[s] vacant” by “other means,” then it is not clear that 
the “during the recess” limitation applies. The provision reads: 
[I]n every case where any [o]fficer, the right of whose appointment is by 
this Constitution vested in the General Assembly, shall during their re-
cess die or his [o]ffice by other means become vacant, the Governor shall 
have power . . . to fill up such vacancy . . . .262 
Under an ordinary reading of this passage, “during the recess” modi-
fies “die,” not “by other means become vacant.”  On the surface, it 
seems implausible that the document would distinguish between va-
cancies caused by death during recesses and vacancies caused by 
“other means.”  But if one can think of any rational reason to do so, 
then a textualist should take the text as its word, so to speak. 
Maryland’s Constitution contains a similar ambiguity.  If its draft-
ers intended the “arise” view, then they would have done better to in-
sert an additional comma in the text.  Here is the passage, with a 
bracketed comma that, if added, would tilt it toward the “arise” view: 
 . . . [U]pon the death, resignation, disqualification, or removal out of 
the county of any Register of Wills, in the recess of the General Assem-
bly[,] the Governor . . . may appoint and commission a fit and proper 
person to such vacant office . . . .263 
To improve the text further, the drafters could have omitted the 
comma after “Wills.” Without one or both of these edits, the phrase 
“in the recess” might modify the phrase “the Governor . . . may ap-
point” rather than the phrase “death disqualification, or removal.”  
That reading is the most natural, and it fits the “exist” view perfectly.  
After a vacancy arises, the governor may fill it in the recess if it still ex-
ists at that point. 
Even if the North Carolina and Maryland Constitutions embody 
the “arise” view, they nonetheless betray an imprecision in drafting 
that is inconsistent with heightened concern over the point.  They 
would also be outliers.  To the extent that early American drafters of 
 
lar recess and does not use the word ‘adjournment’”); Turley, supra note 14, at 974–75 
(discussing early views of the North Carolina Constitution and its relationship to the Re-
cess Appointments Clause). 
261 See MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XLI; N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XX. 
262 N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XX. 
263 MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XLI. 
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constitutions had a general vision of special appointment power, they 
generally do not appear to have cared whether the triggering event 
occurred during a recess.  That position is sensible.  The purpose of 
special recess powers is usually to ensure that the executive can meet 
immediate needs expediently.  From this perspective, it makes little 
sense to the limit the powers based on when a vacancy happens to 
have arisen. If filling the vacancy is—or becomes—important, it 
should be filled. The ratification-era constitutions are weak evidence 
on the timing question, to be sure.  But they suggest that recess pow-
ers were generally viewed as pragmatic in nature, and that their 
drafters and readers generally believed them to be available when 
necessary rather than based on technicalities of when triggering 
events occur. 
Among other types of evidence, support for the “arise” view is 
weaker and more mixed than commonly perceived.  Early opinions 
varied, for example with John Adams apparently taking the “exist” 
view and Alexander Hamilton taking the “arise” view.264  Proponents 
place great weight on the opinion of the first Attorney General, Ed-
mund Randolph, and the practice of George Washington.265  Of 
course, one must be careful not to double-count here.  To say that 
George Washington followed the arise interpretation is merely to say 
that he took his Attorney General’s advice.  And there is strong rea-
son to discount that advice as evidence of original meaning.  Ran-
dolph was an opponent of presidential appointment power—so much 
that he originally refused to sign the Constitution in part because of 
it.  At the federal convention, he appears to have objected to the ap-
pointment power in its entirety.266  When he later advocated ratifica-
 
264 Each opinion is subject to the important qualification that the author was not directly 
assessing the “happen” question, but rather the question whether a newly created office 
counts as a “vacancy.”  See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 384 n.27 (“Care must be taken not to 
read such statements out of context.  These authors were addressing the creation of new 
offices, and relying on the idea, less common in current usage, that only those things that 
occur by chance can be said to ‘happen.’  On this understanding, ‘happen’ is not used to 
designate a time, but rather to indicate the unplanned nature of the vacancy, best cap-
tured today by ‘happenstance,’ or ‘haphazard.’”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1538 (“Most 
readers of the Clause assume that the recess appointment must be made during the re-
cess when the vacancy arose, but careful examination of the Clause reveals that its lan-
guage does not say specifically when the appointment must be made.  This silence as to 
when the recess appointment must be made occurs under both the arise interpretation 
and the exist interpretation.”). 
265 See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1538 (“By contrast, the Washington Administration’s prac-
tice, especially as justified by the Randolph opinion, is entitled to enormous respect.”). 
266 See EDMUND RANDOLPH, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1787) (“Objections to the 
Constitution as far as it has advanced . . . . 9th The appointment of officials will produce 
to great influence in the Executive.”). 
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tion at the Virginia convention, he narrowed his objection, at least 
publicly, complaining only about the appointment (and recess ap-
pointment) of judges.  He qualified his endorsement of the Constitu-
tion by expressing hope that other states would join Virginia 
in taking from [the president] the power of nominating to the judiciary 
offices, or of filling up vacancies which may there happen during the re-
cess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end 
of their next sessions.267 
Rappaport finds that Randolph’s opinion “is entitled to enormous 
respect” because he was an executive official arguing for narrower 
executive power—and also because Randolph engaged in “penetrat-
ing analysis” and “clearly placed great importance on the Constitu-
tion that he had done so much to draft and ratify.”268  Apparently, 
Rappaport is not aware of Randolph’s strong objections to the ap-
pointment power.  Rappaport notes, just before discussing Ran-
dolph’s opinion, that we should be skeptical of early interpretations 
that may have been motivated by self-interest.269  For this reason, he 
apparently discounts the view of any executive official who took the 
“exist” view because it favors the executive.270  But Randolph’s exam-
ple shows that we should be skeptical of the assumption that early of-
ficials simply favored their respective branches of government.  When 
Randolph gained the opportunity to set precedents as attorney gen-
eral, it is far from obvious that he would conform his views to a gen-
eral executive-branch boosterism, or for that matter expound ear-
nestly on the “true” meaning of constitutional text.  More likely is 
that he would take the opportunity to implement his strong, preexist-
ing preferences and weaken a provision that he had openly wished to 
excise from the Constitution. 
Moreover, as a matter of original meaning, Randolph’s opinion 
lends less support to the “arise” view than is commonly assumed.  
Randolph scarcely engages in textual analysis.  He merely notes that a 
vacancy “may be said to have happened” on the day that it “com-
menced,” giving no consideration to whether “happen” might also 
 
267 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 127. 
268 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1538 & n.155 (citing Edmund Randolph, NOTABLE 
NAMES DATABASE,  http:// www.nndb.com/people/099/000049949/). 
269 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1537 (“The weight to be accorded early interpretations, how-
ever, turns on whether the interpreter impartially based his decision on a genuine and 
considered view of the constitutional provision.  One reason why an early interpretation 
might be given reduced weight is if it was motivated by the interpreter’s self-interest.”). 
270 See id. (“The evidence supplied by Hartnett of Presidents and executive branch officials 
who may have interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause broadly raises the suspicion 
that these interpretations were influenced by a desire to enhance executive power.  In-
terpretations in these circumstances are entitled to less respect.”). 
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mean “exist.”271  Perhaps he failed to consider the “exist” interpreta-
tion because it did not occur to him or it appeared unworthy of 
comment.  But perhaps Randolph deliberately chose not to mention 
it because he did not want to lend credibility to an opposing position.  
In any event, Randolph expends little energy on the text.  Instead, he 
relies primarily on his view that the “[s]pirit of the Constitution favors 
the participation of the Senate in all appointments,” and therefore 
the Recess Appointments Clause “ought . . . to be interpreted strict-
ly.”272  This is a statement about one man’s policy preferences, not ev-
idence of original meaning. 
There is another way in which Randolph’s opinion is notably 
pragmatic rather than formalist or textualist.  He explains that he 
would accept that a vacancy constructively arises during a recess if the 
President nominates a candidate and the Senate confirms but the 
candidate declines the position during the recess.273  In truth, of 
course, the position has not been filled, and therefore the vacancy 
predates the recess.  Randolph would nonetheless permit a recess 
appointment on the basis that “the Senate have had a full opportuni-
ty to shew their sense” and “the vacancy was filled up, as far as the 
President and Senate could go.”274  In other words, Randolph departs 
from the arise position when his view of “the Spirit of the Constitu-
tion” points another direction.  Again Randolph demonstrates that 
his partial endorsement of the “arise” view rests more on his policy 
preferences than his view of original meaning.  That Randolph op-
posed the Clause in its entirety only further diminishes his credibility 
as a source of meaning.  His view of “the Spirit of the Constitution” 
conforms closely to his own preferences regarding the Constitution—
which happen to be preferences that the Constitution’s drafters and 
ratifiers rejected when they approved presidential appointments and 
recess appointments. 
Not only are the early opinions on the “happen” question mixed 
at best; each is the work of a political actor who may have had an 
agenda beyond the mere ascertainment of original meaning.  In sum, 
the “arise” view of the “happen” question is the right starting point, as 
to the modern reader it seems to reflect the word’s ordinary mean-
ing, but there is good cause to investigate the issue much more thor-
oughly.  Dictionary evidence and early opinions suggest that the “ex-
 
271 Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-24-02-0176. 
272 Id. 
273  Id. 
274 Id. 
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ist” view was plausible, and most early documents granting recess 
powers adopt the “exist” view, suggesting that in general most found-
ers were willing to forgo legislative participation when expedience 
demanded it. 
IV.  CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF ORIGINALISM AND THE RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
Despite strong evidence for an ordinary meaning of recess, multi-
ple prominent originalists have endorsed the technical position.  The 
existence of serious disagreement on the original meaning of “recess” 
raises interesting questions.  One might start by asking whether 
originalists must agree with one another.  The general answer is no.  
There are multiple theories of originalism, and it is only natural that 
different methodologies might yield divergent conclusions.275  This 
Part introduces four contemporary originalist theories and considers 
how each might analyze the evidence on “recess.”  It finds that, re-
garding the meaning of recess, most of the divergence in conclusions 
is not predicted by theoretical or methodological differences. 
A.  New Originalism 
The most prominent contemporary originalist theory is known as 
“original public meaning originalism”276 or simply “New Original-
ism.”277  A good deal of current originalist discussion is framed 
around New Originalism and its concepts, with participants express-
ing agreement, suggesting refinements or clarifications, or objecting.  
It is therefore the obvious starting point when discussing current 
originalist theory. 
1.  Original Public Meaning, Not Intent or Expectations 
New Originalism is distinguished by two main features.  The first is 
that it attempts to find the original public meaning of the Constitu-
 
275 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 166, at 394 n.82 (“Perhaps it goes without saying that 
originalists will no doubt disagree among themselves about the actual content of the Con-
stitution.  Although such interpretive disagreements might derive from theoretical disa-
greements, they are more likely to derive from simply different approaches to and evalua-
tion of the available evidence about original meaning, and are, potentially, resolvable 
within the confines of originalist theory.”).  
276 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 463 (2013) (discussing the origins of “original public meaning originalism”). 
277 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 412 (explaining what “New Originalism” is). 
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tion.278  This represents a major break with earlier incarnations of 
originalism, which focused on original intent or expectations of the 
Framers.279  Ronald Dworkin is often cited to explain the difference:  
“[t]his is the crucial distinction between what some officials intended 
to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended—
or expected or hoped—would be the consequence of their saying it.”280  
There are many reasons for this move, and we need not rehearse 
them at length.  The most frequently cited are that it is hard to dis-
cern the intent or expectation of the Framers and that, notwithstand-
ing the previous point, the Framers do not appear to have intended 
legal actors to divine the original intent behind the document.281 
2.  Interpretation and Construction 
The second key feature of New Originalism is that it distinguishes 
between the concepts of “interpretation” and “construction.”282  In-
terpretation is the act of discerning the semantic or communicative 
meaning of a text.  It is an empirical practice in which one resolves 
ambiguities to discover a text’s objective, public meaning (as opposed 
to a private or idiosyncratic meaning).283  Construction, by contrast, is 
 
278 For foundational texts, see BARNETT, supra note 47; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Non-
originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Nonoriginalists].  
279 See Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism:  A Comment on Jack Balkin’s Living 
Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. OF LEGAL STUD. 42, 44–45 (2013) (specifying that New 
Originalism does not focus on the Framers’ intentions); Solum, supra note 276, at 462–63 
(discussing early originalists’ focuses on original intentions); Whittington, supra note 166, 
at 378–80 (discussing the interaction between original meaning and original intent).  
Although original intent and original expectations are distinct concepts, they share 
common characteristics and can be treated together for present purposes. 
280 Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 278, at 622 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 116 
(Amy Gutmann ed. 1997)) (emphasis in original). 
281 The most influential critiques on these points are those of Paul Brest and H. Jefferson 
Powell, respectively.  See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (discussing “strict originalism”); H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885–88 (1985) (discussing 
the original meaning of “original intent”). 
282 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 276, at 457 (asserting that interpretation “is the activity that 
discerns the communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text” while 
construction “is the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine and 
the legal effect of the constitutional text”). 
283 See Barnett, supra note 167, at 66 (“It cannot be overstressed that the activity of determin-
ing semantic meaning at the time of enactment required by the first proposition is empiri-
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what one does when interpretation falls short because a text contains 
irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, or internal contradictions.284  
In this discussion, ambiguity and vagueness are not synonymous.  An 
ambiguous word has more than one meaning, whereas vagueness re-
fers to marginal facts that may or may not be included within a 
word.285  The question whether “arms” in the Second Amendment re-
fers to human limbs or weapons is one of ambiguity;286 the question 
whether it includes shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles is one of 
vagueness.  In situations where the meaning of the constitutional text 
cannot be determined with enough precision to govern particular 
facts, the text is “underdeterminate” and one engages in construc-
tion.287  Unlike interpretation, construction is a normative enterprise 
and is not “originalist.”288  In theory, any norms can be used, whether 
stemming from political morality, ethics, or legal practice.289  Larry 
Solum has termed the area outside the text’s determinate meaning 
the “construction zone.”290 
The question where interpretation ends and construction begins 
can be difficult, and there is substantial disagreement over the exist-
 
cal, not normative.”); Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (“Constitutional interpretation is es-
sentially a factually driven enterprise.”). 
284 See Solum, supra note 276, at 469 (“Construction becomes the focus of explicit attention 
when the meaning of the constitutional text is unclear, or the implications of that mean-
ing are contested.”); see also Barnett, supra note 3, at 419 (“New Originalists refer to this 
activity [of “supplement[ing] information revealed by interpretation”] as ‘constitutional 
construction,’ as distinct from ‘constitutional interpretation’ . . . .”).  In other words, con-
struction is what one does when interpretation “runs out.”  Barnett, supra note 3, at 419. 
285 See Barnett, supra note 167, at 67 (“Ambiguity refers to words that have more than one 
sense or meaning.  Vagueness refers to the penumbra or borderline of a word’s meaning, 
where it may be unclear whether a certain object is included within it or not.”); Solum, 
supra note 276, at 469–70 (providing that “[a] text is ambiguous if it can have more than 
one meaning” but vagueness “refers to expressions that have borderline cases”). 
286 See BARNETT, supra note 47, at 119 (arguing that deciphering what is meant by “arms” is a 
matter of interpretation). 
287 See Solum, supra note 276, at 458 (“But in other cases, the constitutional text does not 
provide determinate answers to constitutional questions.  For example, the text may be 
vague or irreducibly ambiguous.  We can call this domain of constitutional underdeter-
minacy ‘the construction zone.’”); see also Barnett, supra note 3, at 419 (“. . . although the 
activity of construction is constrained by the original meaning of the text, construction is 
needed precisely when that communicative meaning is not sufficiently determinate to dictate a 
unique application.”). 
288 See Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (observing “that construction is essentially normative”); 
see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 419, 420 (providing that “originalists can and do disagree 
on how extra-originalist constitutional construction is to be done”). 
289 See Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (arguing that there is a “range of normative possibili-
ties” that could drive constitutional construction). 
290 Id. at 458, 472 (“We can call this domain of constitutional underdeterminacy ‘the con-
struction zone.’”). 
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ence and size of the “construction zone.”  New Originalists like Randy 
Barnett and Larry Solum argue that interpretation suffices to deter-
mine the meaning of most of the Constitution, particularly the struc-
tural aspects of the document, but also believe there remains a sub-
stantial construction zone.291  Others, like Jack Balkin, believe that the 
Constitution is largely a “framework” for construction.292  Still other 
originalists who object to much of the “new” theory, such as Gary 
Lawson, Michael Rappaport, and John McGinnis, argue there is little 
or no need for construction at all.293  Distinguishing between inter-
pretation and construction can lend clarity to what one is doing in 
constitutional decisionmaking and therefore is worth doing. 
3.  Interpreting Recess 
Consider the “recess” question.  Given the evidence reviewed in 
this Article, one can conclude that the question whether “recess” re-
fers only to “inter-session” recesses or to something broader is a mat-
ter of interpretation, or resolving ambiguity.  There is overwhelming 
evidence that the original public meaning of “recess” included “intra-
session” breaks, just as the word does at present.294  There is no evi-
dence that anyone in the public or the federal or state government 
believed otherwise until Attorney General Knox’s opinion in 1901, 
which the Senate Judiciary Committee declined to endorse in 1905 
and Attorney General Daugherty rejected in 1921.295  Since then, no 
President or Senate majority has disputed the issue. 
 
291 See Barnett, supra note 3, at 419 (“By adopting the interpretation-construction distinction, 
the New Originalism frankly acknowledges that the text of ‘this Constitution’ does not 
provide definitive answers to all cases and controversies that come before Congress or the 
courts.”); Solum, supra note 276, at 530 (“As I understand the position of the New 
Originalists (and I count myself as among them), most of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion are structural and have clear original meanings . . . .  Many of  the vague provisions 
(including important individual rights provisions) create construction zones, but this is 
because the discernable original meaning underdetermines some constitutional ques-
tions.”). 
292 See JACK M. BALKIN,LIVING ORIGINALISM 13 (2011); Solum, supra note 276, at 468 (refer-
ring to Balkin and stating that he “explicitly adopts the idea of constitutional construc-
tion”). 
293 See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233 (2012) (“I want to 
dissent from the originalist construction project and declare the Constitution a ‘no-
construction zone.’”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 140, at 772–73 (presenting “ob-
jections to construction”); Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (observing that some originalists 
“deny the existence of the construction zone”). 
294 See supra Part I. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 99–110. 
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To be clear, the point is not that “recess” certainly included all 
legislative breaks.  Rather, to one engaging strictly in originalist in-
terpretation, that is as far as the evidence points.  Dictionary evidence 
strongly suggests that the ordinary meaning of “recess” was broad and 
general.296  Ordinary meaning is also the default position, the pre-
sumption to be rebutted in interpreting texts.  On “recess,” we lack 
evidence adequate to conclude that “recess” was limited in any par-
ticular way in the Recess Appointments Clause.  Evidence for the 
most commonly endorsed limitation—restricting the word to breaks 
between official Senate sessions—is so lacking that, even if viewed in-
dependently, it would fail to rebut the presumption of ordinary 
meaning.  But that evidence does not stand alone.  The record 
strongly contradicts it, as there are many ratification-era examples of 
“recess” referring to intra-session breaks.297  Moreover, the definition 
of an official “session” varied across different jurisdictions, and the 
Framers could not have predicted Senate session practice.  For these 
reasons, it is implausible that the Constitution would incorporate one 
particular definition of official sessions or recesses, particularly with-
out any evidence that its drafters wrestled with the choice among def-
initions. 
4.  New Originalism and the Recess Question 
This Article has attempted to analyze the evidence on “recess” in a 
manner consistent with New Originalism.  The New Originalist would 
use most if not all of the sources discussed in Part I.  One conducting 
this type of inquiry need not reject any particular form of evidence,298 
although one expects a loose hierarchy of evidentiary value.  Most 
important are the core tools of textual analysis:  the close reading of 
text, including which words appear and which do not, their relation-
ships to other words and provisions in the same document, and evi-
dence regarding the “plain meaning” of relevant terms to an ordinary 
reader.299  The latter could stem from contemporaneous dictionaries 
or other instances of contemporaneous usage.300  Next would come 
 
296 See supra Part I.A.1. 
297 See supra Part I.B. 
298 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 278, at 389. 
299 See, e.g., id. at 389–90. 
300 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 47, at 93 (observing that original public meaning references 
“dictionaries, common contemporary meanings, an analysis of how particular words and 
phrases are used elsewhere in the document or in other foundational documents and 
cases, and logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the text”); Bar-
nett, supra note 3, at 416 (“[E]stablishing the semantic meaning of the words in the text, 
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evidence of purpose or values that one finds in the text or structure 
of the document, so long as purpose is treated as evidence of mean-
ing rather than an end in itself that trumps the text.301  Further down 
is extrinsic evidence of purpose, such as statements by the Framers, 
historical interpretations, or other historical practices. 
The strongest evidence discussed in Part I for the ordinary mean-
ing of “recess” is the type that New Originalism values:  a close read-
ing of text and structure, informed by evidence from contemporane-
ous dictionaries and other sources regarding the ordinary 
understanding of those terms.  By contrast, the technical position 
draws significantly less support from these types of evidence.  Perhaps 
the most compelling support for the technical position is a narrative 
about the Framers’ expectations302—a type of reasoning that New 
Originalism rejects. 
Perhaps it is not always easy to distinguish between original mean-
ing and original intent or expectations.  One could take the view that 
the inter-session-expectations narrative is evidence about the mean-
ing of the word “recess” rather than an argument that the Framers’ 
expectations trump the evidence on meaning.  After all, in most cas-
es, one would expect the original meaning of words used in the Con-
stitution to reflect the intentions or expectations of the document’s 
presumably competent drafters and ratifiers.303  For this reason, there 
should be times when strong evidence of original intent or expecta-
tions can help establish original meaning.  But the inter-session-
expectations narrative cannot play that role here because it is not 
supported by evidence regarding the Framers’ actual expectations.  
Moreover, the inter-session-expectations narrative runs counter to the 
weight of the evidence on the text’s meaning.  For these reasons, it 
should fail to persuade the New Originalist regardless of whether it is 
viewed squarely as an appeal to original expectations or as one of the 
sole arguments supporting the conclusion that the original public 
meaning of “recess” was narrow and technical. 
 
given the publicly available context, requires a survey of relevant usage.  The search for 
original public meaning should be as systematic and comprehensive as possible with re-
spect to any source one surveys, reporting deviant as well as predominate usage.”). 
301 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 278, at 390. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 188–91. 
303 See Solum, supra note 276, at 464 (“Under normal circumstances, the intentions of the 
Framers will be reflected in the public meaning of the constitutional text:  as competent 
speakers and writers of the natural language English, the Framers are likely to have un-
derstood that the best way to convey their intentions would be to state them clearly in 
language that would be grasped by the officials and citizens to whom the constitutional 
text was addressed.”). 
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Two additional points are worth raising about the inter-session-
expectations narrative.  First, it is a particularly weak form of expecta-
tions argument because it turns on arbitrary historical changes.  It 
says that the Framers expected inter-session rather than intra-session 
recesses only because of now-irrelevant technological constraints in 
communications and transportation.  By similar reasoning, one might 
as well hold that the Second Amendment does not protect the right 
to bear semi-automatic firearms, which did not exist in the eight-
eenth century and therefore were not what the Framers had in mind.  
Or one might argue that women cannot hold federal office, for the 
Constitution repeatedly refers to representatives, senators, and the 
President as “he,” and surely the Framers did not have women in 
mind.304  These arguments are widely rejected for good reason; and 
the same reasoning applies to the inter-session-expectations narrative. 
In a related point, the inter-session-expectations argument is in-
ternally contradictory.  To the extent that it turns on failures of imag-
ination, it tacitly admits that “recess” does not affirmatively exclude 
intra-session recesses as a textual matter.  It is incoherent to say that 
the Framers meant to preclude unilateral appointments during a type 
of recess that they did not imagine.  To the contrary, at most the nar-
rative points to a vagueness problem—a question whether modern 
intra-session recesses should be included or excluded, which cannot be 
resolved by originalist evidence.  A common source of vagueness is 
the lack of complete knowledge on the part of drafters, and one 
cause of imperfect knowledge is inter-temporal change.  Randy Bar-
nett illustrates this point with the question whether thermal imaging 
of a house constitutes a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.305  
One cannot answer the question with an objective, historical inquiry, 
he notes, because it is “counterfactual, not . . .  factual.”306  This type 
of dilemma is precisely why constitutional drafters prefer general 
principles to narrow prescriptions where possible.307 
The discussion of vagueness returns us to the question whether 
the analyses in Parts I and II of this Article are exercises in interpreta-
tion or construction.  With minor exceptions, this Article has en-
gaged in interpretation, as it has sought to derive the original mean-
 
304 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (referring to state representatives using the male pro-
noun); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (referring to senators using the male pronoun); id. at art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 1 (using the male pronoun to refer to the President). 
305 See BARNETT, supra note 47, at 119–20 (using the example of thermal imaging to show 
that “original meaning may not by itself tell us whether [something] lies outside its core 
meaning but still possibly within its margins”). 
306 Id. at 120. 
307 See supra text accompanying notes 164–67. 
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ing of “recess” as an objective matter, without resort to extra-
originalist sources.308  To the extent that this Article relies on evi-
dence of purpose or intent, it analyzes that evidence for its relevance 
to the meaning of the text of the Constitution.  The Article considers 
constructions of “recess” separately, in Subpart E below. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the divergence between 
this Article’s conclusion and that of some New Originalists is not like-
ly attributable to a difference in interpretive methodology.  After a 
more comprehensive view of the evidence, one might expect New 
Originalists to agree with the positions in this Article.  Or they might 
muster more evidence for the technical position, although this Arti-
cle has attempted to canvas the most probative sources.  Alternatively, 
they might conclude that the term is irreducibly ambiguous. 
B.  Original Methods Originalism 
A second contemporary originalist theory is what John McGinnis 
and Michael Rappaport have called “Original Methods Original-
ism.”309  Under this approach, one interprets the Constitution using 
the “methods that the constitutional enactors would have deemed 
applicable to it.”310  Although McGinnis and Rappaport do not pro-
vide a comprehensive account of ratification-era interpretive rules, 
they argue that the practices embody attempts to discern both origi-
nal meaning and original intent.311  The particular interpretive meth-
ods that they identify appear similar to contemporary tools of legal 
analysis.  For example, they contemplate the use of structure, pur-
pose, intent, and history312 and, regarding the reading of text itself, 
they discuss the use of common canons of construction.313 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s principal points appear to be that orig-
inal methods were originalist rather than “dynamic or otherwise 
nonoriginalist”314 and that those methods involve not just textual 
 
308 An exception is the discussion of the “military-responsiveness” narrative, which this Arti-
cle poses as a challenge to the “inter-session-expectations” narrative.  See supra text ac-
companying notes 208–15. 
309 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 140, at 751 (titling their article Original Methods 
Originalism:  A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction). 
310 Id. at 751, 754. 
311 See id. at 752 (“[W]e do not attempt to determine the precise interpretive rules . . . .”); id. 
at 786 (“We do not have space to provide a comprehensive account of the original inter-
pretive rules.”). 
312 Id. at 752 (“[T]he evidence suggests that ambiguity and vagueness were resolved [in the 
Framers’ era] by considering evidence of history, structure, purpose, and intent.”). 
313 See, e.g., id. at 756 (discussing the “antiredundancy rule”). 
314 Id. at 786. 
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analysis but also considerations of intent.315  One distinction between 
Original Methods Originalism and New Originalism, then, is that the 
former approves of considering original intent because, on its ac-
count, ratification-era legal actors would have done so.316  McGinnis 
and Rappaport also depart from New Originalism in arguing that, 
though the use of original methods, one can fully ascertain the mean-
ing of the Constitution without resort to construction.317  They argue 
that the Framers resolved ambiguity and vagueness “by considering 
evidence of history, structure, purpose, and intent,” as opposed to 
“extraconstitutional” sources that are used in construction.318  To the 
New Originalist, the disagreement over construction appears largely 
semantic.  On this view, everyone must engage in construction, in-
cluding McGinnis and Rappaport.  Irreducible ambiguity and vague-
ness are inherent in the Constitution.319  The Original Methods 
Originalist is merely arguing about the size of the toolset, and shrink-
ing the list of tools does not mean one is not engaged in construc-
tion.  The Original Methods Originalist would likely respond that 
original methods can reduce or even eliminate the need for construc-
tion if those methods require one to choose the best possible answer 
in cases of uncertainty.  If one is compelled by original methods to 
choose an outcome supported by the preponderance of the evidence, 
then one can be said to be engaging in the determinate, originalist 
act of interpretation, not the indeterminate, nonoriginalist act of 
construction. 
Because McGinnis and Rappaport do not provide a comprehen-
sive account of original methods, one cannot be certain how their 
 
315 See id. (“We present some evidence showing the original interpretive methods were inten- 
tionalist . . . .”). 
316 Cf. id. For a contrary view, see Powell, supra note 281, at 887 (“Turning to the views on 
constitutional interpretation expressed during and immediately after the ratification pro-
cess, I conclude that there was a tension during this period between a global rejection of 
any and all methods of constitutional construction and a willingness to interpret the con-
stitutional text in accordance with the common law principles that had been used to con-
strue statutes.”). 
317 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 140, at 752 (“We find no support for constitutional 
construction, as opposed to constitutional interpretation, at the time of the Framing.”). 
318 Id. 
319 McGinnis and Rappaport concede that, as a theoretical matter, there might be some re-
sidual need for construction.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract 
Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 752 n.54 (2012) (“It is theoretically possible that 
the interpretive rules may not resolve every uncertainty, especially uncertainty resulting 
from vagueness.  We have argued that such uncertainties are unlikely if the interpretive 
rules require interpreters to choose the meaning that is more likely, even if other mean-
ings are possible.  But if there is a remaining uncertainty, then one might be in a situa-
tion involving construction, where the original meaning does not provide an answer.”). 
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theory would apply to the evidence on the meaning of recess.  How-
ever, there are three reasons to believe that most of the analysis in 
Part I of this Article is apt.  First, as mentioned above, original meth-
ods appear to have been largely consistent with contemporary prac-
tice.  Second, Rappaport’s own analysis of the Recess Appointments 
Clause evaluates similar types of evidence.320  There, Rappaport states 
that he will seek to understand how “knowledgeable individuals 
would have understood this language in the late 1780s when it was 
drafted and ratified.”321  He also implies that what he will seek the 
meaning in the manner that “[i]nterpreters at the time would 
have,”322 but that he will accomplish that task by “examin[ing] various 
factors, including text, purpose, structure, and history.”323  Finally, to 
the extent that this Article’s analysis is limited to interpretation, it 
should not run afoul of Original Methods Originalism’s prohibition 
on construction, regardless of the tools one uses to conduct that 
analysis. 
On the basis of text and structure, it appears that an Original 
Methods Originalist should reach the same conclusion as a New 
Originalist—that the weight of the evidence supports the general 
meaning of “recess,” or at least that the balance of the evidence does 
not rebut the presumption in favor of ordinary meaning.  McGinnis 
and Rappaport part ways with the New Originalists, however, in that 
they would also consider evidence regarding original intent or expec-
tations.  This difference in methodology could explain the difference 
in conclusions regarding the meaning of “recess.”324  As discussed 
above, the most intuitively appealing support for the narrow view of 
“recess” is the inter-session-expectations narrative—that the Framers 
expected Congress to take long inter-session recesses and no signifi-
cant other breaks, and therefore long inter-session recesses are what 
they meant by “recess.”325  This Article has disputed that view in two 
way:  by arguing that even if one assumes those were the Framers ex-
 
320 Rappaport wrote his analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause in 2005 and proposed 
Original Methods Originalism with McGinnis in 2009, which naturally raises the question 
whether his 2005 analysis followed Original Methods Originalism.  Rappaport re-
endorsed the 2005 analysis in a 2013 brief to the Supreme Court, which suggests that it 
cannot have ventured far outside the bounds of his preferred method.  See generally, 
Originalist Brief, supra note 122. 
321 Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1493. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
324 John McGinnis joined the “originalist” amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Noel Canning 
advocating the technical position.  Rappaport, of course, is the principal advocate of that 
view. 
325 See supra text accompanying notes 188–91. 
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pectations, they might not have written those expectations into the 
Constitution and by offering a “military-responsiveness” counter-
narrative.326  But one certainly cannot disprove the narrative that the 
Framers expected “recess” to mean “inter-session recess.” 
It is noteworthy, however, that McGinnis and Rappaport have rec-
ognized an exception to following original expectations that applies 
to the “recess” question.  They have written that modern actors need 
not follow original expectations that were based on mistakes of fact, 
as opposed to “moral or policy beliefs” with which we happen to disa-
gree.327  Following this reasoning, we need not adhere to what Rap-
paport argues is the original expected application of “recess.”  Even if 
the inter-session-expectations narrative accurately characterizes the 
Framers’ beliefs, those beliefs were mistaken.  The Senate now follows 
a very different pattern of recesses. 
Another aspect of original methods also might cut against the 
technical position.  There is some evidence that original methods in-
cluded a view that historical usage and precedent settle the meaning 
of terms, trumping their original public meaning.  Under that view, 
one should defer to the near-complete consensus of the past several 
decades, if not since the nation’s founding, that the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause permits intra-session recess appointments.  One piece 
of evidence for the existence of this “original method” stems from a 
well-known series of events in which James Madison reversed his posi-
tion on the constitutionality of a national bank, from opposition to 
support (or at least acquiescence), over a twenty-five-year period.328  
Madison’s reasoning was that his view was contradicted for more than 
twenty years by usage and precedent, which effectively settled the 
question.  The precedent did not alter the meaning of the Constitu-
tion’s text, on which Madison’s “abstract opinion” remained un-
changed,329 but rather changed its proper application to the specific 
question of Congress’s power to create a national bank.  The bank’s 
 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 208–15. 
327 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of 
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 379–80 (2007) (“While expected applications are 
important evidence of the meaning of a provision, they are not always to be followed, 
even if they are widely held.  But the circumstances must provide strong reasons for be-
lieving the applications were mistaken, rather than being merely applications modern in-
terpreters happen to reject.”). 
328 See Powell, supra note 281, at 939–40 (providing that as a result of “the exposition of the 
Constitution provided by actual governmental practice and judicial prece-
dents . . . Madison felt himself compelled to change his position on the controversial is-
sue of Congress's constitutional power to incorporate a national bank”).  
329 Id. 
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constitutionality was “a construction put on the Constitution by the 
nation, which, having made it, had the supreme right to declare its 
meaning.”330  From the perspective of Original Methods Originalism, 
what is most interesting about this episode is that Madison claimed 
that his perspective on precedent was not just his personal view, but 
one generally intended by the Framers.331  If Madison was correct, 
then one would expect to see Original Methods Originalists accede to 
the ordinary, general reading of recess based on the historical record. 
C.  Original Defaults Originalism 
A third set of originalist theories supports applying constitutional 
default rules to resolve residual uncertainty when deciding cases.  Ac-
cordingly, we can refer to these views as Original Defaults Original-
ism.  Gary Lawson has rightly pointed out that one does not need ep-
istemic certainty to make decisions in the face of legal indeterminacy; 
one need only set a burden of proof and allocate it.332  He and Mi-
chael Paulsen have independently argued for the existence of default 
rules prescribed by the text of the Constitution itself.  Paulsen’s rule, 
in brief, is that when a government act is not clearly unconstitutional, 
one should defer to the political branches.333  Lawson’s is a presump-
tion “against the existence of federal power and in favor of the exist-
ence of state power.”334 
 
330 Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Marquis de LaFayette (Nov. 1826)); see also 
Letter from James Madison to Mr. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) (referencing “the obligations 
derived from a course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of national 
judgment and intention”). 
331 See Powell, supra note 281, at 940–41 (“Madison claimed, this view represented not just his 
opinion, but the general expectation – the ‘interpretive intention’ – that prevailed at the 
time of the Constitution's framing and ratification.”). 
332 See Lawson, supra note 293, at 1233–34 (“The trier of fact may be genuinely uncertain 
about the facts.  The solution to this uncertainty is not to come up with some extra-
evidentiary mechanism for constructing facts but to allocate the burden of uncertainty to one 
party or the other.”); see generally Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy:  Its Cause and Cure, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996). 
333 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpreta-
tion?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009). 
334 Lawson, supra note 293, at 1234.  Larry Solum labels Paulsen and Lawson’s views, or 
something like them, “Originalist Thayerianism.”  Solum notes that the position he 
sketches might not conform precisely to their views.  See Solum, supra note 276, at 472–73 
& n.76, 512 (noting that “[t]he Originalist Thayerian Theory is related to and inspired by 
the views of Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen” but “[t]o the extent that neither Lawson 
nor Paulsen embraces Originalist Thayerianism as described here, this discussion does 
not directly apply to their views”).  I follow Solum with the same disclaimer.  Solum’s label 
derives from James Bradley Thayer’s influential argument in the late nineteenth century 
that a court can deem a statute unconstitutional only “when those who have the right to 
make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear 
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To the extent that this Article engages only in interpretation, a dif-
ference in methodology could not explain disagreement with Origi-
nal Defaults Originalists because their theories concern what to do 
when interpretation runs out.  In other words, their default rules 
should come into play only if they are unpersuaded by this Article’s 
account, or they do not view it as an exercise in interpretation.  Let us 
assume that is their response.  In that case, the effect of Lawson’s de-
fault rule—a presumption against federal power—is unclear in a sep-
aration-of-powers controversy within the federal government.  Where 
a private litigant challenges a federal action asserting a separation-of-
powers violation, one might believe at first blush that a presumption 
against federal power cuts in favor of the challenger.  But the case 
does not concern the existence of federal power; it concerns the allo-
cation between two political branches of a clearly extant power. The 
presumption appears not to apply. 
In contrast, Paulsen’s presumption would instruct a court to per-
mit a presidential recess appointment even of dubious constitutional-
ity unless it is clearly unconstitutional—or presumably unless it is 
genuinely disputed by the Senate.  If the Senate disputes a recess ap-
pointment, then a presumption of deference to the political branches 
cannot apply because two branches are in conflict.  Moreover, in that 
case, if one agrees with this Article’s account of the Rules of Proceed-
ings Clause, then that Clause should resolve most disputes between 
the Senate and the White House.  Because clear distinctions among 
recesses cannot be found through interpretation of the Constitu-
tion’s text, courts following Paulsen’s default rule apparently should 
approve most if not all recess appointments that a majority of sena-
tors do not dispute. 
D.  Living Originalism 
Finally, Jack Balkin describes his “Living Originalism” as a method 
of “text and principle.”335  It is a form of New Originalism, as it holds 
 
that it is not open to rational question.”  James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the Ameri-
can Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 17, 144 (1893); see Solum, supra note 
276, at 472–73 (“[W]hen the meaning of the text is unclear or uncertain, then judges 
should defer to decisions made by the political branches.  Thus, in a case where the re-
quirements of equal protection are unclear (because of vagueness, for example), judges 
should refrain from declaring legislative or executive action unconstitutional.”).  The 
Thayerian label is most clearly apt as to Paulsen, who straightforwardly advances a theory 
of deference to the political branches.  On my reading, Lawson’s presumption prescribes 
deference to state governments and the opposite of deference to federal political 
branches.  See supra notes 333–34. 
335 BALKIN, supra note 292, at 3. 
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that the Constitution’s text is fixed and binding.336  But it parts with 
many originalists, new and old, in its view of the limits of interpreta-
tion.  Balkin argues that much of the Constitution is underdeter-
mined and must be resolved through construction, but this is by de-
sign.337  In his view, the Constitution provides a “framework” for later 
generations of political and legal actors to build on.338  Rather than 
just a restraint on government actors, the Constitution is a “plan for 
politics.”339  The text is binding as far as it goes.  When it clearly states 
a rule, we must follow the rule.  But when it invokes a standard or a 
principle, it delegates construction to future actors appealing to the 
principles underlying the text.340 
This Article’s reading of “recess” fits well with Living Originalism.  
The starting point for the analysis is interpretation of the text:  the 
original meaning of “recess” was broad, encompassing any legislative 
break.  The word’s generality indicates that it is used to establish a 
standard rather than a rule.  When the Constitution invokes a stand-
ard or principle rather than establishes a hard rule, it implicitly dele-
gates interpretation to future generations.341  In the case of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, a portion of the delegation is unusually explic-
it.  The Constitution gives the Senate authority over the rules of its 
proceedings, and those rules likely include the meaning of Senate re-
cesses. 
But it is also reasonable to hold that the President must have a 
role in interpreting “recess,” for it is primarily the President whose 
constitutional duties are at stake in ensuring that the federal govern-
ment is staffed adequately.  On this view, the President is at risk of 
failing to meet executive-branch obligations if the Senate has com-
plete control over the concept of an appointment-enabling recess.  At 
a minimum, if the Senate is unavailable as a practical matter, then it 
 
336 Id. at 412–28. 
337  Id. at 3. 
338 See id. at 3 (labeling his position as “framework originalism”). 
339 Id. at 22, 3307; see also id. at 275–78 (“Constitutions are designed to create political institu-
tions and to set up the basic elements of future political decisionmaking.  Their basic job 
is not to prevent future decision-making but to enable it.  The job of a constitution, in 
short, is to make politics possible.”). 
340 Id. at 479–80 (“Thus, choosing a standard or principle normally means that adopters are 
delegating the task of application to later generations.”); id. at 162 (“And where the text 
offers an abstract standard or principle, we must try to determine what principles under-
lie the text in order to build constructions that are consistent with it.”). 
341 Id. at 165–66 (“Indeed, the fact that adopters chose text that features general and abstract 
concepts is normally the best evidence that they sought to embody general and abstract 
principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be worked out and im-
plemented by later generations.”). 
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cannot correct any mistakes or oversights it might have made.  Some 
of the executive obligations at issue are tightly linked to some of the 
most critical motivations for establishing a “more perfect Union.”342  
Article IV mandates that “[t]he United States . . . shall protect [each 
state] against Invasion” and upon request, “against domestic vio-
lence.”343  These obligations might arise urgently at the onset of a 
short break that the Senate did not contemplate as an appointment-
enabling recess, such as a weekend.  They might also require execu-
tive-branch appointments.  It is reasonable under these circumstances 
for the President to note that the Senate break is within the defini-
tion of the relevant constitutional text, “recess;” consider the princi-
ples underlying the Recess Appointments Clause, principally the im-
portance of ensuring that the President can meet federal obligations 
when the Senate is not available and permitting the Senate to take 
breaks without disrupting the federal government’s functioning, as 
well as the backdrop of constitutional obligations such as defending 
the states;344 and conclude that the Senate break qualifies as an ap-
pointment-enabling recess under the Constitution.  This is the meth-
od of “text and principle” in action. 
To a lesser extent, the courts might also have a role in building 
out the Clause, as arbiters of intractable conflict between the other 
branches or as guardians of the text’s outer boundaries, ensuring that 
neither political branch stretches the text beyond plausibility.  This 
vision, in which the Constitution establishes a basic framework that 
future actors, largely the political branches, will build upon and im-
plement by appealing to principles underlying the text, is a good il-
lustration of Living Originalism. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that, to the Living Originalist, adherents 
to the technical position are actually engaging in Living Originalism.  
The technical position is based principally on a narrative about origi-
nal expected application.  It is also based on a principle that its pro-
ponents argue is embedded in the Clause—ensuring maximal Senate 
participation in appointments.  The appeal to principle plainly meets 
Living Originalism’s method of “text and principle.” 
To the Living Originalist, original expected application is a tool of 
construction that might help us understand original meaning of text 
 
342 U.S. CONST. preamble. 
343 Id. at art. IV, § 4. 
344 Cf. BALKIN, supra note 292, at 3310 (“Because the Constitution as a whole is a plan for 
politics, we do not look at a particular text or clause in isolation but try to view the Consti-
tution holistically, as a coherent project of governance—or one that at least strives for co-
herence.”). 
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or the principles underlying it.  But the inquiry into original expecta-
tions should not be confused with an inquiry into original meaning; 
nor should original expectations be viewed as binding.  What is bind-
ing is the text itself, and here the text is far more general than the 
technical position holds.  Indeed, it is the very generality of the word 
“recess” that enables appeals to original expected application. 
In other words, Living Originalism is the most descriptively accu-
rate of the originalist theories.  It aptly characterizes the bulk of anal-
ysis of the Recess Appointments Clause, with the curious exception of 
the Noel Canning majority’s ten-day and three-day minimum durations 
of recesses. 
E.  Judicial Construction and Recess 
Although interpretation does not yield a limit on the meaning of 
“recess,” it also does not rule out the possibility that some limit might 
have existed (aside from the technical position) or that some limit is 
advisable.  One common concern with an ordinary, general meaning 
of “recess” is that the President could use broad recess appointment 
power to circumvent the Senate by making an appointment during 
an overnight or weekend break.  Perhaps, then, appointment-
enabling recesses have (or should have) a minimum duration.  The 
evidence on original intent or expectations does not support that 
conclusion; however compelling the possibility of presidential abuse 
might seem to modern observers, we have no evidence that the 
Framers’ shared it, and we have some reason to believe they did not.  
The Framers appear to have expected public officials to act with 
more “decorum” than some recent Presidents and senators have 
shown,345 and they expected the Senate to confirm presidential nomi-
nees in all but extraordinary cases.346  That belief would obviate the 
need to prevent the President from abusing the recess appointment 
power.  But this evidence on original expectations does not rule out 
the possibility of limits on the word recess, and one might choose to 
engage in construction to derive one.  Below, this Article first consid-
ers whether a limiting construction is necessary or advisable, then ex-
amines possible constructions. 
 
345 Cf. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 134 (questioning by Iredell, asking, “[s]uppose a man 
nominated by the President; with what face would any senator object to him without a 
good reason? There must be some decorum in every public body.”). 
346 See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
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1.  The Need for Constructions of Recess 
The principal policy concern driving narrower interpretations of 
“recess” is that, under broader readings, the President might abuse 
the appointment power and circumvent the Senate by making ap-
pointments during any break, however short or insignificant.  Attor-
ney General Knox first raised this concern in 1901, suggesting that to 
permit intra-session recess appointments would be to permit unilat-
eral appointments over a mere weekend.347  In more recent years, 
some have come to believe that abuses have rendered the Clause a 
source of intractable conflict between the President and the Senate 
that requires resolution by the courts. 
Before the courts attempt to remedy these problems with a limit-
ing construction of “recess,” it is worth investigating the need more 
thoroughly.  The record suggests that the concern regarding presi-
dential abuse may be overblown, and the President and the Senate 
are negotiating the Clause’s application reasonably well.  This is par-
ticularly true if one considers the Senate majority, the relevant Senate 
body for purposes of the Clause, rather than the minority.  There is 
good reason to do so.  Under Senate rules, a simple majority of sena-
tors control the decision to adjourn, and therefore a simple majority 
can choose to enable or block recess appointments by deciding 
whether and how to adjourn.348  Moreover, the Senate recently 
changed its rules to eliminate filibusters of all nominees except those 
to the Supreme Court,349 meaning that the Senate itself has chosen 
simple majority rule for nearly all appointments.  A future Senate ma-
jority will likely adopt the same rule for Supreme Court nominees as 
soon as one is filibustered.  This shift to simple-majority voting on 
nominees may end the problem of controversial recess appointments, 
for the principal reason Presidents made them was to circumvent ob-
struction by minority-party senators. 
Even if not for the Senate rule change, the record shows little 
cause for concern over presidential abuse; nor does it suggest that 
conflict over the Clause between the political branches is intractable, 
requiring a judicial reponse.  Since 1979, when intra-session recess 
 
347 See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603. 
348 See Arkush, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“Senate rules, in turn, place power to initiate recesses in 
the hands of a simple majority. . . .  The upshot of these rules is that a simple majority of 
senators can initiate a recess, intersession or intrasession, at any time.”). 
349 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-
limit-use-of-filibuster.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar
&_r=0. 
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appointments began their sharp rise, no President has made one dur-
ing a recess of fewer than ten days.350  Apparently, then, there is little 
reason to fear weekend or overnight appointments.  One possible ex-
ception, of course, is President Obama’s 2012 decision to make ap-
pointments during a break that ranged from three days to several 
weeks, depending how one defines “recess.”351  But Obama’s ap-
pointments appear to have had Senate majority support,352 which 
sharply diminishes the constitutional or democratic concerns that 
they might raise. 
Indeed, majority support for recess appointments is the norm.  
Since 1979, Presidents have made 231 intra-session recess appoint-
ments when their allies controlled the Senate and 109 when the op-
position did.353  Of the 109 appointments made during opposition-
controlled senates, of course, only a small fraction were controversial.  
The vast majority of President George W. Bush’s and all of President 
Obama’s intra-session recess appointments had Senate majority sup-
port.354  Bush made fourteen intra-session recess appointments in 
2001 and 2002, when Democrats controlled the Senate.  When Re-
publicans gained control, he doubled his pace, with 118 appoint-
ments from 2003 to 2006, an average of nearly thirty each year.355  But 
when Democrats regained control of the Senate, Bush made just four 
 
350 For the years 1981–2013, see HENRY B. HOGUE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7 (2013).  The shortest interses-
sion recess during which a President made appointments was eleven days.  See id.  For the 
year 1979, see Brief for the Petitioner at 31a, Noel Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1281 (U.S. 
Sept. 13, 2013) (listing appointments and dates) and CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra 
note 10, at 531–38 (listing dates of intra-session recesses). 
351 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 350, at 64a (listing the appointees and dates of ap-
pointment). 
352 See Arkush, supra note 2, at 2–3 (“It is uncontroversial that the Senate majority has gener-
ally supported the President's nominees, and the most plausible inference is that the ma-
jority also supported his recess appointments.”). 
353 Except where otherwise noted, the source for this section’s facts on intra-session recess 
appointments is data on file with the author.  The data was compiled by combining in-
formation from HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE NOEL 
CANNING DECISION AND RECESS APPOINTMENTS MADE FROM 1981–2013 (2013); Brief for 
the Petitioner, supra note 350, and U.S. Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, 
SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/party
div.htm. 
354 Obama made twenty-two intra-session recess appointments in 2010 and four in 2012.  Da-
ta on file with author. 
355 President George W. Bush made multiple controversial intra-session appointments dur-
ing the first three-quarters of his presidency.  See HOGUE, supra note 350, at 10 (noting 
appointments of William H. Pryor and Charles W. Pickering to United States Courts of 
Appeals); Jim VandeHei & Colum Lynch, Bush Names Bolton U.N. Ambassador in Recess Ap-
pointment, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080100436.html. 
242 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
more intra-session recess appointments before the new majority at-
tempted to stop him by holding “pro forma” sessions in which a sin-
gle senator gavels the Senate in and out of session once every three 
days.356  The gambit worked.  Rather than test whether the Senate 
could lawfully use pro forma sessions to block recess appointments, 
Bush declined to make any more.357  This episode arguably ended the 
practice of making recess appointments over Senate majority opposi-
tion.  In that case, the worst practice regarding intra-session recess 
appointments—making controversial appointments over Senate-
majority opposition—arose under President H. W. Bush in 1991 and 
disappeared by 2007.358 
In summary, the Senate has been well on its way toward ending 
the recess appointments controversy since late 2013, when it adopted 
simple-majority voting for nominations.  Even before then, the most 
controversial type of recess appointments ceased in 2007, possibly 
never to resume.  In 2007, the Senate majority and the President set a 
precedent that the Senate majority can hold pro forma sessions to 
block intra-session recess appointments that it opposes.  No President 
has tested that limit.  Although President Obama made appointments 
during a recess between pro forma sessions in 2012, the Senate ma-
jority shared his political party and appears to have supported his ap-
pointees.  The pro forma sessions were not chosen by the Senate ma-
jority, but rather forced by the House.  If all that remained of the in-
intra-session recess appointment controversy was a practice of making 
appointments to circumvent obstruction by the Senate minority—or 
for that matter, by the House of Representatives, as in the case of the 
2012 appointments—then it is not clear that the practice would pre-
sent significant constitutional or democratic concerns.  More likely, 
 
356 See HOGUE, supra note 350, at 11. 
357 See id. 
358 All of Carter and Ronald Reagan’s “controversial” intra-session appointments were made 
when the Senate shared their respective political parties.  Reagan made three intra-
session appointments in 1988, but they do not appear to have been controversial.  Presi-
dent H. W. Bush began making controversial appointments over a Democratic Senate ma-
jority in 1991, with an appointment to the Legal Services Corporation.  See Carrier, supra 
note 108, at 2215–16 (“Both the Ashley appointment and the Legal Services Corporation 
controversy[, which resulted from his making eleven recess appointments] suggest that 
Bush's legal advisers viewed the clause as an offensive weapon in tilting the balance of 
power between the President and the Senate—by evading Senate confirmation proce-
dures – rather than as a supplement to the general appointment power – in filling  vacan-
cies when the Senate could not provide its confirmation.”).  He continued making such 
appointments throughout his term, including some just before he left office.  Id. at 2204–
05 (discussing the recess appointments he made two weeks before leaving office). 
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even less remains, as the Senate has changed its rules to permit sim-
ple majority approval for most appointments. 
2.  Constructions of Recess 
The preceding discussion suggests that there is probably no need 
for the courts to adopt limiting constructions of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause.  But for one who perceives a need to limit the meaning 
of “recess” in some manner, this Subpart offers four reasonable an-
swers.  The first two adhere closely to the interpretive evidence, while 
the latter two engage more extensively in construction. 
a.  Senate Control 
First, one could hold that the Senate has authority under the 
Rules of Proceedings Clause to define with binding force the terms 
“recess” and “session,” so long as it stays within the broad boundaries 
of the ordinary meanings of the words.  Under this theory, the Senate 
could protect itself from presidential abuse.  A shortcoming, of 
course, is that the President would have no relief from Senate ob-
struction, aside from a judicial decision that the Senate has violated 
the separation of powers or exceeded the boundaries of what “recess” 
could possibly mean. 
 Additionally, one must answer how the Senate adopts its views as a 
procedural matter.  Must it make an official, affirmative statement, 
explicitly defining them in rules or a resolution, or can it refine the 
meaning of “recess” and “session” implicitly through practice?  If the 
former, then the Senate appears not to have defined the words.  If 
the latter, then one could argue that the Senate has accepted that 
“recess” includes intra-session breaks, as it has recognized intra-
session recess appointments as valid for decades.  One could also ar-
gue that the Senate has drawn a lower boundary for the duration of 
appointment-enabling recesses.  They must be longer than three 
days, at least when the Senate majority is exercising its prerogative to 
control its recesses.  This rule is derived from the Senate’s 2007–2008 
practice of holding pro forma sessions to block appointments.  The 
Senate majority plainly did not want the President to make appoint-
ments during the recesses between pro forma sessions at that time.359  
 
359 See supra text accompanying notes 356–57.  Note, however, that the pro forma sessions at 
issue in Noel Canning are a special case because the Senate majority did not want to hold 
them.  Rather, the House of Representatives refused the Senate permission to adjourn for 
more than three days, and as a result the Senate majority believed it had no choice but to 
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Less clear is whether the Senate believed that recesses must be longer 
than three days as a matter of law, merely hoped that a court would 
adopt that position, or expected its pro forma sessions to have more 
political than legal impact.  Under the “Senate control” view, the 
Senate simply has the power to make the relevant law. 
  b.  Ordinary Meaning Plus Politics   
 Under a second theory, one could hold that “recess” retains its 
broad, ordinary meaning and that the President’s and the Senate’s 
actions under the Clause are limited primarily, if not exclusively, by 
the political process.  At first glance, this position appears to be in 
tension with the Rules of Proceedings Clause.  But one can reconcile 
the two by holding that although the Senate can define “recess” and 
“session” for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, its deci-
sions are not judicially enforceable.  Under this view, the Senate has 
interpretive authority, but it is political rather than legal.  Another 
possibility is to hold that the joint nature of appointment power re-
 
hold pro forma sessions if senators wished to go home for the holidays.  See Arkush, supra 
note 2, at 2–3, 6–7 (discussing whether the House has authority to block recess appoint-
ments and the fact that the Senate felt forced to hold pro forma sessions as a result of the 
House’s actions).  One could argue that, having established a practice that the breaks be-
tween pro forma sessions do not constitute “recesses,” the President and Senate majority 
were bound by that practice in 2012.  But the result would be perverse:  a holding, justi-
fied by the Senate’s control over its own proceedings, that pro forma sessions forced by 
the House dictate whether the Senate is in recess. 
   Moreover, the House’s actions were probably unconstitutional.  See Arkush, supra 
note 2, at 6–7 (discussing “reasons to doubt that” the House has authority “to block recess 
appointments”).  It purported to act under the Adjournments Clause, which affirmatively 
grants each house the ability to block the other from adjourning for more than three 
days.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, 
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other 
Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”).  But it is unlikely this power 
extends to interference with appointments.  Article II clearly assigns appointment power 
to the President and the Senate.  It grants the House a single role:  the ability to join the 
Senate in passing legislation that authorizes the President to make unilateral appoint-
ments of inferior officers.  Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in 
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).  It is unlikely that the Adjourn-
ments Clause operates as a back-door means for the House to interfere in matters as-
signed to other branches.  Moreover, the Adjournments Clause operates “during the ses-
sion of Congress,” id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4, whereas the Recess Appointments Clause turns on 
Senate sessions and recesses.  Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The  President  shall  have  Power  to  
fill  up  all  Vacancies  that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Com-
missions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”) (emphases added).  It makes 
sense for the Adjournments Clause to operate when the two houses of Congress have 
joint business, “the session of Congress,” but not with respect to the Senate’s own busi-
ness. 
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quires recognizing a limited exception to the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause and permitting the President some role in deciding when the 
Senate is in recess.360  In either case, politics remains the primary limi-
tation on the Clause so long as the courts largely leave controversies 
over recess appointments to the political branches. 
 c.  A “Work Periods” View   
A third possibility is that the Clause embodies a concept of recess 
that is narrower than “any break” but still much broader than the 
technical position.  The best candidate is the break between what the 
modern Senate refers to colloquially as “work periods.”361  A work pe-
riod is any period of legislative business between a break of one or 
more weeks.  The Senate in fact calls these breaks “recesses,” often 
using more specific names like “the Easter recess”362 or “the August 
recess.”363 
Recall that, in the ratification era, New Jersey and Massachusetts 
used different nomenclature for the same underlying concepts.  New 
Jersey called each period of legislative business a “sitting,” while Mas-
sachusetts called it a “session.”  To someone drawing distinctions be-
tween recesses based on official sessions, an identical recess would 
have been “intra-session” in the former and “inter-session” in the lat-
ter.  This arbitrary variation is why the Framers did not likely make 
“recess” turn on official Senate sessions, particularly without defining 
that term or prescribing Senate practice.  More likely is that the 
Framers had in mind a general concept that encompassed the breaks 
between New Jersey “sittings” and Massachusetts “sessions.”  That 
concept, in colloquial Senate parlance, is the recess between work pe-
riods.  It is characterized by senators taking a break from the ordinary 
 
360 This is a variation on the President’s Noel Canning argument. 
361 See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S7563 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 2013) (statement of Sen. Maj. Leader 
Harry Reid, Upcoming Work Period), (“This work period is going to be 4 weeks long.  We 
have a great deal to accomplish during this 4-week period and it will go by quickly . . . .  
During this next work period, the only time we will have off will be November 11 for the 
celebration of Veterans Day.  Therefore, if we are going to finish our work in this 4-week 
period, that means we are going to have to work on Mondays and Fridays.  I hope we 
don’t have to work weekends, but we have to get this work done.”). 
362 See, e.g., Erik Wasson & Bernie Becker, Senate Democrats Strain to Get Budget Over Finish Line 
by Easter Recess, THE HILL (Mar. 11, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/
budget/287237-senate-dems-straining-to-get-first-budget-in-four-years-over-finish-line. 
363 See, e.g., Ramsey Cox, Durbin Releases 2013 Senate Calendar, THE HILL (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/270365-durbin-releases-2013-senate-
calendar (“The August recess will last for slightly more than a month, going from Aug. 5 
to Sept. 6, 2013.”). 
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course of legislative business practice and leaving town for some pe-
riod of time—a sensible trigger for recess powers.  Indeed, the tech-
nical, “inter-session” position has been justified largely by the narra-
tive that the Framers thought inter-session recesses were the only 
significant breaks that Congress would take.364  But the record pro-
vides little basis to conclude that the Framers held or implemented 
that view.365  A less ambitious and more plausible assumption about 
the Framers’ expectations, if one chooses to speculate about them, is 
that they meant to confine recess appointments to breaks of some 
significance, when legislators may be unavailable because they are not 
in the midst of a work period, without claiming that the Framers pre-
dicted exactly what form those breaks would take.  The “work peri-
ods” view would preclude recess appointments on nights or week-
ends.  Rather, the appointment power would be triggered when the 
Senate takes a recess from a general period of business. 
To the extent one is motivated by the Senate’s authority to define 
its sessions and recesses, or by historical precedent, then it is note-
worthy that the work period concept of “recess” is consistent with 
what the contemporary Senate calls recesses, as well as its practice of 
accepting appointments during intra-session recesses in the Johnson 
Administration and from the Truman Administration to the present.  
It is also consistent with Attorney General Wirt’s 1823 intuition that 
appointments should not be made over a weekend,366 Attorney Gen-
eral Daugherty’s 1921 view that an appointment-enabling recess 
should likely be more than five to ten days long,367 and more contem-
porary views that perhaps a recess must be longer than three days.368  
Indeed, the work period view is also consistent with the Senate’s at-
tempts to use pro forma sessions to block appointments in 2007 and 
2008.  The three-day break between pro forma sessions is shorter 
than the typical recess between work periods.  It comes closer to ap-
proximating a weekend, which in the Senate often spans three or 
four days rather than two.369  For all of these reasons, the work period 
view may be the longstanding consensus position on “recess” dating 
 
364 See supra text accompanying notes 188–91. 
365 See supra text accompanying notes 199–204. 
366 See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603. 
367 See supra text accompanying notes 110–11. 
368 See supra text accompanying note 177. 
369 It is common for the Senate not to work on Monday, Friday, or both.  See, e.g., Days in Ses-
sion Calendars, 113th Congress 1st Session, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/ds/h1131.html (showing the days that the Senate is in session during the 
2013 calendar year, which often excludes many Mondays and Fridays). 
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back to the Framers themselves, even though it has never been pre-
cisely articulated. 
The work period view satisfies the Recess Appointments Clause’s 
pragmatic purposes better than the technical position, providing a 
means for the President to make appointments when the Senate is 
away and for the Senate to leave Washington more frequently without 
needing to return to consider nominees.  As a result, it also better sat-
isfies specific values that likely motivated the Framers, such as the 
need for military responsiveness.  Under the work periods view, if the 
President needs to make emergency appointments in response to the 
attack on the country while the Senate is away on a long “intra-
session” recess, the appointments would have been constitutional.  By 
contrast, under the technical position, the appointments would have 
been unconstitutional, leaving the President unable to fulfill one of 
the federal government’s principal purposes and leaving the nation 
at risk.  
Note that under the work periods view, if one holds that “recesses” 
and “sessions” are mutually exclusive, then a recess appointment 
would expire at the end of the Senate’s next work period.  The typi-
cal recess appointment would last roughly four to eight weeks.  This 
arrangement might sound implausible initially.  But recall that from 
the founding until recent years, the Senate was expected to confirm 
most nominees.  If one holds that view, and the Framers appear to 
have held it,370 then short terms for recess appointees present little 
problem, for the Senate can simply confirm them during its next 
work period.  In the rare case, it might reject one.  But if one pre-
sumes that the Senate will reject an appointee only for good cause, 
then it is all the better for the appointee to have had a short term.  
However, it is not obvious that “recess” and “session” are mutually ex-
clusive, and Senate practice does not treat them that way.  The Senate 
has accepted appointments made during “intra-session” recesses but 
adhered to the common understanding that the terms of appointees 
last until the end of the Senate’s next formal session. 
 
d.  Work Periods Plus  
A final construction would supplement the “work periods” view 
with allowances for practical necessity.  Under this theory, a legislative 
break would constitute a “recess” if it falls between Senate work peri-
ods or if the Senate is actually unavailable and the President needs to 
 
370 See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
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make appointments urgently.  To give the most extreme example, if 
the Senate merely stepped out for lunch and downtown Washington 
was annihilated by a nuclear attack, the President could make recess 
appointments to replace important officers quickly rather than wait 
for the Senate to be reconstituted and to consider nominations.  This 
construction best serves the main principle underlying the Clause—
ensuring that Senate unavailability does not unduly hamper the fed-
eral government’s ability to meet its constitutional obligations. 
V.  NOEL CANNING, ORIGINALISMS, AND THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
CLAUSE 
A.  Noel Canning and Originalism 
The role of originalism in the majority and concurrence is in 
some ways precisely what one would expect, given the author of each 
opinion:  Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion makes a point of 
asserting that precedent and tradition can trump original meaning, 
while Justice Scalia’s dissent-like concurrence stridently claims to 
adehere to original meaning.  What is perhaps surprising is that de-
spite its disclaimer regarding the authority of original meaning, the 
majority comes much closer than the concurrence to respecting the 
original meaning of “recess,” and likely “happen” as well.  The major-
ity opinion largely reads the Clause correctly.  But its argument would 
perhaps be stronger if it were more firmly grounded in Living 
Originalism—in “text and principle” rather than what we might call 
an ad hoc mixture of precedent, pragmatism, and deference to poli-
tics. 
The majority comes much closer than the concurrence to respect-
ing the original meaning of “recess” because, despite its point regard-
ing precedent and tradition, it takes care to ensure that its analysis 
falls within the bounds of the text.371  It recognizes that the meaning 
of “recess” is broad and that it does not rule out any particular type of 
break.372  Beyond this point, the majority opinion uses multiple analyt-
ic tools—precedent, purpose, pragmatism, and deference to politics.  
It relies on precedent, purpose, and deference to the political 
branches in establishing a ten-day presumptive minimum for recesses, 
noting that limiting the Clause to inter-session recesses would “frus-
trate its purpose” and citing apparently “settled practice” of the polit-
 
371 NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 26, 2014). 
372 Id. at 21 (“[W]e conclude that the phrase ‘the recess’ applies to both intra-session and 
inter-session recesses.”). 
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ical branches accepting intra-session recess appointments.373  It also 
reasons that because no President has ever made an appointment 
during a recess shorter than ten days, appointments “[are] not need-
ed in that context.”374  The majority then notes an exception to the 
ten-day mimimum for “very unusual circumstance[s]” such as a “na-
tional catastrophe,”375 apparently as a pragmatic means to ensure that 
the federal government can meet its responsibilities even during un-
precedentedly short and (therefore presumptively non-qualifying) 
recesses.  Finally, the majority announces a three-day, hard floor on 
qualifying recesses, holding that a three-day recess is constitutionally 
de minimis.376  It appears to justify this conclusion in part by deference 
to the political branches—the Solicitor General conceded that three 
days was too short377—but also by a loose analogy to the Adjourn-
ments Clause, which states that either house of Congress must obtain 
the other’s consent before adjourning for more than three days.378  
Implicit in the absence of any exception to the three-day floor is a 
pragmatic judgment that the President should not need to make re-
cess appointments during so short a break. 
Some aspects of the majority opinion could be characterized as 
Living Originalist.  Its analysis of the recess questions begins with text 
and purpose.  It observes that the phrase “the recess” was used in the 
ratification era to signify intra-session as well as inter-session recess-
es,379 and it also notes that the principle underlying the text—allowing 
unilateral appointments “so that the President can ensure the con-
tinued functioning of the Federal Government when the Senate is 
away”380 applies to both inter and intra-session recesses.  The majori-
ty’s analysis of “happen” is largely Living Originalist as well.  It notes 
that the text supports either reading of the word, even though the 
“arise” reading is more natural,381 and it reasons that the narrow read-
 
373 Id. at 16. 
374 Id. at 20. 
375 Id. at 21. 
376 Id. at 20 (“The Adjournments Clause reflects the fact that a 3-day break is not a significant 
interruption of legislative business.  As the Solicitor General says, it is constitutionally de 
minimis.”). 
377 Id. at 19–20 (“As the Solicitor General says, it is constitutionally de minimis.”). 
378 Id. (“The Adjournments Clause reflects the fact that a 3-day break is not a significant in-
terruption of legislative business.”).   
379 Id. at 9–10 (“The Founders themselves used the word [recess] to refer to intra-session, as 
well as to  inter-session, breaks.”). 
380 Id. at 11. 
381 Id. at 22 (“We believe that the Clause’s language, read literally, permits, though it does  
not naturally favor, our broader interpretation. We concede that the most natural mean-
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ing of the word happen could do more to damage to the Clause’s 
purpose by preventing the President from making appointments, “no 
matter how dire the need,” “how uncontroversial the appointment,” 
or “how late in the session the office fell vacant.”382  It also notes that 
its reading is consistent with longstanding historical practice and the 
apparent agreement of the policital branches.383 
By contrast, the latter aspects of the majority opinion on “re-
cess”—the ten-day presumptive minimum, the pragmatic exception 
to that presumption, and the absolute three-day floor—are driven by 
an assortment of analytic tools and rationales.  In each case, the ma-
jority’s argument or conclusion could be improved by the application 
of Living Originalist method.  First, there are Living Originalist 
grounds on which to support the majority’s ten-day minimum and 
the pragmatic exception to it.  Historical evidence and the principles 
underlying the Clause suggest that what fits best with the constitu-
tional framework, and what the Framers likely expected, is that the 
Clause would typically enable unilateral appointments during Senate 
breaks of some significance (a concept similar to what the majority 
calls recesses of “substantial length”).384  The most obvious candidate 
for a break of significance is what this Article has identified as the 
break between “work periods,” a concept that embraces both inter-
session and intra-session recesses of significance at the time of the 
framing and that corresponds roughly to a minimum of ten days, as 
well as to what the Senate refers to as recesses.385  Indeed, the likely 
reason why this definition corresponds almost perfectly to the ten-day 
minimum that the Noel Canning majority derives from political-
branch precendent is that the modern Senate and the President have 
been implicitly following the “work period” view.  In fact, the same 
was probably true at the time of President Andrew Johnson’s ap-
pointments. 
The majority is right to sense that the Clause’s broad text and its 
underlying principles are in tension with forbidding unilateral ap-
pointments during any break when they are genuinely needed and 
the Senate is unavailable, even if the break in question does not fit 
typical expectations for appointment-enabling recesses.  For this rea-
 
ing of “happens” as applied to a “vacancy” (at least to a modern ear) is that the vacancy 
“happens” when it initially occurs.”). 
382 Id. at 26. 
383 Id. at 26–33 (discussing the practices of George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas 
Jefferson and the lack of Senate hostility to presidential appointments). 
384 Cf. id. at 9 (“All agree that the phrase ‘the recess of the Senate’ covers intersession recess-
es.”). 
385 See supra text accompanying notes 361–63. 
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son, the majority’s exception for “unusual circumstances” is amply 
justified by text and principle.  For the same reason, the same cannot 
be said for its absolute three-day floor.  The text is broader; as the ma-
jority recognizes, ratification-era dictionaries “define the word ‘re-
cess’ much as we do today, simply as ‘a period of cessation from usual 
work.’”386  And the reasoning behind the “unusual circumstances” ex-
ception applies to three-day breaks as well as three to nine-day breaks.  
The drafters and ratifiers did not establish a minimum duration of 
recesses, and any such limit runs the risk of subverting the Clause’s 
core purpose in a time of grave national need. 
Despite claiming to follow original meaning, the concurrence’s 
analysis is deeply flawed, as it largely mirrors the incomplete and mis-
taken originalist scholarship that this Article discusses.  Like that 
scholarship, the concurrence engages in construction (rather than 
interpretation) to reach a definition of “recess” that is narrower than 
the word’s original public meaning.  The concurrence supports its 
construction mainly by appeals to original expectations and the prin-
ciples underlying the text, but these arguments are unpersuasive be-
cause they have weak evidentiary support:  the concurrence relies on 
the counter-factual inter-session expectations narrative387 and ignores 
important expected applications such as prompt and effective federal 
military responses to foreign invasion and domestic rebellion.388  It al-
so credits a strained and unpersuasive attempt to dismiss evidence 
that legal actors around the time of the Andrew Johnson Administra-
tion were not concerned about the intra-session nature of many of his 
recess appointments.389 
The concurrence’s discussion of “happen” is similarly flawed.  It 
ignores contrary evidence from ratification-era dictionaries and us-
age, even stating that “no reasonable reader” would have understood 
“happen” in the “exist” sense,390 despite that Thomas Jefferson used 
the word that way.391 It also relies credulously on constructions by ear-
 
386 Noel Canning, slip op. at 9. 
387 See id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In the founding era, the terms ‘recess’ and ‘session’ 
had well-understood meanings in the marking out of legislative time. . . .  By contrast, 
other provisions of the Constitution use the verb ‘adjourn’ rather than ‘recess’ to refer to 
the commencement of breaks during a formal legislative session.”).  
388 See supra text accompanying notes 208–15. 
389 See Noel Canning, slip op. at 17–18 (Scalia, J. concurring) (finding that “the precise nature 
and historical understanding of many of [the Johnson] appointments is subject to de-
bate”). 
390 Id. at 28.  
391 See id. at 22 (majority opinion) (“Jefferson used the phrase in the [exist] sense when he 
wrote to a job seeker that a particular position was unavailable . . . .”); supra text accom-
panying note 248. 
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ly legal actors who appear to have been politically motivated, like 
Edmund Randolph.392  And it invokes a partial and flawed account of 
the principles and original expectations underlying the Clause, em-
phasizing the need to prevent the President from side-stepping the 
Senate393 while giving short shrift to the Clause’s primary purpose of 
ensuring that the federal government fulfill its functions and failing 
to credit evidence that the Framers expected both branches to act 
reasonably.394  Instead of citing evidence, the concurrence merely 
states that it is “unthinkable” that ratifiers would have overlooked the 
perils of a permissive appointment policy.395 
B.  Originalisms and the Analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause 
It is common among many originalists that the meaning of most 
constitutional text, and particularly the “structural constitution,” can 
be ascertained as a matter of objective fact.396  The sharp disagree-
ment between this Article’s and other originalist analyses poses a 
challenge to claims regarding objectivity in originalist interpretation.  
One response, of course, is that everyone makes mistakes, and that as 
a result we can expect to observe occasional disagreement even on 
matters of objective fact.  That response is surely correct.  But here, 
regarding the word “recess,” if not “happen,” one view has far more 
substantial grounding in textual evidence, the principles and purpos-
es underlying the Recess Appointments Clause, and likely even the 
original expectations of the Framers.  If “recess” has an objective 
meaning, then the technical position is mistaken.  Even if one disa-
grees with that view, it remains that proponents of the technical posi-
tion—whose ranks include prominent originalists—have failed to 
consider or respond to some of the most important evidence and ar-
 
392 See Noel Canning, slip op. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring) (approvingly citing Randolph and 
stating that he “provided the Executive Branch’s first formal interpretation of the 
Clause”). 
393 Id. at 29 (arguing that under the majority’s view, “[w]henever there was a fair prospect of 
the Senate’s rejecting his preferred nominee, the President could have appointed that 
individual unilaterally during the recess, allowed the appointment to expire at the end of 
the next session, renewed the appointment the following day, and so on ad infinitum” and 
that [i]t is unthinkable that such an obvious means for the Executive to expand its power 
would have been overlooked during the ratification debates”). 
394 See id. (assuming that the Senate and President would be in conflict); see also id. at 34–35. 
395 Id. at 29 (“It is unthinkable that such an obvious means for the Executive to expand its 
power would have been overlooked during the ratification debates.”). 
396 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 276, at 530 (“As I understand the position of the New Original-
ists (and I count myself as among them), most of the provisions of the Constitution are 
structural and have clear original meanings . . . .”). 
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gument.  What is one to make of these lapses?  This Subpart offers 
two initial suggestions. 
1. The Difficulty of Establishing Narrow or Specialized Original 
Meanings 
First is a simple but potentially useful point that appears to be un-
derappreciated:  it is difficult to establish a specialized original mean-
ing of a general term.  One cannot establish it with a handful of us-
age examples, as has been attempted with the technical position on 
“recess.”  Those examples do not rule out other possible uses.  Ra-
ther, to support a narrow meaning of a general term through usage 
examples, one must find an overwhelming number of the particular 
uses and none (or virtually none) to the contrary.397  An illustration 
will help make this point:  imagine that one wishes to establish that 
“instrument” refers only to musical instruments.  One cannot accom-
plish the task simply by citing a few (or even many) examples in 
which “instrument” was used to refer to a musical instrument.  De-
spite these examples, the word also might have been used to refer to 
other objects that fall within the general word “instrument,” such as 
surgical equipment.  Conversely, just a few examples in which “in-
strument” refers to something other than a musical instrument will 
deeply undermine the claim of narrow meaning.  Better evidence, of 
course, would be a document that refers to many types of objects that 
are arguably “instruments” but uses that word to refer only to musical 
instruments.  A single document of this type might still be the result 
of chance; several examples would look convincing.  Better still, of 
course, would be texts that explicitly discuss when “instrument” is and 
is not apt, or ones that actually define it.  Aside from dictionaries, 
documents like these will be rare.  None of them exist to support the 
technical position on “recess.”  The closest—and it is not very close—
is the OED’s definition of “session,” which lists a technical meaning of 
that word, not “recess,” as a specific usage in English parliamentary 
practice.398  Even in that context, the OED notes that “session” is 
sometimes used more broadly.399  Had the difficulty of establishing 
specialized original meanings been more widely appreciated, then 
 
397 I do not take a position on the dispute between Randy Barnett and John Balkin regarding 
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, but Barnett’s work is a good example of 
attempting to undertake comprehensive research to establish a narrow meaning.  See 
Barnett, supra note 3, at 416 (detailing comprehensive research that he argues yields 
overwhelming support for a particular reading of “commerce”). 
398 See supra text accompanying notes 223–30. 
399 See id. 
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perhaps the technical position on “recess” would have gained less 
traction in the first place. 
2. Methods of Objective Inquiry—and Originalist Claims and 
Disclaimers 
Claims regarding the Constitution’s original meaning can have 
great force in contemporary legal analysis, as they purport to flow 
from the highest authority in a textualist legal culture and to be ob-
jective in nature.  This force no doubt helps explain why the tech-
nical position on “recess” gained influence so rapidly despite contra-
dicting a longstanding consensus among all three branches of 
government.  Not every claim about original meaning is given such a 
wide berth, of course, particularly not those that implicate complex 
and controversial questions of policy, political philosophy, ethics, or 
morality.400  Unlike those arguments, however, the technical position 
on “recess” involves a provision in which few people have an endur-
ing interest or stake.  Therefore, there is little reason to resist an ap-
parently authoritative account of the word’s original meaning. 
At the same time, originalist interpretation is not an easy task.  
There are countless sources one could (and arguably should) investi-
gate, many of which are not readily accessible or easy to search, and it 
is not always clear how to weigh them.  Few, if any, originalist ac-
counts will examine all potentially relevant evidence.  And despite 
claims of objectivity, as well as extensive research into the original 
meaning of particular language, disputes regarding original meaning 
are common.  To be sure, there are instances in which the original 
public meaning of constitutional text can be established objectively, 
so to speak.  There are standard examples, like that the President 
must be at least thirty-five years old.401  Indeed, in these cases, the 
text’s meaning is so plain that no inquiry is necessary to resolve it, 
and no one disputes its meaning.  Even prominent “living constitu-
tionalists” like David Strauss agree that we must follow the letter of 
these provisions.402  Beyond some core of text whose meaning we can 
readily treat as objective, whether due to the unanimous consent of 
all observers or some other means, originalists who seek objective an-
swers to disputed text would do well to adopt a set of standards or 
methods to assure quality, rigor, and thoroughness in their analyses.  
 
400 Cf. Barnett, supra note 3, at 420 (referring to his back-and-forth with Jack Balkin over the 
original meaning of “commerce”). 
401 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 292, at 56. 
402 See STRAUSS, supra note 3. 
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In other fields that seek objective answers, such as the “hard” sciences 
and social science, as well as in courts that attempt to establish facts, 
inquiries are guided by rules, standards, and methods geared to in-
crease quality and reliability. 
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to suggest methodological 
standards for originalist legal inquiry.  It is perhaps a good test for 
originalism whether any such standards can be developed.  If they 
cannot, then perhaps the notion of objectivity in original public 
meaning should be limited to those areas in which everyone can 
agree.  Even that metric is one of consensus rather than objectivity it-
self—a mere absence of dispute.  But this Article can suggest a mod-
est initial step:  originalist scholarship would benefit from a practice 
of providing a clear accounting of its scope and limitations.  To the 
extent possible, originalist researchers should identify potentially use-
ful sources that they did not examine and analyses that they do not 
conduct.  Judges and scholars should exercise caution before relying 
on originalist scholarship that does not provide this type of account-
ing.  Because of originalism’s special claim to authority, and the 
complexity of the enterprise, scholarly accounts of original meaning 
should be thorough.403  No less important, as few if any inquiries into 
original meaning can be complete, they should frankly acknowledge 
their limitations. 
Here, then, are this Article’s accounts of its evidence and its dis-
claimers.  Some are discussed above, but it is useful to collect them in 
a single place.  This Article is based on textual analysis of the Consti-
tution (the Recess Appointments Clause, the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause, the Senate Vacancy Clause, and the use of potentially relevant 
terms like “session” and “adjournment” elsewhere in the document), 
a survey of Johnson’s dictionaries and the OED, and a comprehensive 
examination of the usage of “recess,” as well as discussions of the Re-
cess Appointments Clause’s purpose to the extent they exist, in the 
records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification de-
bates, ratification-era state constitutions, and the Federalist Papers.  
The Article relies on a few other sources, such as the records of the 
House of Commons, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Jefferson’s Manual for 
the Senate, some personal correspondence of the Framers, and some 
records of the Pennsylvania Gazette, and certain ratification-era state 
 
403 Barnett has written that originalist research “should be as systematic and comprehensive 
as possible with respect to any source one surveys, reporting deviant as well as predomi-
nate usage.”  Barnett, supra note 3, at 416. 
256 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
statutes.  It does not rely on a systematic or thorough study of these 
latter sources. 
This Article also considers dictionary evidence on “session” and 
reads that word in the context of the Constitution and contempora-
neous state legislative usage, but it does not adopt a firm position on 
the word’s meaning.404  It also contemplates a provisional view on 
“happen”405 but does not rely on an in-depth study of that word.  Nor 
does it conduct a thorough study of other potentially relevant terms 
such as “adjourn,” “adjournment,” “intermission,” or “prorogation.”  
The Article does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause.  Finally, this Article does not offer a compre-
hensive view on the Noel Canning controversy.  To evaluate that case, 
one would need a more complete account of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause and should likely consider questions on which this Arti-
cle barely touches, such as the constitutionality of filibusters of presi-
dential nominees and House interference with the President’s and 
the Senate’s appointment powers. 
CONCLUSION:  ERASING THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE? 
The recent willingness to read the Recess Appointments Clause 
narrowly appears to stem from two factors:  a distaste for the presi-
dential practice of using recess appointments to avoid Senate confir-
mation and a sense that the Clause has become irrelevant in an era of 
rapid communication and travel.406  Neither of these contemporary 
notions should influence one’s assessment of the Clause’s original 
meaning. 
Presidents have typically used recess appointments to combat ob-
struction by Senate minorities, not majorities.407  Whatever the desira-
bility of that practice, it does not clearly present a constitutional prob-
lem, as filibusters of nominees may have no more constitutional basis 
than intra-session recess appointments.408  Most recently, the Presi-
 
404 This Article’s view is that a settled meaning of “session” would not compel any particular 
meaning of “recess,” see supra text accompanying notes 218–20, but one might argue to 
the contrary. 
405 See supra text accompanying notes 240–74. 
406 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 12 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“The Recess Appointments Clause therefore is, or rather, should be, an 
anachronism—‘essentially an historic relic, something whose original purpose has disap-
peared.’”(citation omitted)). 
407 See supra text accompanying notes 348–58. 
408 See, e.g., Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster:  The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 467, 480 (2011) (“[T]he sixty-vote supermajority requirement in Senate Rule 
XXII is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Constitution in seven ways.”). 
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dent used recess appointments to circumvent obstruction by the 
House of Representatives, which likely acted unconstitutionally when 
it attempted to interfere with appointments.409  Moreover, the Senate 
recently changed its rules to prevent most filibusters of nominees, 
which suggests that we may witness a sharp decline in the use of re-
cess appointments to avoid Senate obstruction.  When the Senate ma-
jority opposes the President’s nominees, it can reject them.  When it 
supports nominees, it can confirm them by simple majority vote, 
without interference by the minority.  In short, there is little reason to 
let the filibuster and presidential responses to it guide our view of the 
Recess Appointments Clause. 
The sense that the Clause is a needless anachronism requires 
more discussion.  The idea is that, in modern times, if the President 
needs to make an appointment and the Senate is away, he can simply 
ask it to return quickly.410  This is an unduly superficial take on the 
Clause.  Both of its generally accepted purposes—enabling to Presi-
dent to make appointments when the Senate is unavailable and per-
mitting the Senate to spend more time away from Washington—
remain relevant despite the relative ease of travel.  One can imagine 
circumstances in which the President needs to make appointments 
quickly and the Senate is not available, for example in the event of a 
military conflict or natural disaster.411  Indeed, if the Senate is ever 
away and unable to return quickly, it is more likely to be on an intra-
session than inter-session recess, as the former are much more com-
mon.  It would make little sense for the Constitution to bar the Presi-
dent from appointing replacements for officers killed by an enemy 
merely because an attack happens to have occurred during an intra-
session rather than inter-session recess.  Moreover, as communication 
and travel have hastened, so have world events that could give rise to 
a need for urgent appointments.  There is no reason to assume that 
the speed at which the President and Senate can respond to crises has 
outpaced the speed at which they emerge. 
 
409 See Arkush, supra note 2, at 6–7 (“The Constitution assigns virtually all authority over ap-
pointments to the President and the Senate . . . .”). 
410 Id. at 5 (“If the President needs to make an appointment and the Senate is out of town, 
the argument goes, he can call it back quickly.”). 
411 The Framers were certainly aware that an invasion or domestic rebellion might prevent 
legislatures from acting, at least in the case of state legislatures.  That is why they gave 
state executives, not just legislatures, the power to trigger federal aid in the Guarantee 
Clause.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 467 
(“Mr. Dickinson moved to insert the words, ‘or Executive’ after the words ‘application of 
its Legislature’—The occasion itself he remarked might hinder the Legislature from 
meeting.”). 
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Even when the Senate is available and the United States does not 
face an imminent threat of violence, recess appointments may serve a 
useful purpose.  Senators may simply wish to spend more uninter-
rupted time in their home states, as the Framers’ republican theory 
prescribes.412  Perhaps someday Gary Lawson’s, Randy Barnett’s, or 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s views of limited federal powers will prevail, 
and the Senate will choose to spend less time in Washington, holding 
brief semiannual or quarterly work periods with long intra-session re-
cesses between them.  Even if the Senate keeps with its current meet-
ing practices, there will still be times when it is simply inefficient to 
call one hundred senators back to Washington to confirm a nominee 
whom a majority of senators would gladly permit the President to ap-
point unilaterally.413 
As for the Clause’s original meaning, the ordinary tools of textual 
analysis strongly support a general reading of the word recess, and 
that reading is consistent with the Clause’s widely accepted purposes.  
By contrast, the technical position finds little support from the Con-
stitution’s text or contemporaneous usage.  It pencils in the word “in-
ter-session” to force the Clause to conform to a twenty-first-century 
narrative about the Framers’ expectations for Senate practice, and it 
transforms the Clause from a pragmatic tool for the President and 
the Senate to advance the national interest into, curiously, a bulwark 
against presidential usurpation.  In the process, it effectively reads the 
Recess Appointments Clause out of the Constitution.  By contrast, 
under a method that recognizes the text’s broad original meaning 
and adheres to its underlying principles, the Clause remains a rele-
vant and potentially valuable part of the constitutional framework. 
 
412 See supra note 80. 
413 Note that the view that the President can quickly call the Senate back to confirm a nomi-
nee implies that the Senate would grant consent quickly.  In that case, there is particular-
ly little value in barring the Senate from permitting a recess appointment. 
